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CHAIRMAN OLLIE SPERAW: We're about ready to start. We had a letter from 
Senator Diane Watson that said she would be attending. I was delaying to see if she 
would make it, but I know that everyone here to testify has a busy schedule and time 
is important, so we won't delay .any further. 
I am Senator Ollie Speraw, Chairman of the Select Committee on Anatomical Trans-
plants. With me is Senator Robert Presley. I might add that Senator Presley has been 
a supporter of this committee and carried the bill last year that changed the law so 
that coroners were able to authorize the release of eye tissue in the absence of dissent 
on the part of any next of kin, which was just a reversal of the role -- instead of 
having to obtain consent, if there wasn't any dissent there, they were able to release 
it. 
That bill, at this point in time, has accommodated about half of the people who 
were awaiting cornea transplants -- about 1,000 people. There was a waiting list of 
about 2,000 at that time. Hopefully, within the next few months, the entire backlog 
will be cleared up and all these people will have a normal quality of life restored. 
Of course, this means not only has joy been brought to their lives, but also to the 
lives of the taxpayers since most of these people have to rely on some social assistance. 
Senator Diane Watson is Chairman of the Health and Human Services Committee so that 
you will know when she arrives what her interest in this is. 
With regard to some of the past work of this committee, we generated a bill which 
was to place heart transplant benefits under Medi-Cal. Since there would be about a 
$7 million expense connected with that, and the Legislature has been very cost-conscious 
of late, we explored possible sources of revenue to offset this cost. We discovered 
that when people who have been using wheelchairs, pacemakers, etc., and all the other 
types of equipment, pass away, this equipment just becomes part of their estate; it 
does not revert back to the State of California. As a result, there is approximately 
a $10 million expense per year for these types of health aids. So we included in the 
bill a provision that at time of death this equipment would revert back to the state. 
The Health and Human Services Department felt that part of the bill was cumbetson~ 
and they wouldn't be able to implement it; however, they dropped their active opposi-
tion at the last moment and the bill was passed and is in front of the Governor now. 
I have been informed by Secretary Swoap of the Health and Human Services Depart-
ment that they have the administrative capability to authorize payment of heart trans-
plants under Medi-Cal without SB 1967 and they are asking the Governor to veto the bill 
because they feel it is an administrative nightmare trying to keep track of all the 
health aids and equipment that are dispersed around the state. In any case, they are 
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authorizing heart transplants for Medi-Cal, irrespective of whether the bill is vetoed. 
This is the fifth hearing that this committee will have held in the past year. It 
is also the last one. We will deal exclusively today with the question of brain death. 
I might add that our first witness is responsible for this hearing being held on this 
subject. 
Dr. Boyd Stevens is the Chief Medical Examiner and Coroner of the County and City 
of San Francisco. I have worked with him for three years through a nonprofit group 
called the Anatomical Transplant Association of California in which he and other coroners 
have been quite active. 
I am not going to spend a lot of time addressing a subject on which I am certainly 
not an expert as are few other lay people. I will leave it to Dr. Stevens to set the 
ground for why we are here today and what his concerns are, including the fact that 
determination of brain death is not uniform throughout our fifty states and the problems 
generated when brain-dead bodies cross state lines. Dr. Stevens, if you would please 
start the testimony. 
While he's coming up, I would like to announce that we have additions to the agenda. 
First, Dr. Lawrence Pitts will be represented by Dr. John Wagner of UC, Davis, and 
attorney Jay Hartz of Weissburg and Aronson, Inc., of Los Angeles. We also have received 
letters from Brian Broznick, Organ Procurement Coordinator of the University of Pitts-
burgh; Dr. Albert Jonsen, Professor of Ethics at the University of California, San 
Francisco; Dr. Thomas Raffin, Assistant Chief of Medicine at Stanford University Medical 
Center; Dr. Philip Calanchini of the Pacific Medical Center; and Dr. David Ogden of the 
National Kidney Foundation, that will be included as part of the record. 
One additional introduction is the chief counsel to this committee, Kathleen Norris, 
on my right. 
Doctor, It's all yours. 
DR. BOYD G. STEVENS: Thank you, Senator. Good morning, Senator Presley and 
Miss Norris and ladies and gentlemen. 
I won't go back into the history, since I know you've already done this, of trans-
plantation and the benefits that can be reaped by that. But I would like to just simply 
aadress one th±ng---and tha-t --±s-the- aspect-s-o-f the- -issue- ef ~ae~oroners 
and their involvement in sudden unexpected death. 
As you know, the primary purpose of the medical examiner/coroner is that of law 
enforcement and protection of public health. It's also well known to you, however, 
that the ideal candidate for a tissue donation is a healthy young individual who is both 
free of disease or significant aging processes and is either somatically or brain dead 
suddenly and unexpectedly. By definition this is a case that is typically death under 
the coroner or medical examiner's jurisdiction with relatively few exceptions. 
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Since we must obviously be an interrelation between any transplant program and those 
responsible for the investigation of sudden or unexpected death, there must obviously be 
support and interaction between the two. In point of fact, that has not always been the 
case up and down the state; and there have been conflicts and problems on both sides in-
cluding those that cause the loss of potential donor patients from the system as well as 
those cases that have cost the loss of evidence for the judicial system. 
The problem, then, that I want to discuss here today deals primarily with the reso-
lution of those difficulties so that tissue and organ transplantation can continue to 
advance the welfare of mankind smoothly and unimpededly. Principal to tissue harvesting 
is the assurance of death or that death is totally assurable. No family should have to 
fear the potential of error in the diagnosis of death. That anatomic death is assured 
beyond any reasonable doubt must be an unquestionable principal for any of our donor 
programs. 
Although all of our states have adopted a Uniform Anatomic Gift Act, principal to 
which is the concept of brain death, there is considerable variation by which that 
critical decision is made. Not only do the minimum criteria vary, but the quality of 
the evaluation and the training of those making the diagnosis of somatic or brain death 
vary tremendously. 
Currently, all of the cases that I am personally aware of in the United States 
where a person was declared dead but in fact wasn't were patients pronounced dead by 
physicians. In some situations death was so very near that the difference was a mere 
technicality; but nevertheless, the basis for cures is such that doctors will act in a 
selfless or self-serving manner, taking lives to aid their own purpose. This evokes the 
movie writers and, of course, stirs the press. 
The most significant problem of concern to myself and others, however, is the 
judicial aspect. Since many of these patients are victims· of accidents or violence, 
there is an increased probability of a court proceeding either in the criminal or civil 
system. Such proceedings are extremely expensive to the taxpayers and depend heavily on 
evidence and facts for proper adjudication. More and more, patients are being removed 
from the scene of the death or injury and, more and more, they are being placed on life 
-- -----suppurt--equ±pmentvlhih tlre-i.ssue---u£- tissue-~onsidered. Without the 
scene of the injury or the accident or the event, careful investigation becomes diffi-
cult. While the patient is in the hospital, vital real and biologic evidence is being 
lost. 
Recently we had the experience of a young lady who had taken an overdose in another 
state who was determined to be brain dead largely by physical examination and an EEG. 
The medication she had ingested was a classic, a very strong respiratory and mid-brain 
depressant. She was transported across several state lines to my particular jurisdiction. 
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On investigation, having heard of the case, I determined that she was not legally brain 
dead. Brain death was redetermined in our state and she was used as a donor success-
fully. 
I performed an autopsy and examination. The drug in question was still detectable 
in her body. However, afterwards, the county jurisdiction issued a death certificate. 
This death certificate then raises a tremendous difficulty, because the lady had two 
death certificates, two separate times and dates of death. And as you can well imagine, 
her death has left a conflict typical of what we are seeking to avoid. 
What if a physician, mistakenly or through some error, transfers a homicide across 
several state lines? Or if a death initially thought to be an accident or suicide 
changes in its perception, how can we protect the people involved? 
Principal to this purpose is the issue of jurisdiction, reporting to the legal 
authority, and some degree of investigation, supporting the manner of death prior to the 
intercounty or interstate transport of those cases where the entire patient must be 
moved. And I know well that this committee is familiar with the differences. 
Similarly, this should be true where patients of unnatural death are being main-
tained for potential harvesting. The same policy should be enforced nationally as well 
as within the state. 
Secondly, there must be a uniform brain death protocol, one that will reasonably 
protect patients and physicians alike from error. I personally believe that the proto-
col proposed by Dr. Pitts, which you are familiar with and will be discussing, will 
reasonably preclude the potential for medical error that a patient who in fact still has 
brain stem function will be inappropriately or mistakenly pronounced brain dead. 
Under the concept of the Uniform Anatomic Gift Act, brain death is in fact somatic 
death. All life forces have irreversibly left the patient, never to return in any form; 
and as such, the following problems become significant to the medical examiner/coroners 
responsible for the investigation of that death. 
First, when is a brain-dead individual legally dead? What date and time should go 
on the death certificate? On those cases where the coroner has jurisdiction with the 
legal proviso that that jurisdiction starts at the moment of death, when does he assume 
----phyb--ieal----an-d-l:egal--e-rm-t-FGU When--does-he assume --the.... responsibility_ .fo..r the body and 
the evidence that goes along with it? Who has the legal responsibility for collecting 
and maintaining in a legal chain of custody such evidence as paint fragments, fibers, 
foreign material, or blood in urine for toxicology or serology? Who has the respon-
sibility for documenting pattern injuries that may be present on the patient initially, 
but will fade or disappear or be lost over the days or sometimes weeks? Since these 
patients on a respirator to facilitate harvesting for hours or even days continue to 
metabolize chemicals, many times that evidence is lost. Since the potential for a legal 
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motion or a trial misdirected is enormous against what would have been proven by 
appropriate investigation -- or, I should say, could have been proven -- there is little 
doubt that prolonging the patient's life interferes with or affects, at least, potential 
for a proper adjudication. 
Many of the facilities, for example, have protocols where wounds are debrided if a 
patient appears to be capable of surviving for 24 hours. As such the issue of a wound 
such as a gunshot wound may become clouded in the aspects of the distance from which 
the weapon was fired; and therefore, the issue of homicide, accident, or suicide becomes 
forever clouded. 
To me, this type of question would require the examination of the patient on admis-
sion by a criminalist or forensic pathologist when trained in collecting and recognizing 
that evidence as well as the appropriate photography, collection of blood and urine, 
other specimens for proper examination. Who will pay for these costs? 
Currently, we know who pays the costs when they aren't done properly because in the 
judicial system, these questions become major questions and with the advent of Hitch and 
Nations and several other decisions regarding evidence, such issues are commonly major 
difficulties. 
With our capabilities, is a patient who is being transported over a state or county 
line brain dead by definition somatically dead? Which coroner or medical examiner is 
responsible for the investigation; and therefore, which county incurs the costs and 
responsibilities of the investigation and potential court presentation, and mention the 
issue of what time and hour go on the certificate? Additionally, if brain death is 
somatic death, do you have to file a death certificate and get a transport permit to 
move a patient across the county or state line? If indeed brain death is somatic death, 
then what becomes of the brain-dead patient on a respirator for weeks or possibly months? 
Do we file a death certificate at a required time even though that patient may techni-
cally have an EKG on a ventilator? Once a brain-dead patient is taken across the state 
or county line with or without a death certificate or transport permit, what procedure 
do we go through to legally get them back to their loved ones? Is the coroner or medi-
cal examiner responsible for obtaining donation permission in harvesting tissue? And 
part _af._that answer iS-currently in the works, as you're wel-l--aware. Does this inter-. 
fere with his responsibility as a law enforcement officer and does it incur any reflec-
tion in the public's eye as to his impartiality to do such an investigation? Should a 
homicide case be included or excluded from consideration in this program? 
Obviously, I suggest and believe that these are not minor or trivial questions, 
but the very foundation of which any transplantation program must be based. They go to 
the root also of our American judicial system and the health of our community. 
We've recently seen a coroner accused of contributing to a recipient's death by 
-5-
failing to make certain patients available for harvest. As a result, these questions not 
only in our state but nationally take on potentially more and more consideration. 
If we make appropriate legislation to evaluate a patient and determine brain death 
nppropriately throughout the nation, that alone would help solve many of these problems. 
The uniform brain death policy is one that must be followed •.. in order to mean a mean-
ingful transplant program. 
Additionally, we need to recognize the few problems involving certain tissues, at 
this time, that require intercounty or interstate transplantation or transport of the 
patient in its entirety. As you well know, many organs and tissues do not have that 
unusual situation. 
Since many of these patients represent civil or criminal issues, the transplant pro-
gram must not advance at the expense of the judicial system. In my opinion, to attempt 
to do so would be a critical error, because in that struggle the transplant program could 
only lose. 
Finally, the coroner system in the State of California is extremely vulnerable as 
we've recently seen. The system is generally not well-established or supported in the 
U.S. in its entirety so that problems in methods of handling them vary widely as they do 
even within the 58 counties of this state. Since the changes we are discussing could be 
national, or should be national, in their scope, inappropriate and poorly made laws could 
literally destroy the medical legal investigation system as it exists in the United 
States. That would be a major injury to the legal and health programs in America and, in 
short, could make every suspicious death investigation as poor and as suspect as that of 
President Kennedy. 
There is no reason that reasonable laws cannot be enacted to benefit all. With 
appropriate safeguards, no rights would be violated and both health and law would grow. 
To reach this goal, we need reasonable, well-thought-out state and national laws that fit 
the needs of all involved and don't sacrifice one aspect of patients' care. 
One of the additional things that we may well consider is adding appropriate courses 
in medical school on death determination and the legal responsibilities of physicians. 
Generally we find that neither of those subjects are included formally in medical school 
pnrgrams; and if they -are, they-!-re given enly very casual treatment-
That's my prepared statement. Can I answer any questions? 
CHAIRMAN SPERAW: First of all, do we have a copy of your statement? 
DR. STEVENS: I will see that you get one. 
CHAIRMAN SPERAW: Thank you. Could you explain, Dr. Stevens, because the question 
has been asked me several times by reporters who are interested in this hearing, whether 
or not this has anything to do with pulling the plug on live patients? 
DR. STEVENS: Yes, it does. As you well know, there is a great deal of controversy 
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about who has that authority or who should take that authority or who wants that 
authority. It's an extremely tough decision many times to make. We do not have well-
prepared programs for handling just that issue, as you pointed out in the literature 
that Miss Norris prepared. 
A classic example of exactly such a problem exists in the state now. These are not 
totally unheard of. This one has caught a lot of attention. But these are major issues 
because the issue on this particular case reference is whether or not the step is a 
factor if a patient dies of homicide. The longer the patient lives on a respirator, the 
more difficult those questions become to answer. Actually pulling the respirator plug 
or turning off the ventilator or life support equipment is tough. Legally there is a 
precedence. Legally the law sets forth those criteria. However, a court order has been 
issued not to turn off the respirator. 
So yes, it does go to exactly that definition of when and how and who should do it. 
CHAIRMAN SPERAW: But then, in fact, you're raising a second question. One, we 
have a person who is still legally alive and there has to be a decision made whether or 
not to pull the body function systems. Is that correct? 
DR. STEVENS: Yes. On the brain death, the criteria should be absolute. The brain-
death individual cannot survive without mechanical support. That should be an absolute 
criteria. But a patient who is injured severely and who is unquestionably not going to 
survive but who is not brain dead, that's another and totally separate issue. 
CHAIRMAN SPERAW: All right, thank you. 
All right, first of all, before we get into other questions, I'd like to introduce 
Assemblyman Nolan Frizzelle, representing the Fountain Valley area of Southern California. 
Are there questions of the witness? 
SENATOR ROBERT PRESLEY: Only a question of jurisdiction, Doctor. I always thought 
that the jurisdiction rested with where the---I guess in this case in your discussion, 
involved with crime--where it initially was committed. For example, if it occurred, 
say, in Phoenix and the person was transported to the Eisenhower Medical Center in Palm 
Springs, I thought the jurisdiction would remain with Phoenix. Is that clouded? 
DR. STEVENS: Well, it is clouded, Senator. The investigative responsibility is 
ordinarily where the crime was committed. The responsibility for the body is wher~ the 
body lies. So under the laws that exist now, if somebody murdered an individual in 
another county, transported the body to my county, I am the responsible medical examine~ 
even though the investigation for that case may be handled by another agency. It ordi-
narily means then that I would have to prepare my report and go to that other place for 
the actual court presentation. But yes, there is a dichotomy. 
SENATOR PRESLEY: But within the State of California that law would be applicable 
statewide, so county to county wouldn't create the problem that state to state does. 
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DR. STEVENS: Well, no, that is the existing law in the county as you are well aware 
that coroner/medical examiner is a county agency, not a state agency. So we're limited 
by our county boundaries. Within the states, it becomes even more confusing because some 
states have a state medical examiner system and some have a coroner system that varies 
from what we use. 
SENATOR PRESLEY: I think you're saying that the longer a person is in a hospital 
on life support systems, the less viable--! guess is the word--the organs that may be 
potentially transplantable. 
DR. STEVENS: No, not necessarily. That really goes to the quality of their condi-
tion at the time they're actually pronounced brain dead. If the patient is not labile, 
in other words, very difficult to maintain, does not become infected or septic, then the 
organs may be fully transplantable for quite a period of time. 
SENATOR PRESLEY: But it does cause a deterioration on some very important evidence, 
l guess. 
DR. STEVENS: Well, it does. Just as a very quick example, if a person was in an 
auto accident and had a very high level of, say, alcohol, even though they are techni-
cally on a respirator and unquestionably brain dead, they're still metabolizing the al-
cohol at the rate of about one ounce per hour or very nearly so, as long as the liver is 
oxygenated. Therefore, the body continues to eliminate that drug as long as they're on 
the respirator. If the question asked of me, then, as a medical examiner after 24 hours 
is, was this person legally drunk, I have no data on which to give an opinion. And 
that's true for many drugs. And I had mentioned fibers and other evidence. In most of 
our trauma centers, one of the first things that's done to examine a patient is to cut 
the clothing off. With that clothing goes so much vital evidence. 
Obviously, if the patient survives, that's an entirely separate matter and certainly 
that's the primary responsibility. But if the patient is not survivable in the beginning, 
once that evidence is lost, it's gone forever -- the clothing are lost or thrown away or 
discarded and the issues of distance of gunshots, the movement of particular autmobiles, 
so much of that trace evidence is just simply lost forever. 
SENATOR PRESLEY: Is there any prohibition against a doctor, or maybe not a doctor, 
any-kind ~f an evidenee eJtpert, coming into the hospital and securing that evidence---
immediately flown in to the hospital and while the person is under a life support system? 
DR. STEVENS: No, there is no prohibition against doing that as long as it is a 
crime or a crime being investigated. Some cases would not ordinarily be investigated 
by the police in the same aspect. It really goes to protocol, what's commonly done, 
legal jurisdiction, and even reporting a case. Many times cases are simply not reported. 
We recently had a man walk into the hospital with a fractured neck who indicated 
that he had been robbed and during the robbery his neck had been broken. But he was 
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still able to walk into the hospital. The patient died, essentially, two days later. 
There was never a police report made because it was expected by the hospital staff the 
patient would survive. 
So there are many factors that do cause difficulty, but technically, there's no 
law that would prohibit someone from the police department or agency going there. There 
is an increased cost, of course, because some of these cases would never be adjudicated. 
But that's not the basis on which law enforcement works. 
SENATOR PRESLEY: Since the Legislature is in the business of trying to clarify law 
or laws, have the coroners met and are they able to with one voice make a recommendation 
to the Legislature in areas where these kinds of confusion or cloudiness of the law 
could be clarified? 
DR. STEVENS: Well, they do within our jurisdiction, Senator. The California 
Coroners Association represents the vast majority of county coroners, and they do have 
information that they've prepared and are certainly willing to submit and have done so 
in the past for the use of the Legislature. 
SENATOR PRESLEY: So those recommendations have been made and it's up to us to try 
to sort those out and then, hopefully, they'll gain passage of some changes .•• 
DR. STEVENS: Yes, sir. 
SENATOR PRESLEY: where we generally are at the moment. 
DR. STEVENS: Yes. 
SENATOR PRESLEY: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 
CHAIRMAN SPERAW: Nolan? Care to ask a question? 
ASSEMBLYMAN NOLAN FRIZZELLE: I might take a stab at one ••• I carried a bill last 
year, 3378, that I dropped in the Judiciary Committee before the legality problems in 
many circumstances confronted by physicians and attorneys. It has to do with the ethics, 
I suppose, and morality of making a final determination of when an individual is dead. 
And I consulted Leslie Steven Rothenberg. You may know of him through his efforts with 
the Los Angeles County Medical and Bar Association. They have a joint committee trying 
to deal with this very critical problem. 
If I may, Mr. Chairman, I'd like to read just one little segment of this letter now 
because I think it bears it kind of goes to the heart of an issue. He says: 
Finally, I am not so certain that eliminating any fear of liability is 
is good for the patients. I have not been sued or prosecuted to date for the 
dozens of situations in which I have recommended the withdrawal of treatment 
and have stood by while treatment was withdrawn and the patient died. I cer-
tainly hope that I will never be found to have acted in violation of any civil 
or criminal legal standard. But if I should in the future, that is a risk 
that I must be willing to face as long as I do the type of work I do. I must 
approach each patient with humility and extremely conscientious concern, care-
fully learning and documenting each element of the factual situation on which 
I base my recommendation or consultation. I don't want people to be casually 
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strolling down the hall, deciding who shall live or who shall die. I know 
that is your opinion as well, but if we make this task too risk-free [that 
is, by defining to tightly all the different elements that comprise death], 
there are those who may succumb to laziness or indifference or worse motives. 
The concern about unknown liability may keep some people "on their toes"; 
it may also prevent patients from having their rights respected, but the 
solution to that may be to encourage them to find another physician or hospi-
tal, if possible [if there's a doubt]. 
I think that this gentleman has been dealing with this problem for many years. I 
know you have a board or some kind of a device, I understand you have, that makes or 
accepts some kinds of recommendations regarding death, when it occurs, who should be 
allowed to expire and who shan't and so forth. If we're going to transplant organs, I 
think it's very important that there be some definable way of ascertaining whether or 
not this individual body or structure could sustain life if it weren't on life support 
systems which you can't find out until you take the life support systems away. Then 
you get into the area of legal liability. 
I'm not sure that we can solve the issue of transplants, Mr. Chairman, until we get 
to the business of solving legal liability, who makes these kinds of decisions. My bill 
spoke simply to having the family or nearest relatives have a hand in making that deci-
sion. If the patient does not activate themselves prior to being in the hospital, that 
legal document that they can activate, as I understand it, currently, which directs at 
what point, by the patient, at what point life support systems would be withdrawn. 
I don't know that I have a specific question except to frame an issue that is sort 
of a bottom-line context for deciding how organs or when organs might be lifted or 
transferred from one individual to another. It's all related. And this gentleman, 
after much consideration, seems to say, let's not make the decision, let's decide not 
to decide in order to provide an ongoing risk to physicians so that they will not treat 
too lightly this concept of withdrawing life support systems or recommending that they 
be withdrawn. 
DR. STEVENS: Well, my comment is that generally physicians take on inherent risk 
when they take their license, and almost everything they do is a decision-making process. 
Under our current system, risk is certainly entailed in many of the decisions they make. 
-------- I haven't really d1.scussed or talked" about ethics, because I know that's been a 
subject this committee has handled before. But the ethics of dying and of no-code 
policies of how an individual hospital or medical group is going to handle the termi-
nally ill or dying patient is another totally different subject. Ethics are extremely 
important here, and I think many times that the public is very concerned about just that 
factor. That's a subject that's commonly mentioned to me by next of kin when an issue 
of turning off a respirator or the fact that a no-code policy has been written by a 
physician, has occurred. And certainly one of the important ethic considerations is 
-10-
the family itself. The right to die policy that you described is a very important docu-
ment. But it's human nature for all of us not to expect to die; and therefore, few 
people are really that farsighted to really take the time to sit down and fill that very 
simple document out or even to discuss it with their next of kin as to what they want to 
happen in the event of a severe illness. 
Those are important considerations and certainly just as the old issue of trans-
plantation, discussing that with your family and loved ones, making your wishes one way 
or the other known is very important, because among other things it helps take some of 
the pressure off the family at that moment, a tremendous situation of grieving and the 
grieving process. 
So I think the person who wrote the letter to you was certainly---has firsthand 
understanding of the ethics issues involved. I hadn't really gone into them because of 
what I believe the committee has done in the past. 
CHAIRMAN SPERAW: I would---first of all, do you have a question? Well, thank you 
very much, Doctor. 
DR. STEVENS: Thank you so much. Thank you for holding the hearing. 
CHAIRMAN SPERAW: You're most welcome. For the succeeding witnesses, I'd like to 
ask that because the question has also been raised---or the issue has also been raised 
of the removing of life support systems for living patients as opposed to brain-dead 
patients, that if when they refer to life support or support systems that they clarify 
that they're talking about a life support system of a live person or whether they're 
talking of a support system for---we can refer to it as an organ function support where 
there is brain death. If you could clarify in your statements which it is you're re-
ferring to. Because without that, some of these lay people here may get a little con-
fused about the issue you are addressing. 
All right, our next witness is Phyllis Weber, the Program Director for the Northern 
California Transplant Bank at Pacific Medical Center in San Francisco. 
MS. PHYLLIS WEBER: Good morning, concerned .•• 
My testimony is basically directed to the questions that you asked us in your 
letter of invitation, Senator Speraw. And I would like to comment on some things that 
ll1ere discussed uith Dr. Ste•Jens after my 
CHAIRMAN SPERAW: Could you briefly explain, first, exactly what it is that you do 
and why you're involved? 
MS. WEBER: Sure. I'm the Program Director of the Northern California Transplant 
Bank. Our activities involve coordinating organ donation with the transplant centers 
in Northern California. We also operate a tissue bank including an eye bank which 
Senator Presley was •.• [Inaudible.] 
A couple of things: What criteria should be accepted in determining brain death? 
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Because of rapidly changing medical technology , we feel that it is very important not 
to incorporate medical criteria into the brain death statute that is already in exis-
tence in the State of California. While the State of California has a legal standard 
for the determination of brain function or brain death, the medical criteria must remain 
the prerogative and the responsibility of individuals involved. 
We would recommend a uniform agreement among physician groups, however, to adopt 
certain criteria, such as those described by Dr. Pitts in his recent article in the 
Western Journal of Medicine. This would eliminate confusion regarding acceptable medi-
cal standards in the determination of death. 
To give you an example, there is still a lot of confusion in hospitals as to what 
actually is the legal standard of death. Many hospitals have written their policies 
and procedures years before the California brain death statute went into effect in 1974. 
They require, for instance, on some occasions, two isoelectric EEGs 24 hours apart. 
Some hospitals even require three. Since this is not the legal standard in the state, 
there still is some confusion though as to how hospitals should approach this. And be-
cause the medical criteria are under the responsibility of the physician that it assumes 
that the physician will adhere to the standards in the community and that often is what 
the hospital's policy has already been dictated to be. 
This has also been a problem on occasions with some of our county coroners who when 
we contact them about getting consent for organ donation, they will say well, do you have 
the results of the three EEGs. And again, since that's not legally required, we would 
like any attempt that you could make to eliminate the confusion in that area. 
This conservative approach to declaring a patient brain dead can also result in a 
circulatory demise of the patient which would mean that even if the family was very com-
mitted to organ donation, the process or the delay in declaring brain death may mean 
that the patient will no longer be suitable for organ donation. This has been a very 
devastating impact to some family members who have really wanted to make some sense out 
of a terrible tragedy. 
CHAIRMAN SPERAW: A question on that point: Aren't these patients on life support 
systems at that time and doesn't that preserve the organs and tissue? 
MS. WEBER: Perhaps we should really clarify what we're looking for in the brain-
dead individual who is to be an organ donor. These patients have to be without any---
they cannot make any attempt to breathe without the aid of a ventilator support. The 
patients are in a deep coma. They're unresponsive to any type of painful stimuli. 
That's really the basic medical assessment that the physician will make of the patient. 
Now there are other promontory tests that can be done to support this assessment 
of the physician. If you will read Dr. Pitts' criterion, I'm sure that Dr. Wagner will 
address this later on, these other supporting laboratory tests are not always necessary. 
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CHAIRMAN SPERAW: But my question---it's still not clear to me. If the person has 
lost the ability to perform his own body functions, and there still hasn't been a deter-
mination of brain death, doesn't the person go on life support systems at that time 
until brain death is determined? 
MS. WEBER: I think it would depend on the situation of the individual patient --
what diagnosis the patient has, what disease the patient has. If we're talking about a 
patient who's involved in a car accident comes to the emergency room and it looks like 
that patient is not going to be able to maintain his vital functions, then yes, that 
patient resuscitated, is put on life support systems until some time can elapse where 
the determination of brain death can properly be made. 
CHAIRMAN SPERAW: But you're saying that there are some cases where the determina-
tion will be made that the person is dead and therefore ••• on life support systems 
even before a brain death is determined? 
MS. WEBER: No, brain death can't really be determined unless the patient is main-
tained on life support. I think, you know, if the patient is not on life support sys-
tems, then the patient dies a circulatory death or a somatic death as Dr. Stevens often 
refers to it. 
CHAIRMAN SPERAW: My question was based on the statement you made that sometimes 
procuring the organs is defeated by the waiting for the determination for the brain 
death. And I just thought they would be on support systems during that period of time. 
MS. WEBER: Yes, the patients would be. However, as a result of the injury that 
the patient has sustained, the patient may become very unstable. And many studies that 
have been done, retrospective studies evaluating patients that have been declared brain 
dead, very few patients will survive more than about 48 hours once it's very apparent 
that the patient meets the clinical criteria for brain death, even if they are maximally 
supported on ventilator support. 
Another question that you had was, Should "brain" death be accepted as legal 
"death"? The Uniform Brain Death Act establishes that irreversible cessation of brain 
function as death. This policy has become a legal standard in the State of California; 
therefore, we believe that there should be no question as to brain death being accepted 
as legal - death. We operate under the~~the legal time of death is the t~e----­
when the second physician documents brain death in the patient's chart. 
Just to give you, again, an example of some of the common problems that we run 
into when our teams are often out in the hospitals doing an organ recovery, the nursing 
supervisor will call the operating room nurses and say, "Well, make sure to call me when 
the patient has died." Well, the patient already is dead. If the patient were not dead, 
the transplant programs really have no business being there. What the nursing super-
visor really means to say is "Please contact me when the surgical procedure is over." 
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However, her leading statement is misleading and at times the O.R. nurses will then 
write on an O.R. sheet a different time of death; i.e., when the organs were removed 
or when circulation ceased. And that has become very confusing to many people. 
Does the local coroner have jurisdiction when a body is transported from another 
county or state for organ donation? If the determination of brain death is, in fact, 
legal death, then jurisdiction should remain with the county coroner where brain death 
occurs. Arrangements for post-mortem examination must be made in advance with the 
originating county coroner's office by the transplant program. Provisions for the 
transfer of an unembalmed donor body across county or _state lines by common carrier 
should be made by amending rules and regulations relating to funeral directors and 
embalmers. 
Again, this is a problem that Dr. Stevens initially addressed. What do you do 
when a patient has been declared brain dead at the legal standard of one state is 
transported to another state for organ recovery? You know, there are rules and regula-
tions against transporting unembalmed bodies via common carrier. Now, we certainly 
don't use common carriers to transport these donors. We have a medical team that does 
the transportation. However, once the organ recovery has taken place in a state where 
the donation has taken place and the body is transferred back to the originating state, 
the body at that point, of course, is still unembalmed, so it doesn't interfere with 
the other coroner's duties. Often those bodies are shipped via common carrier; and you 
know, it's something that we've not really looked into very closely and we've just gone 
ahead and done it. But it is against the rules and regulations of the funeral directors/ 
embalmers. 
Does brain death need to be reaffirmed in California, when the determination has 
been certified in another state? And again, I think that Dr. Stevens really addressed 
this. There are different criteria in different states. Not every state has adopted 
the model statute that California has. And to determine a time of death in one state 
and then to determine it again in a second state makes the issue even more complex than 
it already is, and Dr. Stevens gave you a good example of the difficulties that he has 
run into in one occasion already. 
'1'lTI: issue of discontinuing life support when a patient has beeome brain dead, 
where the families are not going to donate the organs for transplantation, is an area 
out of my realm since I'm really involved simply in transplantation. I think that this 
is really a very, very difficult moral and ethical dilemma. 
Not too long ago -- again to give you an example of how difficult this becomes to 
the family -- I was asked to speak to a family about the possibility of donation. Their 
young son who was 17 years old had been playing basketball; he had fallen and cracked 
his skull on a cement playground and was taken to a hospital where he underwent many 
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hours of surgery; and he simply did not recover from that. Two days after the accident 
he was pronounced brain dead by the physicians in the morning. And the family was in-
formed of how serious this event was and that their son would not be with them for much 
longer. The physicians considered the fact that the patient might be an ideal organ 
donor and they did ask me to come and talk to the family since they had not had much 
experience in doing that in the past. I went to the hospital where the extended family 
was waiting in the waiting room. And I went in and sat down with them and asked them 
exactly what they understood about the gravity of the situation. The family told me 
that they understood that their son was really very ill; however, he had never ever been 
sick for a day in his life and that he had a very, very strong heart. And they felt 
very strongly that if they just waited long enough he would get better. 
Now clearly in those situations, that family will never give consent for organ 
donation. But how, you know, if the family feels like that, can the physicians sensi-
tively remove the patient from life support even though the patient has been declared 
brain dead. It's a very, very difficult situation. Another example has been included 
in your handout. Again, I can't really answer those questions. 
The other thing that I would, finally, recommend is that the coroners, at least in 
the State of California, provide the transplant programs with guidelines. I know that 
individual counties have done that. Dr. Stevens has done that in his office. Other 
county coroners have done that. But a lot of the counties want different things from 
the transplant programs. Some want more information, more detailed information than 
others. And, you know, it gets very difficult when you're dealing with so many counties 
about OK, well, this person is---you know, this donation is occurring in this county, 
now let's make sure that this coroner has everything that he needs, which might be dif-
ferent than the adjacent county. 
Senator Speraw, I really want to thank you once again for holding these hearings 
and dealing with some very, very sensitive issues. 
CHAIRMAN SPERAW: Well, I want to thank you for your interest and participation on 
a statewide basis also. Are there questions of the witness? 
ASSEMBLYMAN FRIZZELLE: May I ask a question? Is it true that some of the organs 
of the body do not the donation of them or the use of them have the successful use ~ 
them does not necessarily depend on the brain death or absence of brain death, but 
rather, maybe, the circulatory death is more significant than brain death? 
MS. WEBER: Yes, you're absolutely correct. When we're talking about patients 
being organ donors and needing to meet the criteria of brain death, we're talking about 
really solid organ transplants the heart, heart-lung combinations, liver, pancreas, 
and kidney. There are many tissues; again, as Senator Presley is very familiar with. 
The cornea can be used in transplantation. The cornea can be removed within six hours 
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after the patient's circulation ceases. And there are other tissues, like bone, skin, 
midd l e ear tissue, cartilage, many, many tissues. And those donors are certainly many, 
many more that we see than we see organ donors. 
ASSEMBLYMAN FRIZZELLE: Do you have in addition the ability to remove organs that 
have been donated by a given patient prior to any criteria of death, like brain death 
or circulatory death, if I wanted to donate something, I could donate it in a live con-
dition, right now? 
MS. WEBER: The only time when transplants are removed or donations are taken from 
living persons is in the situation of kidney transplants where you can easily give up 
one of your kidneys and continue to live a normal existence and where the chance of the 
outcome of the recipient is very, very good. And right now, that's really restricted 
to family situations. 
There is also a question now of being able to donate bone marrow to unrelated 
donors. That's not being done now in the State of California although bone marrow 
transplant programs are considering that. 
But they're really the only tissues or organs that we're limited to in living situ-
ations. You could always donate your blood. That's included as tissue through trans-
plantation. 
CHAIRMAN SPERAW: Senator Presley? Thank you very much. 
I'm going to make a quick change in the sequence here. I am most pleased to be 
able to announce that Dr. Lawrence Pitts, Chief of Neurosurgery at San Francisco General 
Hospital, has arrived, has made it. And we appreciate very much the fact that he made 
this effort. I know he had some problems this morning. 
And I'd also like to add that in our request---our letter that we sent out to pos-
sible witnesses, we asked them to name anyone else they thought should testify as well. 
And in most cases, Dr. Pitts's name was included in the response; and he seems to be an 
authority on brain death. So we're most happy to have him here with us today. 
DR. LAWRENCE H. PITTS: I'm not sure I'm entirely happy to be an expert on brain 
death, but that is the situation I'm afraid. 
A particular point that I would like---several points I'd like to make at the out-
'!fe---r-a-nd therr r.Ld be -happy- t-o- re-s-pend -te a-ny EfUe&t4,rms- thB-t---¥-OU -may have. 
CHAIRMAN SPERAW: I might add that we have your summary here and your paper on 
brain death too. 
DR. PITTS: Thank you. The points that I would make, and I believe these are 
fai~ly universally accepted among physicians, and that is the fact that it is possible 
to determine brain death and that insofar as there are any reasonably documented cases, 
there are no survivors of individuals who have had proper application of brain death 
criteria. 
-16-
I think these facts have allowed the legislation in a number of states including 
California under the general rubric of the Uniform Determination of Death Act to be 
enacted. And I think that the UDDA is an excellent piece of legislation. 
A couple points about the brain death law in California, at least in my judgment, 
reside in the fact that it's a very general statement of the concept of brain death 
without undue reliance on legislative determination of what goes into the determination 
of brain death; that is, it merely states that two physicians need to certify brain 
death by acceptable medical standards and that is the limit of the legislative language. 
Now in my judgment that's the proper way for such legislation to be written because 
technology is changing fairly rapidly. What was necessary for the proof of brain death 
at some point in the past is no longer necessary. The advent of new technologies in-
cluding widespread availability of CT scanning, for instance, to measure the degree of 
brain injury. All of these things have changed our ability to diagnose brain death. 
You referred to an article that I wrote and was published recently in the Western 
Journal of Medicine, and I was a little surprised to see a query come from one of the 
California Medical Association committees dealing with brain death and transplantation 
talking about the Pitts' criteria. That's a little shocking; it was clearly not written 
to be any set of criteria, but rather an interpretation of the elements necessary to 
diagnose brain death. They were not set up to be ironclad criteria or be the basis for 
any protocol determination of brain death, because from patient to patient, there are 
minor differences and so what necessarily must be used in one patient may not neces-
sarily be required in another patient. So I think the general language as stated is very 
important. I think that trying to tighten it up more than that would be detrimental to 
technologic change in medicine. But the application of that portion of the law that is 
applying brain death to an individual, I guess, is still not universally or readily 
accepted or easily done. 
I was just shown a copy of an article in the Sacramento Bee from, I guess, yester-
day or the day before where a problem still remains with the application of an inter-
pretation of brain death and the actual carrying through what the law allows us to do. 
So, with those very general comments, I'd be happy to explore any further ques-
tions that ~may have. 
CHAIRMAN SPERAW: Doctor, you mentioned that you felt rather than the state 
attempting to set up by statute standards for determining brain death, or criteria, 
that it should be left to acceptable medical standards. Who in your opinion would 
determine those? Should they be uniform within our 58 counties? Should they be uni-
form within the 50 states? That's a relatively simple question I understand. 
[Chuckles.] 
DR. PITTS: Right. I think that since patients vary and clinical situations vary 
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from case to case that it would not be trivial to write a set of protocol guidelines 
that could then be applied across the board throughout this state or among states, 
for instance. 
For instance, if one---at one point in time, electroencephalography was, if not 
required, was strongly recommended. And at one point with respect to the Harvard cri-
teria where EEGs were not formally required but alluded to and then shortly after the 
Harvard criteria someone came up with the idea that you had to have two flat EEGs 24 
hours apart. Well, that's a suggestion for the application of technology to confirm 
brain death and the irreversible nature of brain death, which is the other feature of 
the law. 
The problem with that is there are a number of patients who are so clearly 
irreversibly injured from the moment of impact -- steamroller over the skull, for 
instance -- that a flat EEG 24 hours apart really bears no relationship to the real 
world. And so to set up technologic standards or time periods of standards would be 
impractical in some instances, would be detrimental in some instances. If a patient 
were having a rapid deterioration of their organ systems and one were waiting for the 
second EEG tomorrow, and in the process despite the fact the patient may have wanted to 
give organs for transplantation, the family may want to do that, and yet if you're con-
strained by some set of rules, then you may lose those organs which everyone agrees---
everyone in that clinical situation would have agreed would have been apppropriate. 
So, I think that an article such as mine or other general guidelines that might be 
proposed by some of the nervous system associations -- either one of the neurosurgery 
associations or one of the neurology associations -- would provide enough specific 
material for physicians to apply the concept of brain death in individual cases. And 
I think the matter of an individual physician judgment should still be left in the 
equation. I think that there are times when for family reasons you may know that a 
patient is brain dead, but for a variety of reasons choose not 'quite yet to say that 
because some family member is on their way to town or something and you don't want to 
quite quit at that point. There are a lot of judgment matters that would be very dif-
ficult, I think, to write into any specific set of guidelines in the interest of 
uni£efffiity. 
ASSEMBLYMAN FRIZZELLE: Before you go past that point, I want to point out one 
particular dilemma that we consistently run across. In the absence of some kind of 
definition, even if we define in flexibility or define in physician participation and 
so forth, ultimately the court makes a decision. And they seem to exercise jurisdiction 
as a matter of public policy rather than the Legislature that probably ought to be doing 
it. The public is more and more conscious of these kinds of problems, both the desire 
to donate organs, the concern about death and who determines it and who ought to have 
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the right to make judgments regarding it. And in the absence of legislative determina-
tion to some specific end, if we leave that void into which, for one reason or another 
or one set of criteria or another, this court may decide one thing, another court may 
decide another, other types of decisions may be made that really establish by precedent 
public policy that may not be valid across the board at all, may not allow for partici-
pation by physicians in general. It may indeed make physicians involved liable in some 
circumstances. Maybe it's the absence or the void that needs to be addressed. I don't 
know how to construct that type of thing . I think the committee is seeking, as much as 
anything else this type of addressing of the issue, some kinds of guidelines. And you 
struck a very common thesis, I believe, an important thesis, that physicians ought to 
be involved in the equation. But to what degree should public policy be actually an 
identifiable factor and could we even construct it? If we're going to take an organ out 
of a body, we can't allow the tissue structure to be dead. We can't allow the courts 
to go through their decision-making process to the point of the death of a tissue struc-
ture that you may need to use. You may lose the very motive for transplant or the very 
capacity to transplant if you allow that kind of complication in procedure. So could 
you address that a little bit? 
DR. PITTS: It's a very thorny problem, as you have very clearly stated, But I'm 
fearful that even fairly specific language may not necessarily prevent a court from 
ruling otherwise. For instance, this article that I just reviewed or just read before I 
came up to the stand indicated that at least several physicians in the instance of this 
child who, I guess, is still on a ventilator or was when the article was written several 
days ago, the child had been pronounced brain dead by several physicians and it's clear 
in current California law that that is an allowable situation in which to call the 
patient dead and stop support. And yet the court, as I understand the article very 
briefly, decided to at least have to allow or require the hospital to continue to support 
the child with a ventilator for the present time. Now that's a situation where the law 
is reasonably clear and has been complied with and yet the court still chose to take a 
different course than it was my belief that the law intended. 
So even if you write down a careful set of rules, the best rules that someone can 
construct, and I 1m worried about bow wel 1 they can he constructed, but even if you do____ -·--
that, I don't feel certain that that would forestall the legal process from stretching 
out from changing what the initial intent of legislation was. 
ASSEMBLYMAN FRIZZELLE: ••• by the court. 
DR. PITTS: Sir? 
ASSEMBLYMAN FRIZZELLE: That's a general problem we have with the court. 
CHAIRMAN SPERAW: Doctor, you do have some suggestions though, I believe, that 
certain things be in place to determine brain death. Could you state what those 
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minimums---what you think those minimums ought to be? Like, for instance, should there 
be at least a second determination by a second physician? 
DR. PITTS: The law currently calls for that, and I think that that's very reason-
able. This is an emotional-laden situation in many instances, particularly in my area 
of specialty which is head injury. It's an unexpected event. All of a sudden someone 
has gune from very healthy to basically dead or indeed dead. And so that time course 
is such that it's hard for families to deal with the information and so forth. And I 
think that under those circumstances one wants to be very certain of the ground on which 
you're standing in calling brain death. So I think the opinion of the second physician 
would be entirely appropriate. I think that the individuals who are joining in the de-
cision or in the diagnosis of brain death should feel comfortable in their ability to 
diagnose brain death. 
And the purpose of the article that I wrote was to enumerate a number of things 
which must indeed be present before diagnosis of brain death could be entertained. I've 
tried to be as---since wishy-washy within the article or to allow as many interpretations 
of the data as are appropriate clinically. And the example of the steamroller over an 
individual's head is clear without a lot of technology that that's a pretty dead indi-
vidual. So that needs to be tolerated or allowed within the criteria as well as the 
much more complex patient in whom a diagnosis is not certain, a CT scan doesn't neces-
sarily show overwhelming brain injury. And in those individuals a much greater deal of 
caution needs to be applied and more data needs to be gathered. That's the spectrum in 
which we're trying to operate. 
However, I did state a number of elements which must be present in order to be cer-
tain that brain death is present. They are enumerated in the article: the absolute 
absence of all brain function. That is clearly definable and testable and must be done. 
Making sure insofar as possible and as far as the clinical situation will allow that 
there are no toxic---intoxicated states-- barbiturate overdose, alcohol intoxication--
that would complicate the exam. Those need to be considered. And a known cause for 
brain injury, and the fact that it is overwhelming. Those are the essential elements. 
~1en circumstances are uncertain, then one needs to allow a bit more time to pass 
----ro matce-· smf the diagnosis and the accuracy of the diagnosis. I don't know if I can 
enumerate any more closely than that. 
CHAIRMAN SPERAW: Dr. Stevens, who testified prior to you, mentioned the possible 
need for something on brain death as part of the curricula for medical students, for 
doctors. And what brought that to mind was your statement that many doctors are not 
familiar with determining brain death. In your opinion, should it be part of the 
general education of the doctor to have some knowledge of brain death or how to determine 
brain death? 
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DR. PITTS: I think it certainly should be part of the medical curriculum to go 
over the key features of brain death. I think the interest in the process and the need 
for making the diagnosis is clear today, but was not perhaps so clear ten or fifteen 
years ago. So now would be an appropriate time to consider making it a formal presenta-
tion in some fashion to medical students because they indeed may be called on to make 
such determinations in the future and do need to feel comfortable with how the diagnosis 
is made accurate. 
CHAIRMAN SPERAW: I'd like to introduce Senator John Doolittle who has joined us. 
Are there further questions of the witness? Senator Presley. 
SENATOR PRESLEY: Doctor, on the last point, I guess that could be included--
medical training-- without any legislation though, right? 
DR. PITTS: I think so. I'm not sure. I'm not aware that there are other legisla-
tive features ..• 
SENATOR PRESLEY: ••. down there, there's a bill introduced that says in medical 
school you have to teach this and that you have a heretofore policy. I guess that's 
to force people to teach something maybe they don't want to. But nothing is said that 
they can't go ahead with it. 
I was trying to listen very closely to your testimony and that of Mr. Frizzelle. 
I think what I hear you saying is that you think the law, as you've set forth in your 
article, the existing law, is adequate and that if you try to build on that, you may 
build more complications than you're asking or we'd like to have. With the 58 counties 
and different interpretations, I guess with the courts available if somebody has a dis-
pute to resolve that, you think that's probably the best we can do-- I think, is what 
you're saying. 
DR. PITTS: Insofar as physicians need to be educated as to how to make a diagnosis 
of brain death and what ~he applicable law is, it would suit me very well if the courts 
could come to some agreement that they understood these same interpretations and would 
take a common approach from the legal side. 
SENATOR PRESLEY: I think Mr. Frizzelle's point is one that certainly is valid and 
that is that courts aren't supposed to be making public policy. They're supposed to be 
__ _.·.n-t.e*-P*8ti.ng. And I think his pOO;nt is that we ot1ght to somehow build on this law with 
some rules and regulations that will be applicable statewide, but I don't hear any answer 
to those few concerns. And I guess maybe that your opinion is let's leave it like it is, 
and I think Mr. Frizzelle's opinion isn't all that strong. He just raised the question 
more than anything else. So we have a great big unresolved 
CHAIRMAN SPERAW: Perhaps what we need is that something be included in the educa-
tion of the attorneys who eventually become judges. That would help clarify the situation. 
ASSEMBLYMAN FRIZZELLE: It needs to be pointed out also the fact that we have a 
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situation that bleeds the treasury or the money facilities of individuals, families, 
insurance companies, the state, and all kinds of people who put up the money to keep 
people alive which, technologically, in the future, potentially, would happen to every-
body that you could keep the tissue structure somehow alive with technology at however 
much cost with cost not even considered. We may get to the point where we have to keep 
them alive at any cost and people not be allowed to die in a normal way. And it's to, 
maybe, at some point or other, be stated who gets the right to make that decision when 
an individual be allowed to die in the face of all this technology and the dollars 
involved. 
DR. PITTS: There is a very major issue that to my knowledge no one has approached 
and that's the care of the clearly terminal patient but not, for instance, a brain-dead 
patient--a patient who has irreversible brain damage and will not resume consciousness 
but who is not brain dead. That's a very sticky problem and a lot of legal, economic, 
ethical considerations are yet to be unraveled. But in the brain-dead patient, it really 
is a fairly straight-forward matter in terms of there are no survivors. No matter how 
much money you choose to spend in the person who is brain dead, there are no survivors. 
And given that fact, that's a fairly straight-forward question that I'm intrigued con-
tinues to generate so much discussion. That's a resolvable issue. And I think the law 
has resolved it and yet, periodically, it gets overridden by well-meaning legal systems. 
There certainly is an element that needs to be passed on to the courts; and that 
is, when physicians seek---when a clinical situation seeks legal input, it needs to be 
extremely speedy. And I don't know how quickly court systems can move. But the point 
that you make while the legal wheels are turning, certain transplantable organs are 
deteriorating. And here again, I'm not trying to market the concept of harvesting more 
organs. I'm just saying, to allow the possibility when the patient wanted his organs 
to be transplanted should he die and his family wants it, everybody wants it, and yet 
the system can't quite deal with, that's very detrimental, I think, to the system. And 
so, there needs to be a speedier response from the courts in order for their decisions 
to have much meaning. 
CHAIRMAN SPERAW: You used the statement that no brain death patient survived. 
"Would you expl:rinhow that takes--p-la-ce-?- How wou-1-d--yeu j-us-t---pu-:1-±-----the -plug and-~i'*f-­
they don't start reviving themselves, the proof that they were brain dead ••• 
DR. PITTS: The technique that I have found useful is that one goes through the 
motions of confirming brain death by what is outlined in the article, leaving in a sense 
the breathing test as the last test. That is sort of one of the most robust brain 
functions that lasts longer than almost any other and may be present when no other 
brain function is present, for instance. Leave that test for last. One knows by the 
time you get around to having made all the other determinations except this breathing 
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test that the patient is a transplant candidate or is not a transplant candidate. 
If the patient is a transplant candidate, then a breathing test that is outlined 
in the article, and it's a fairly straight-forward, well-accepted test, is conducted. 
If the patient fails to breathe, that is, has now shown in the last test to have no 
brain function, then the patient is put back on a ventilator and the process is started 
promptly for harvesting transplant organs, usually within a matter of hours, because 
everything has been lined up at that point. 
If the patient is not a transplant candidate for a variety of reasons, then one 
simply does not reinstitute the ventilator and the patient then without a ventilator 
goes on to a lack of oxygen and the heart stops within a matter of half an hour or an 
hour. So that is---so when you pull the plug, you are doing so in the setting of the 
last test. Then if the patient fails that test, then the patient is indeed brain dead 
and there is no purpose in continuing artificial support in that setting. In the trans-
plant setting, they have to go back on the ventilator to preserve the organs for the 
short time necessary to harvest the organs. 
CHAIRMAN SPERAW: So when you do in fact terminate the life support---the body 
support systems, you do continue to check them and in fact that your diagnosis that 
there is brain death that it is confirmed? 
DR. PITTS: Absolutely. I mean that is---discontinuing the ventilator is an 
absolutely critical feature of the brain stem death of the dead brain examination. And 
so one terminates the life support systems under a very specific circumstance where 
you're watching carefully to see if the patient has any brain function. 
CHAIRMAN SPERAW: Are there any other questions of the witness? Doctor, thank 
you so much for the trouble you took this morning. We appreciate it. 
We'll return to the agenda. Our next witness is E. L.---Mr. Twilley, would you 
like to wait until the rest have testified before you make your comments? 
MR. E. L. TWILLEY: Yes, ••• 
CHAIRMAN SPERAW: Very good. Then we'll move to Dr. Julius Yeomans. Is he here 
yet? He was to arrive at 11:00. Good. Professor of Neurosurgery at UC Davis Medical 
Center, our host. 
DR.____.lllLLUS _yEOMANS: .Tha.n.k__:}WIL- Senators, 1 adies and_ gentlemen.. ...ID.}1: t_estimony wilL __ _ 
be very brief because I was going to say, almost word for word, what Dr. Pitts was say-
ing. I guess it's because I'm a neurosurgeon also, we see the same type of problems 
on a daily basis. 
I think the law as written is a masterpiece of brevity and clarity in the sense 
that it has to be where it can be broadly used. It has to be a physician's judgment. 
And although we use the same basic criteria of brain stem function being gone and some 
various chemical and ancillary laboratory tests, there are differences and it's a medical 
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judgment as to when brain death has occurred, just as you would make the medical judg-
ment using various things if you were going to decide to do an appendectomy. It has to 
be left without the encumbrance of a tightly structured technologically defined area 
because, as was mentioned by the previous gentlemen, today we declare brain death dif-
ferently than ten years ago. For instance, coming on the horizon now is a nuclear mag-
netic resonance scanner, which probably will tell us even more. So I think it's---in 
essence, I'll just stop to say the law as written I think is appropriate. 
CHAIRMAN SPERAW: You mentioned a magnetic---! didn't catch all of it. 
DR. YEOMANS: Nuclear magnetic resonance -- NMR -- scanner. It's a new type of 
scanner that, as opposed to the CT scan, which can show tumors or serious injury to the 
brain, it shows function of the brain; and we're basically judging functions. So we 
may be just on the horizon of having even a better technology. But this does bring up 
one point: it's expensive; it will be only in the larger medical centers. And it's 
necessary that brain deaths be---people to be declared in the smaller medical centers 
even if there's not going to be a transplant because, as one of the Senators mentioned, 
you can keep many patients going day after day and at $500 to $1,000 a day, it's rapidly 
draining the family when there will never be any good out of it whatsoever. 
CHAIRMAN SPERAW: Question? Thank you very much, Doctor, for your testimony. 
Our next witness, Dr. Davis Drinkwater, Assistant Professor of Cardiothoracic 
Surgery. That's a new one now. I haven't stumbled over that before. University of 
California, Los Angeles. 
DR. DAVIS DRINKWATER: Good morning. I thank you for letting me speak. I just have 
a few thoughts as a physician and as a participant in the transplant program and some 
technical aspects I think which pertain to both which may be---should be uncovered a bit. 
The question of brain death and what is defined has taken new meaning in the recent 
years with organ transplantation which is now a medically accepted practice. At issue 
is protecting the rights and dignity of the living as well as of the dead and to see or 
to be thought of as premature about the establishment of this diagnosis of death both 
in a legal and a medical term is an anathema to a transplant surgeon or to a transplant 
program. 
Most of the victims that are potential donors are young, in prior good health, and 
participants in the senseless accidents of the type that we're all familiar with, with 
massive injuries involving a motor vehicle, gunshot wound, alcohol, drug, and suicide. 
The families are in some sense vulnerable to the aspect of the organ donation as a gift 
of life, which indeed it may be. And most families, therefore, are willing and support-
ive of a transplant program when educated properly. 
However, if organs are perceived to be harvested, as it were, without a full 
diagnostic and therapeutic action being taken, and without full and informed consent, 
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a well-deserved sentiment against the organ procurement will severely and justifiably 
curtail transplantation programs. A judicious and efficacious arrival of the diagnosis 
of brain death prior to a program's involvement is essential. 
Now as a brief background, I'll summarize what is involved in a transplantation. 
Since the introduction of cyclosporin A, I know that a transplantation era has begun. 
Briefly, it involves the kidney, the bone marrow and, more recently, the heart, heart-
lung, and liver transplantation. Now the last two are very important in distinction to 
the earlier ones as one can easily see. 
The constraints on a heart and liver transplantation are obvious; and they are two, 
primarily: one is---the first is financial, and the second is suitable donors. The 
question of cost effectiveness for social and personal good is a large one and one which 
we'll have to deal with with some more time and more results as we indeed have decreas-
ing resources to deal with. 
The issue of suitable donors is an important constraint as well. , And strict cri-
teria and guidelines are needed to achieve the best results for the recipient in the 
sense to make the gift of an organ or organs as meaningful and justified as possible. 
We have strict criteria in the cardiac field for transplantation donors. Some of the 
criteria have been alluded to: less than 35, no infection, no major chest problems, 
etc. , etc. And these have to be very strictly adhered to. 
Now, a significant delay in the diagnosis and transplantation program involvement 
is crucial in some cases to the outcome. This equality of brain death, secondary to 
closed head injury, intercranial hemorrhage, gunshot wounds, respiratory rest, has a 
number of very important results. The first and most important is less vasomotor tone, 
resulting in hypertension of the individual. A second one is diabetes insipidus, re-
sulting in hypovolemia. A third one is the homeostatic temperature regulator, which 
results in hypothermia. And neurogenic pulmonary edema may as well be present. And 
the ultimate, of course, is renal failure where acid-base regulation is deficient. 
Now, an expeditious resolution of the question of death medicolegally then is cer-
tainly warranted. Whether or not a body may be released too presently has consequences 
to the transplantation program. 
Now, in order to mobilize, in ottr experienee, reeipient and a donor in~ol~es the 
regional organ program, which then involves the doctors at the location of transplanta-
tion, special O.R. nursing, special pump teams, and transportation. It's a great deal 
of financial and logistic headaches, but it's one which is very worthy. 
Now it takes two forms. The body itself may be supported with inotropes, keeping 
the organs and body in homeostatic balance; and this is probably presently preferable 
to the individual organ procurement from the standpoint of the coordination of these 
various teams. Now, if not allowed as in some instances of crossing state lines or 
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county coroner situations or any question of legal problem, the individual organ pro-
curement time is an even greater issue. 
Now with respect to the heart, approximately three hours to six hours from removal 
to implantation, kept in a cold environment, is the continentally accepted time period. 
Research is going on; and in some cases, certainly, this can be extended. 
Liver transplantation has even larger constraints on time because of the mobiliza-
tion of a large amount of blood. 
Now I've presented two sides of the issue that are joined by the primary physician 
to make diagnosis of brain stem---brain death is at issue. A diagnosis which must be 
based on straight-forward guidelines and principals and government by "commonly accepted 
medical knowledge and practice." 
Now, the Harvard Ad Hoc Committee of 1983 update of the earlier results, particu-
larly relating to children, and as a participant at that time, I want to point out some 
of the important highlights of that which are workable. And that is, that the primary 
diagnosis of brain death is a clinical diagnosis and is based on clinical examination. 
Now, all medical schools currently have neurology and neurosurgery rotations; and 
I think the diagnoses of brain death can easily be covered in their rotations and indeed 
are. 
Now, the question of whether a death---the diagnosis of a death the individual suf-
fered either, first, "irreversible cessation of circulatory respiratory function," and 
two, "irreversible cessation of all functions of the entire brain regardless of the 
cardiopulmonary status." And I think at issue here is the second one which is the 
diagnosis of brain death. Clinical examination is the absence of responsiveness 
to external stimuli, heartbeat, respiratory effort, in the absence of two very important 
factors: Hypothermia, which can result; and circulatory assist devices. Confirmatory 
tests only should be the EEG and other tests such as an NMR and other more advanced 
laboratory techniques which, I think, should be used as supporting if there is a ques-
tion---any doubt in anyone's mind, particularly the two physicians making the diagnosis. 
If there is 2 coma involved, the physician has to be absolutely or sufficiently 
certain that he can or she can account for the loss of brain function on the basis of 
----the-injuiy and not on other causes--external such as drugs or alcohol. 
The strict adherence to a policy of establishing brain death prior to the involve-
ment of the transplantation program is vital to the protecting of the individual 
rights and to preserve life when at all possible. This adherence is integral and essen-
tial for the success of transplantation programs by maintaining the high standards of 
human compassion and care at all levels that the public deserves and expects of the 
physicians. 
This is some prepared remarks that I had, Senator. I'd be glad to answer any 
questions -26-
CHAIRMAN SPERAW: Are there questions of the witness? 
ASSEMBLYMAN FRIZZELLE: Through mechanical devices of one kind or another or chem-
ical devices, you can keep the circulation going long enough to extend the time period, 
I imagine, for the surgery necessary to remove organs, transplant them in good repair 
from the donor to a recipient. Is a lot of the complication you mentioned chemical? 
I mean, you mentioned a number of different things that happen such that it occurred 
to me that there's no way you can measure what the response would be in a normal or a 
more vital individual. If an organ was transplanted from a donor to the other indi-
vidual---in the other individual, you don't really know what kind of chemical reaction 
is going to occur under the nonartificial circumstances that you've created keeping 
this person alive. I begin to wonder whether or not there's a point at which we cannot 
really consider a donor however willing to be really a legitimate effective donor of an 
organ. Is there a way we can derive criteria that would establish not just is a tissue 
alive, but is the tissue credible tissue? 
DR. DRINKWATER: Experience probably is the greatest test of that, the time that 
we're gaining with a number of cases that we do is increasing daily, but using strict 
selection criteria as always. The degeneration of the organs within the body, using 
the body as a support system, as it were, to create a whole new static environment is 
not without its problems. It cannot be done as some people alluded to, to 48 hours. 
In our cases, we've seen the effects at an earlier time period. And the heart, using 
so much oxygen, is very vulnerable to any type of oxygenation defect which can result --
acid-base problems; the use of inotropes--these are drugs that support the cardio-
vascular system. Once we get over a certain level, which most physicians would con-
sider a medium dose, we found the heart doesn't function as well, that it has a very 
grave input as to the result of that recipient's results of the heart. 
ASSEMBLYMAN FRIZZELLE: And the fantastic cost of the whole procedure 
DR. DRINKWATER: Exactly. 
ASSEMBLYMAN FRIZZELLE: involves---
DR. DRINKWATER: Is an emotional---
ASSEMBLYMAN FRIZZELLE: If you have actually taken an organ from a donor that is 
------4n~o~t~~s credible as it ought to be, you are not g~·ing the apprepriate chance to the 
recipient. 
DR. DRINKWATER: True. Then on the same regard, you are not giving the, as I had 
mentioned, I think the donor the benefit of giving the best in a sense as it were. When 
we obtain organs, we approach the families and they are very willing, because it is a 
gift that oftentimes makes their suffering a bit more palatable as it were. It's a 
difficult situation all told. 
ASSEMBLYMAN FRIZZELLE: I think, !rr. Chairman, that where we're possibly heading 
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with this kind of a question is, is there a point at which, whether the brain is dead 
or not, there ought to be as a public policy a capacity for a donor to donate anyway? 
I'm not sure that we can take that quantum leap. Physicians don't want to potentially 
create the vulnerability or liability to themselves unless they have some definable 
criteria for when they can take the organs. And yet, on the other hand, I'm wondering 
if maybe under some circumstances with some kinds of organs, we ought not to establish 
a freedom to take from the donor the organ at an earlier point in time than when brain 
death has been established. Especially if it's a voluntary donor. 
DR. DRINKWATER: I would think, Senator, that a very concise and flexible law re-
lating to the criteria of brain death would facilitate its diagnosis at an earlier time 
without having to wait for the 48 hours or the 24-hour EEG, second one, which we don't 
feel is necessary in most cases. And if we could avoid that delay, I think we'd 
probably still be within a very acceptable period of time for organ procurement with 
good results, without having to bypass the family involvement, the issue of law, etc., 
which I think is a big one. 
CHAIRMAN SPERAW: Are there other questions? Doctor, thank you so much for your 
testimony. 
DR. DRINKWATER: You're welcome. 
CHAIRMAN SPERAW: Our last scheduled witness, and I might add if there is anyone 
in the room who wishes to testify, you may have the opportunity to do so after 
Mr. Twilley. Mr. Twilley, Manager of Licensing and Identification Policies and Proce-
dures with the Department of Motor Vehicles, Division of Driver Safety and Licensing. 
MR. E. L. TWILLEY: Thank you, Senator Speraw. As you know, since the Legislature 
directed us to begin providing the donor cards with drivers licenses and identification 
cards in 1976, we have been one of the behind-the-scene instrumentalities of creating 
public awareness of this important program. Although our program doesn't involve these 
awesome issues on a day-to-day basis that are the topic of this hearing, we have a lit-
tle survey that I believe you were aware of; and one of the responses that was given to 
one inquiry-- if you do not wish to become a donor, what are some of the reasons? And 
one of those was, candidly enough, that "I'm afraid that perhaps they might prematurely 
take the a on a tion. 1 ' Ana- l.~ wasn't given facetious-ly · or- in---h-ume~ ,-bu-t- it-Was a- candid_ 
response that kept appearing in the responses that we received. 
As a point of information, we provide approximately 7 million of these cards to 
individuals and organizations each year. And we feel that it is a valuable function 
that we play for the benefit of the people in California. 
CHAIRMAN SPERAW: Well, it most certainly is. We've been working closely with 
you, as you know, for the past two years; and the Department has been most supportive 
of a function that really had nothing to do with drivers licenses or licensing people 
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to drive. But they've been more than cooperative in assisting in this vital area of 
organ donations. 
Are there questions of the witness? 
I might add, I made a statement that I want to retract. I said this was the last 
witness. I'm sorry I didn't have---we also have Jay Hartz and Jon Wagner. I didn't 
mean to overlook you. Go ahead, Senator Presley. 
MR. TWILLEY: We acquire 7 million and we make an effort. In addition to mailing 
it with each renewal by mail notice and each driver's license and identification card 
that we send out, we make them available to individuals upon request and to organizations 
who wish them. For the last two years, the round figure purchase of these for distribu-
tion has been 7 million. 
SENATOR PRESLEY: Do you have any way of knowing what the return is on those 
7 million in terms of a donored ••• ? 
MR. TWILLEY: No, unfortunately, we don't have any way of determining that. Based 
upon these questionnaires, 5000 questionnaires, approximately 62 percent of the indi-
viduals responded favorably--yes, we look upon this favorably. 
SENATOR PRESLEY: There's no way to measure, though, what the actual return is on 
that 
MR. TWILLEY: No, we have no way of knowing whether people use them or not. 
CHAIRMAN SPERAW: I might add that the Governor signed into law a bill that 
generated from this committee which eliminated the need for the witnesses on the pink 
slip that goes on back of the license which seemed to be one of the stumbling blocks in 
people using it. 
In addition, it will be included in the mailings for those who are able now to renew 
their license by mail--the pink slip will be included so that they may attach it to 
their new license when they get it. 
And one other item, there will be a small sticker issued that a donor may place on 
the face of their driver's license so that if someone forgets to turn their license over 
to look at the back, that they will be notified, it will appear on the front that they 
are donors. We thank the Department for their help in that. 
MR. TWILLE¥~ ~~~~~--------------------------------------------------­
CHAIRMAN SPERAW: You bet. All right, Mr. Jay Hartz. 
MR. JAY N. HARTZ: Yes, thank you, Senator. Good morning. My name is Jay Hartz. 
I'm an attorney with the firm Weissburg and Aronson in Los Angeles. We represent the 
United Hospital Association, and I'm appearing on behalf of the association. 
CHAIRMAN SPERAW: I'm sorry, can we hold up? I don't believe the P.A. --something 
has happened, we're not ••• hear the witness. 
MR. HARTZ: Is that better? 
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CHAIRMAN SPERAW: Yes, fine. Oh-oh, you just lost it again. 
MR. HARTZ: [Faintly.] Does this do it? 
CHAIRMAN SPERAW: I don't know. Just a moment, the Sergeant will help you. 
MR. HARTZ: Is that working now? 
CHAIRMAN SPERAW: Yes, that's all right. Continue. 
MR. f~RTZ: Thank you. I'm here on behalf of the United Hospital Association. It's 
an association comprised of over 170 hospitals in the State of California with about 
17,000 beds. 
We carne in response to a letter invitation addressing this issue which I think is an 
important issue. I'd like to start by focusing, I think, attention on the critical dis-
tinction that I think exists, that I think has come up already in some of the testimony 
that has been given between this issue of brain death and the issue of terminating life 
support with respect to persons who do not satisfy criteria of brain death. I think you 
might visualize this issue as being the extreme end of one spectrum, because there are a 
whole host of decisions that must be made along the way as to when and under what circum-
stances to withhold treatment. The decision to terminate care for a patient who is brain 
dead is only the very extreme end of that spectrum, one where it is most clear that the 
patient is irreversibly gone and that brain function is gone and will not return. 
It is, or at least has been, until very recently with one or two court intrusions 
into the area what I think all have viewed as the one fairly fixed point in the spectrum 
of decisions about terminating life support. Brain death, I think, has, as I think all 
the witnesses have acknowledged, come to be a necessary concept in our society as the 
technology improves and we can keep organs functioning longer and longer. It's necessary 
to facilitate transplants. It's necessary to answer some thorny problems that have 
arisen in the areas of criminal laws to when one dies. It's been necessary to relieve 
concerns about liability by physicians who are charged with the responsibility of care 
and decisions about when to terminate care. In some states, in fact, where there is no 
statute authorizing brain death, the courts have gone so far as to create it because of 
the necessity for it. 
In our view, however, it is a mistake to go beyond the statute that presently 
-exis-ts-, -which says "Brain death is the loss of function of the entire brain which must 
be confirmed by two physicians." I think it's the view of the Association and its mem-
bers that to try and legislate on a specific protocol about how one goes about measuring 
the absence of brain function would be unworkable since technology changes, will con-
tinue to change, and since there is some clinical judgment involved in that determination. 
I think the statute as it exists now is workable and it is, I think, the proper function 
of the statute to define the concept generally and to permit the physicians to make the 
precise measurement. 
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Although I am not a physician, I have been consulted on a number of occasions by 
hospitals and physicians about these issues. From what I've seen, physicians tend to 
err, if at all, on the side of conservatism. Particularly in the climate of fear of 
liability that now exists, with the criminal prosecution that we saw in Los Angeles, 
most physicians are walking very carefully on these decisions and if anything, as I say, 
err on the side of conservatism. Every once in a while you find one who absolutely 
won't terminate care for fear of liability no matter what the statute says; and that 
exists out there right now-- not on a large scale, but a certain degree. 
The accepted medical standards which I think the statute points to as the basis for 
determinations have evolved and will evolve over time. There have been study groups such 
as that which published the Harvard criteria, which most physicians, I believe, have 
looked to. There have been updates of those criteria. The President's commission 
recently published, I think, some suggested criteria. And I think these things will 
continue to change over time and must be left flexible to accommodate changes in the 
technology. 
I might point out that all of the groups that I'm aware of that have studied this 
issue have also recommended that there not be a precise protocol written into law. That 
includes the President's commission, the Commission on the Uniform State Laws, and some 
of the courts even who have gone so far as to create these standards such as the Supreme 
Court of the State of Washington in the Bowman case. 
To my knowledge, I've been unaware of any actual disputes about the validity of the 
diagnosis of brain death. The few cases that I've seen that have gone into the courts 
have not really focused on a dispute as to how one determined brain death or whether it 
was properly found. If I might take a moment to address the two cases that I think have 
been referenced here in testimony, the one that's currently underway in Eureka and 
another case in Riverside -- it was decided within the last six to eight months, which 
spawned this case in Eureka. What has happened in each of these cases is that there 
have been some unusual circumstances in the Riverside case, known as the Dority case, 
were these: A child came into a hospital as a result, apparently, of a severe beating. 
The child was in a coma over a period of time, was on a respirator, and was finally 
determined- by-physicians to be ""brcctn dead. Wnen th-e- physicians sought the family's -per---
mission to terminate care, as hospital guideline required within that hospital, the 
family refused to consent because of the pending child abuse charges against them. The 
hospital was uncertain what to do, so it went to court and asked that a conservator be 
appointed for the child and given the authority of consent to terminating aare. That's 
conceptually a strange situation since conceptually the child was already declared dead 
and they were asking a court to appoint a conservator for a dead person, which is 
theoretically very strange and not what the conservatorship is designed to do. 
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The court did it, however, I think, as a matter of practicality to try to resolve 
the situation. And the child, in fact, died of natural circulatory cessation even prior 
to the court's decision. It went up on appeal, and on appeal the Court of Appeals said 
that was the proper way to deal with it, that hospitals ought to consult with family 
members before they terminate care, and if there's a dispute, the courts are available. 
That I think is what's happened up here in Eureka, as I read the newspaper article and 
from some information I've received about the case. 
~~at's happening there is there are, once again, four physicians who have certified 
the condition of brain death. You have family members-- and I've seen two different 
issues raised in the news article: One is the possibility that there is some child abuse 
behind the incident, and the other is simply a mother who says, "I'm not prepared to 
accept that; I think a miracle will happen." And what's happened there is the physicians, 
because of all the litigation that they've seen including the criminal case in Los 
Angeles, are, as I understand it, simply afraid to terminate care until there's been an 
adjudication of whether or not they can do it in the face of opposition by the mother. 
Now, as I understand it, there has not been an order precluding them from stopping care, 
but rather they have voluntarily not stopped care until the issue has been decided. Yes. 
ASSEMBLYMAN FRIZZELLE: I'd like to ask you, you've taken the issue on a basis of a 
protection of the patient or the protection of this odd case you've stated---protection 
against the legal situation. To take them from the other side, is there any protective 
device available to people who are required to support the individual who is on life 
support systems? Is there a petition device by means of which they can petition the 
court to terminate life? 
MR. HARTZ: Prior to the determination of brain death, for example? 
ASSEMBLYMAN FRIZZELLE: Yes. 
MR. HARTZ: OK. There is not really a formal mechanism to do that. Theoretically, 
you can do it through the conservatorship proceedings, but as I think some of the 
physicians have referenced, that's long and cumbersome in terms of the time frames that 
medical care---or medical practitioners must act within particularly with respect, for 
example, to transplant issues. So it's difficult. One can sign---there is, for example, 
a natural deatfi ac t- "O"irect1v--e "whicrr-.:an say' t-ermina-t-e -the -use- 0 llfe._supp.orts. under 
certain circumstances. There is a document known as the "Durable Power of Attorney for 
Health Care" which someone can sign to appoint someone else to make decisions for them 
and then someone else might assist in directing care in an appropriate fashion. 
There are conservatorship proceedings; but as I say, they're long and cumbersome. 
So there is not really a direct mechanism by which that can occur unless you have a 
mentally competent patient who can sit there and tell you, this is what I want you to do, 
this is what I don't want you to do. 
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Have I addressed your question? I'm not sure that I---
ASSEMBLYMAN FRIZZELLE: You've addressed the question, I guess, but you haven't 
addressed the issue fully. And of course, that's not the subject of this hearing--
we're basically involved in the transplant procedure and so forth so I'm not going to 
extend the question. But it is a consideration all the same in the determination at 
which point an individual can be determined to be dead and where life is not supportable. 
And I'm concerned about, to some extent, the liability that we place people under. Are 
hospitals always willing to terminate a life or to allow it to come to a conclusion in 
the face of the fact that they can extend life and collect $1000 a day? 
MR. HARTZ: Yeah, I think that they're not, and not necessarily for that reason. 
But I think many of them are simply concerned of legal liabilities as well, And I think 
there are two sides of the coin, which I think you're bringing out here, which is that 
many times families would like to have life support terminated prior to the time that 
physicians in hospitals are willing to do that. And individuals who are the recipients 
of care in some cases want that too. And that's the area where it's most difficult and 
most muddied because there are interests on both sides of that. 
ASSEMBLYMAN FRIZZELLE: And nothing addresses it. 
MR. HARTZ: Right. That's an unresolved problem, I think, at the present point in 
time. 
But getting back one moment again to the court situation. The courts, from what 
I've seen, have intervened in cases like the two I've described, where there are unusual 
circumstances. In most cases, the determination of brain death has not resulted in 
legal problems and I'm not aware of any outside these two cases. In most cases where 
physicians determine that the patient is brain dead, the families, the loved ones, or 
the individual simply accept that and there is no incident. In some cases, they have a 
difficult time dealing with that emotionally. Typically what happens is the hospitals 
simply wait until they've had an opportunity to digest the situation and deal with it 
emotionally and then some resolution is achieved. In the rare and unusual cases, this 
kind of court proceeding may resolve the issues in the end. But that's what we've seen 
of the issues as they've gone through the court system. 
That's really the end of my prepared statement. If anybody has any quest1.ons, I 'a 
be happy to answer them. 
CHAIRMAN SPERAW: Questions? [Inaudible.] 
MR. HARTZ: Thank you. 
CHAIRMAN SPERAW: Thank you very much, Mr. Hartz. 
Dr. Jon Wagner was here to testify for Dr. Pitts. Is he still here? All right, 
are there other witnesses that wish to testify? One is J. E. "Skip" Muir of the 
California Hospital Association. 
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MR. J. E. "SKIP" MUIR: Senator and Members, we have prepared a statement for you 
answering the questions posed in your original letter setting up the hearing. And I 
have also included for your information and background portions of a document from the 
Consent Manual, which our legal staff prepares for the various hospitals; and it does 
deHcribe the protocol used in determining brain death and also the obligations of a hos-
pital in informing the family and all of the necessary requirements. And I think that 
will answer some of the questions that have been posed by the committee; and really, I 
have nothing further to add. 
CHAIRMAN SPERAW: Any questions? All right, thank you very much. 
Are there any other witnesses? Then we thank you for your interest and your 
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Nothi g easy ir1 case 
B:r Tom C..llle:r 
-SI.IHWrttor 
of a brain-dead child 
aad 8111 Israel 
-~·· EUREKA - Kalby Wllllamo 
foupt to keep breatll lo ller Welell 
~ld'l IIIJIII!I Friday and WOII, j\11111! 
aJoomy cloud• broke up to ollow 
patcbel of blue lily OUIIIde tile 
Humboldt County courtDouse. 
But ller temporary victory In court 
filled to !ICalter tbe doudl or uncer-
tainty, lepl eotaqlemelll and IIIIIPI-
cloo IUITOIIndllll WWiam'l attempt 
to keep ller 5-year-old clau&bter on 
Jllesupport. 
Tllll week, even more lept ml· 
neuverlng II el!peded as tile cue 
lhlfts to Juvenile Court, followlq a 
deCision by Humboldt County SUpe-
rior Court Judge J . Michael Brown 
lllat Juvenile Court 11 wbere !be 
matter beloop. 
Tbe court declllon Friday a11o baa 
meant lbal SL Joaepll Hoopltal. tbll 
toWn'l CBI!Iollc beallll care pf'CIYido 
er, operating on a medical land· 
acape lraupt wllll tile rear or Jaw· 
IUIII, II treating a clllld - dlagooaed 
• brain- dead by four docton - 1o 
u lntellllve cera unll where ooly a 
bed or two bu been open In recent _....
•If your daugllter wu run over by 
a car,• wed Jerry White, a.111aot 
ad.allolltrator at tile hoopllal, "BDd 
our ICU was ruu. ud all we could do 
II 118blllze ud lr8lllport, and aome-
lllllllllllppened to ber 111 trallllt. bow 
would ynu feel?" 
In 11111 Norlllem cauroroJa couta1 
lown or 25,000, Wllllamo and bar 
atlomey, Bruce Wataoo, went to 
court Jut week to lllop tile bOIPital 
!rom turolq off a ventilator pump. 
1111 oJtygen toto tile -Y or SlobiLu 
LyDII LaBin, WWJaml' cb1ld. 
For !be put tbree weelll, Wll· 
IIams. ber Uve-ln boyfriend Darrell 
Sherman, boapltal omclall, docton. 
Jawyera, !be dlltrlct attomey ud 
county aoclal worken bave been 
playen lo u lo'-, track dnma 
offerlq an uniii\LAI pubUc alrtl!l or 
tbe medical and legal Jaoueo sur· 
roundlq tile concepts of Jlle and 
dealll. 
Tbls dramt IDVOIVOI twO percep. 
110111 or deelll: !bet or docton and a 
boopltaJ cllolcally esamlniJig a pa-
tient and llodlog tile brain II dead, 
and !bet or a motller seeing tbelllle 
· cblld'a color II better, walcblqllle 
cblld "breallle" on a macbloe, talk· 
1111 IO 1118 UDCOIIICIOUI yOUllpler, 
spendlna !be alibi wllll bar and 
waltlqfor a miracle. 
"There II clear Jaw on tbe matter,• 
said S!Rer Corrine Bayley, vice pres-
Ideo! for biCH!IIIIca or tile St. Joaepb 
Reallll Syatem. "If lbere II lrreve,.. 
lble c:e.atlon of all IUDcUoDJ of tile 
brain, llley're dead. Tbe COIIfllllol 
llllq IS !bet tecbnolotl)' pveo tile 
&PIWI6Dce ttutl a pawn II really 
alive Wbeo tlley're dead. • 
Williams and Sberman, wbo llave 
lived togetber ror more· tbao two 
yeara, llave decided aot to talk to tbe 
pre& 
But. Watson, Williams' attomey, 
olll8rved: ·u, on day one, Slobbao 
llad died and !bel - !be beiiDDIDB 
and tile end, (It would llave been) 
euler for (WIIIIaml) to deal wllll 
tile llnaJity. (But) wltll tile tile lUll-
port IYII8ID ••. llle, u a parent. to 
wlllldraw tile bralll !rom tile cbUd. 
Sbe can't brlq benell to do IL Sbe 
-It u ceuolq dealll to ber cbUd." 
Tbe drama unfolding bere bu 
beeo made even more trallc by law 
enforcement suspicion~ lllat cblld 
abuse may have played a role In 
Slobllllll's late. It II a drama raiJIIII 
qu..Uo111 about wbat protecUoo was 
provided to tile child by tile public 
egeney cbarpcJ wllllller welfare. 
Tbll dnuna bu not caused speru 
of anger or commuoal grtel to IIDite 
lo 11118 COGMm~tlve commuolty. But 
II baa made Ute tougher for people 
~-~-a~. tile boopllal !bet Is em-
II bepo Aug. 25 when tbe cblld 
was talleo by ller molller to tile st. 
•JOIOpll eJ!IefllliCY room. uDC:OIIIIIous 
and lo cardiac and reoplratory .,... 
rest, aecordlog to tile hOIPital'a petl· 
Uoo !Ued lo tile cue. Tile child was 
resuscitated, but bu been uncoo-
slous ever llloce. Tbe hoapltal aought 
a court order Sepe. e to permtt tile 
lllulll.q off or ber lire 111pport IIYI-
tem after two electroencepbalo-
gremo lllowed Slobbao to be brain-
dead. 
Oearly, If IIIII lllory bad occurred 
In yean put. wheo tecbnoiCIJJY wu 
1- IOpblltlcaled, Kallly WIIIIIUIII 
mlabt !lave already burled ber 
daughter. Nor lllould tills drama be 
confused wllb tbe life and deatb 
acenertoa or Kereo AIID Qulolno or 
Elizabeth Bouvla, 1o whlcb tile IIBue 
was a Uvlq penon's rlabl to die. 
In IIIII drama, a bOIPIIal Is not 
ftghiiDB to keep a peUenl alive, but 
to obtain tile lept go-abead to Jtop 
treatment after deelll, even lllougll 
hoapltal omcaJJ reel tbetsucb a go. 
abeed may not be leptly aeceaary 
IQ Pllll the plua. but II a prudent 
approacb. 
Money, boapllnl omclall llave In-
sisted, has no bearloa 111 tile case, 
alhough one local doctor'• ..Umate 
or tile coat or cartog for Slobbao - a 
Medl<aJ peUeot- II roUgllly 11,100 
to 11,200. day. 
In IIIII drama, utbe court hearlq 
Friday pointed out, key lept queo-
Uoos loclude .,.bat rlabts doeo tile 
perenl of brain-deed petlent pol8ell 
when life support II bellll ceued" 
and "bow loqlllould a IIOIPIIaJ walt 
to pull tile pl"l when a survivor II 
bavlq difficulty adjUitlna to a pa-
Ueot's deelll?" 
In Its original petition, tile boapllal 
cited the Dority case, a Soulllem 
California Appenls Court decision In 
wblcb tile court userted tile rlabt or 
a hoopltal lo cease life IUpport to a 
breln-<lead peUent, but allo empba-
slled pereotal rlgllts to COIIIUIIadoo 
on that decision. Tbe court allo IIIII" 
aested lllat II might be adYIJable for 
a llospllal to CODIIder keeplq a 
braln-<lead peUeot on life support, u 
relatives were not prepared lor tile 
lllock or tile penon's dealll. 
Sisler Corrine, tile beallll systems 
vlce•preoldeot, said slle believes !bel 
tile ooly etblcaJ dilemma Ill tbe cue 
CODCUDI tbe family's rllbts to losllt 
Oil CODIIIIUIJII mediCal treatment. 
Bat. In bralo-c!ealll caaee, llle said, "I 
lllloll lllere's no sucb rlgiiL • 
Wataon, argued In court Friday 
!bet 1111 client bel a rlgllt to veto a 
decision to lllut off tile support to 
her child. Alld, bei\IIPIIed !bet tbe 
lloopltal's request for lepl sanction 
to tura oil me veomator wu prema· 
lUre. 
Meanwhile, as Slobban lay In her 
Intensive care bed, taw entorcement 
offtclals bepo lnvestlpUIII bow sbe 
- so badly Injured. And bolll po-
llee and proaecuton conceded a sad 
fact: any successful lnveoUgaUoo 
would require an autopsy on tbe 
child's body and a coroner's report. 
"No cbaraes are llled on aoy· 
-y .• IBid Eureka Pollee Depert· 
meat cape. Murl Harpham. "Tbere'a 
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not mucb you ceo do unless you 
llavea-y.• 
Still, late last week tile Humboldt 
County Dlatrlct Attorney's ortlce 
bepo ftghiiDB"Chlld Protective Ser-
vices or Humboldt County ror re· 
cordi prosec:uton want for lllelr 
lnvestlptloo of cblld abuse lo tills 
caae, Dlllrlct Attomey Terry Farm-
er said Prlday. · 
SlobbaD came under tile jurisdic-
tion of protective MYiceo In April 
after DUrell Sben11811 was CIW'Jed 
In a mlademeanor warrant wllll 
abllllllllllle cblld. 
Lut June. FIU"IIIer'a omce placed 
Sbe1111811 on a dl•enlon proaram, 
approved by protecdve servlcea, 
orter learolDB !bel lbe agency's plan 
lor tile child Included permlltlnB ber 
to II•• WIUI bar molber and wllb 
~ tbe dlltrlct attomey said. 
But !be qucy IIIII reiUaed to 
comment pubUcaUy on any aspect or 
tile caae, and, acconlilll to Farmer, 
IIIII claimed !bat It's recorlls are 
confldantlel - even to a dlltrlct 
attomey loYellllptlq cbUd abuse. 
So tile drama goes on. llalllllllle 
baCkdrop ol tbll coasem~tlve town, 
wbere timber Is klnl but tile govern-
ment Is tile larBest employer. Resl· 
dents have read about tile court 
developments lo !be lOcal DeWipe-
·per and -ltorl• OD televllloo. 
But In tbla moot praamallc of 
town~, tbere bas been Do ru.sb to 
jUdgeiD8DL Humboldt County Oerlt 
Don Mlcbael, a IOJIIIIme resident, 
obaerved !bel people lo Eureka get 
aclted over ap&DJioo or RedWood 
NatiOIIal l'llft or IIP"IYIIII of pestl-
ddes. But tbll drama 11 a prlvale 
one. 
"The IUY In tile street really bull'! 
become !bat Involved In II," IBid 
Mlcbae!. a Celllollc. "I really doo'l 
llllnll !bey knoW wbat lt'a all about. • 
At tile lloapltal, and eapeclaJiy In 
tile ~floor lotelllllve care uolt, 
bowever, tile tragedy bel llad a 1111-
DIIIcaot Impact. 
HOIPitaiiiPOIIesmaa Robin Cmwn 
aald !bel nunes 1o ICU llave beeo 
lostructed to use all available IMBIII 
to suotaln a child, ruled dead by 
doctors. Tbe nuneo have even beeo 
told to attempt ...,._llaUon. II tile 
cblld's baerl pves out even :_tboUib 
abe's on !be macblne. " 
•ean you 1magtoe resuacitaiiDB a 
dead penon?• Cmwn aued. 
"I was lo VI~" be aald. "l"ve 
seen a lot or kinds or deatll. Tbll 11 
tile wont.• 
CritiGJI Issues in Medicine COMPLIMENTS OF: LAWRENCE H. PITTS 
M.D. 
Determination of Brain Death 
LAWRENCE H. PITTS, MD, San Francisco 
With the careful application of the principles outlined herein, brain death can be deter-
mined with certainty. There have been no documented reports of survivors when these 
guidelines have been followed. The triad of a known mechanism of brain injury, absence 
of contributing metabolic or toxic central nervous system depression and absence of 
demonstrable brain function is sufficient to determine brain death clinically and, In most 
states, legally. The use of apneic oxygenation protects cadaver organs for transplantation 
during the period needed to prove that a patient cannot breathe. 
Very little can ameliorate the tragedy of sudden and unexpected fatal cerebral injury. 
Nonetheless, the concept of brain death is well established, and there Is no longer a med-
ical or an ethical reason to prolong unnecessary support of these patients. 
(Pitts LH: Determination of brain death [Critical Issues in Medicine]. West J Med 1984 
Apr; 140:628-631) 
T.hc recent report of the President's Commission for the Study of Ethical Problems in Medicine and Bio-
medical and Behavioral Research devoted considerable 
attention to the questions of defining death generally1 
and brain death specifically. 2 The concept of brain death, 
defined as the irreversible loss of all function of the 
cerebrum, the cerebellum, the midbrain, the pons and 
the medulla, is no longer very controversial among 
clinician., in the United States. However, during a recent 
nationallv televised debate in Great Britain, claims 
were made that some patients had survived termination 
of life-support systems despite a diagnosis of brain 
death.~ A review of the cases in question showed that 
no patient who survived termination of life support 
had been declared brain dead. Additionally, a review 
of published instances of brain death3 and a review of 
data banks that have extensive information on central 
nervous system (CNS) disease1•3 did not identify a 
single instance of patient survival, for even bnef pen-
ads, after brain death had been determined using the 
proper criteria. Conversely, none of more than 1,000 
patients with severe head injuries who survived ever 
were suspected of being brain dead, even during their 
worst clinical states. 8 
Medical professionals must be able to accurately 
determine if a patient is brain dead so that life-support 
systems can be withdrawn in a timely manner to pre-
vent unjustified use of precious critical care facilities 
and to provide donor organs for transplantation. The 
success of renal transplantation and continuing attempts 
to transplant other vital organs require that appropriate 
donor candidates be identified and that their neurologic 
status be defined carefully to assure that they are in-
deed "beating heart cadavers" before organs are har-
vested. Transplant surgeons are extremely cautious and 
insist that candidates cannot be considered for organ 
donation until after they are declared to be brain dead. 
Because incorrect or questionable criteria have some-
times been used to evaluate brain death, occasionally 
incorrect diagnoses of brain death have been made. 
Rarely, organs have been harvested from patients who 
were not brain dead at the time of organ removal; pa-
tients have survived for short periods after organs were 
removed. Such errors invariably can and must be 
avoided by applying pi oper criteria for determining-
brain death. 
Laws regarding brain death vary from state to state. 
California has an excellent law that requires only that 
brain death be certified by two physicians and does not 
require undue and unnecessary technologic verification 
of brain death. (Pertinent sections of the statute are 
reprinted in Figure 1 ) . I believe that this law is 
Frum the lleparlmcnt of Neuroloaical Suraery, UDIYOnlty of California, SUI F11111cllco, Scbool of Medlclllc, and tbe Department of Neurosurpry, San 
Francia«> General Hoapltal Mt'dlcal Ccnlrr. 
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DETERMINATION OF BRAIN DEATH 
ABBREVIATIONS USED IN TEXT 
CNS =central nervous system 
cr=computed tomography 
I!EG =electroencephalography 
appropriate, expedient and correct and rightly places 
responsibility on physicians who are called on to deter-
mine if a patient is brain dead. Although a diagnosis 
of brain death does not have to be made by neurologists 
or neurosurgeon's only, it is imperative that other phy-
sicians who may be in a position to make this diagnosis 
are confident of their knowledge of the criteria with 
which brain death can be determined and of their abil-
ity to apply them properly. I hope that the following 
discussion of these criteria will make this process easier 
for all clinicians. 
Criteria for Determining Brain ·Death 
Criteria to determine brain death described below 
are used at the San Francisco General Hospital Medical 
Center, a regional trauma center that treats a large 
number of patients who ultimately die of head injury. 
should be done to determine the nature and extent of 
the brain lesion; a CT scan provides the most readily 
available and definitive documentation of structural 
damage such as unilateral or bilateral cerebral infarc-
tion, massive intracerebral hemorrhage or other cere-
bral mass lesions that would account for failure of 
cerebral and brain-stem function. In a few patients with 
basilar artery occlusion that leads to brain death, early 
CT scans may show no abnormalities and cerebral 
angiography will be necessary to delineate the patho-
logic features. In the absence of clear clinical or radio-
graphic evidence of overwhelming brain damage, a 
clinician must be extremely cautious in diagnosing 
brain death; patients should be supported for one or 
more days, during which time appropriate additional 
diagnostic information can be obtained. 
Metabolic and Toxic CNS Depression Must Be 
Excluded 
Many systemic abnormalities will depress central 
nervous system function and should be corrected as 
completely as possible· before· the diagnosis of brain 
It should be emphasized that most patients who die Article I 
after head injury typically are not brain dead until the § 7180. Determlaadoa of death; lrrevenlble ceaadoa of 
time of terminal cardiopulmonary failure and arrest. drculatory aad respiratory or braiD faacdo111 
The clinical course of these patients is characterized by (a) An individual who bas sustained either (I) ir-
. h '1 · d h b · reversible cessation of circulatory and reapiratory tunc-
coma wlt spontaneous venb atlon an ot er ram-stem lions, or (2) irreversible cessation of all functions of the 
function for some days or weeks after severe head entire brain, including the brain atem, is dead. A deter-
injury; patients usually die of infection or ventilatory mination of death must be made in accordance with 
complications of protracted unconsciousness. Thus, accepted medical standards •••• 
criteria for the diagnosis of brain death can be applied Article 11 
properly to only a relatively few of these patients.1 
The diagnosis of brain death requires that the cause ~ ladepeadeat coDfinaadoa of braiD falldloa 
of CNS dysfunction be known, that no toxic or meta- When an individual is pronounced dead by determin-
bolic factors that could depress neurologic function be ina that the individual has sustained an irreversible ceaa-
present and that there be no demonstrable brain func- lion of all functions of the entire brain, includina the 
tion (Table 1). While a number of electrophysiologic, brain Item, there shall be independent confirmation by 
d. 1 · 1 d' · d' 'd another physician .•.. ra 10 og1c or nuc ear me Jcme stu 1es may prov1 e 
additional proof of brain death, generally these studies 17182. ladepeDdeat confirmadoD wbea part of doaor 
need not be done in typical patients. However, it is ~!~r a~ 0~~=~: used for direct transplan-
necessary occasionally to do one or more of these tests tation •.. and the death of the donor is determined by 
in patients whose clinical course is complicated, or who determining that the individual has suffered an irrever-
have a myriad of apparently unrelated clinical signs or sible ce&Bation of all functions of the entire brain, includ-
results of laboratory tests (or both) that can make a ins the brain stem, there shall be an independent con-
diagnosis extreme! difficult. An e • .~~x~a,!.!m.!JlP~II£e_;o~f~st!!U!kCh!La!L._-f----JI~Ih Lnn~~tiei''onan---tofnallthe:it'll1dieatbethMI!byetelanmolli~natric. pmhryOlstr--'c"diaCJnlt. lrN--;e,_'the;-;-r-,lhiDel'" ----j-
·--------:-.'l"---c:--:-. ' h b ' h 1 'd • ":: -~ :••-"!!' _,. __ "':"'', Ul UCGW , , , IIUI" 
patient m1g t e one Wit pro onge unconsciousness, the physician making the inde~dent confirmation shaD 
no evidence of brain function, negative toxicologic participate in the procedures for removing or transplant-
studies and a nondiagnostic computed tomographic ins a part. 
(CT) scan for whom no definitive cause for apparent 
brain death has been established. 
The Cause of Brain Damage Must Be Known 
A diagnosis must be established. This can be done 
clinically in instances of severe open head injury, gun-
shot wounds of the brain, prolonged cardiac arrest, 
drowning with recorded long periods under water or 
other very obvious causes of brain damage. Without 
such convincing clinical evidence, diagnostic studies 
APRIL 1984 • 140 • 4 
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Figure 1.-Pertinent sections of the Uniform Determination 
of Death Act of the State of California (Chapter 3. 7 of the 
California Health and Safety Code). 
TABLE 1.-cr/ter/a for Determlnln~ Brain Death 
Known mechanism of in;ury 
Absence of toxic or metabolic central nervous 
system depression 
Absence of brain function 
829 
DETERMINATION OF BRAIN DEATH 
death is considered. Systemic hypotension or intracran-
ial hypertension, singly or in combination, can lower 
cerebral perfusion and depress CNS function. Hypo-
thermia Jowers cerebral metabolism and can depress 
brain function, though coma as a result of hypothermia 
alone does not occur if core body temperatures are 
above 32°C (90°F). Temperatures between 27°C 
(80°F) and 32°C can cause coma and temperatures 
below 27°C virtually always cause coma.• Severe 
hyponatremia may increase brain water content pro-
foundly and cause severe cerebral edema, thereby de-
pressing brain function. Hyponatremia also may cause 
focal or generalized seizures, the presence of which 
excludes a diagnosis of brain death. Poor ventilatory 
function with hypoxemia or hypercarbia can depress 
cerebral function and should be corrected. While it is 
unlikely that any of these metabolic disorders can cause 
cessation of cerebral function, any might depress mini-
mal brain function to the point that an incorrect diag-
nosis of brain death could be made. 
Systemic toxins alone can produce apparent brain 
death in patients who can recover with absolutely nor-
mal neurologic function if they are supported during 
the period of intoxication. Thus, it is imperative to 
exclude an intoxicated state, either by reliable history 
(for example, the patient being normal immediately 
before trauma or having a dramatic and abrupt neuro-
logic ictus consistent with intracranial hemorrhage) or 
by appropriate toxicologic screening before the diag-
nosis of brain death is made. Barbiturate overdose can 
abolish all clinically detectable brain function, though 
brain-stem evoked potentials often are present even in 
the absence of other demonstrable brain function. Other 
hypnotic or sedative agents can greatly depress CNS 
function to the point that brain-stem reflexes are lost. 
Ethanol intoxication also can depress CNS function, 
though it is exceedingly unlikely that the effects of 
ethanol intoxication alone can mimic brain death. 
An appropriate toxicologic screen for CNS depres-
sants should be carried out on blood and urine speci-
mens. Even in patients known to have structural brain 
lesions, toxins must be excluded before the diagnosis 
of brain death can be made reliably. 
TABLE 2.-Absence of Brain Function 
No pupillary response to light 
No corneal reflex 
No eye movement with doll's eyes maneuver or caloric testing 
No response to supraorbital pain 
No gag reflex 
No cough reflex 
Apnea 
brain. Pupillary response to light is absent because 
death of the upper midbrain causes loss of optic nerve 
input and parasympathetic nerve output from that re-
gion. No eye movement can be elicited either by the 
doll's eyes maneuver or by cold water caloric testing 
because pontine vestibular nuclei are without function, 
as are the pathways for coordination of eye movement 
in the medial longitudinal fasciculus that extends from 
the third nerve nucleus in the upper midbrain down to 
upper cervical spinal cord segments, where joint-posi-
tion sensation of the cervical spine enters the medial 
longitudinal fasciculus for coordinating eye movement. 
Corneal reflexes in both eyes are absent with loss of 
trigeminal sensation input and facial nerve output to 
th~ orbicularis oculi. There is no gag response to firm 
tongue blade pressure against the oropharyngeal wall. 
There is no cough reflex with tracheal suctioning via an 
endotracheal tube. Finally, a patient must be apneic in 
the presence of an adequate carbon dioxide stimulus. 
Because hypoxemia with prolonged apnea can cause 
cardiac arrest and complicate possible organ removal 
for transplantation, proper apnea testing' is necessary 
and is summarized here. A patient should be ventilated 
for five minutes with 100% oxygen at normal tidal 
volumes so that arterial levels of oxygen are greatly 
elevated and levels of arterial carbon dioxide are nor-
mal (about 40 mm of mercury) at the time that 
ventilation is discontinued. The ventilator then is re-
placed by a T-piece delivering pure oxygen to replace 
oxygen removed from the alveoli by circulating blood. 
The patient is observed carefully for evidence of re-
spiratory efforts; if none occur within 10 to 15 minutes, 
during which time the partial arterial carbon dioxide 
. . pressure usually will increase 30 to 45 mm of mercury, 
There Must Be No Demonstrable Bram Functzon then apnea will have persisted despite an intense re-
-- Neurologic testing must show .tba..t_ there is no brpJ'l:._ ---~iratory_~im_ulus._ This method of apneic oxygenation 
generated response to any neural stimulus (Table 2). ensures that a patient has no response to apnea, a Sine 
Some brain dead patients retain spinal cord reflexes. qua non of brain death, but will maintain an adequate 
Thus, minor flexion of upper or lower extremities with partial arterial oxygen pressure for 15 minutes or more 
local extremity pain need not preclude the diagnosis (in the absence of lung diftusion abnonnalities) 
of brain death. With medullary failure, however, spinal and protect organs that are potentially available for 
shock generally intervenes and deep tendon reftexes transplantation. 
and segmental withdrawal reflexes are absent. In a few instances, patients being ventilated mechan-
A patient would have no response to supraorbital ically are given muscle relaxants during treatment and 
pain stimulus because sensory input to the brain is via the ability of a patient to respond to neurologic testing 
the trigeminal nerve into the brain-stem trigeminal might be questioned. Most paralyzing agents used in 
nuclei. Pupils will be mid-dilated (5 to 6 mm in size), this setting are metabolized within a few hours of 
with loss of neuronal response of both hypothalamic administration. Even in unusual circumstances such as 
sympathetic cells and of parasympathetic cells in the the use of aminoglycoside antibiotics in patients with 
Edinger-Westphal nucleus located in the rostral mid- renal failure or in rare instances of prolonged paralysis 
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TABLE 3.-Supporting Examinations to Confirm Brain Death 
Electroencephalography 
Brain-stem evoked responses 
Cerebral angiography 




from the use of a single injection of succinylcholine 
chloride, paralysis can be assessed using a nerve stimu-
lator and observing an appropriate muscle twitch re-
sponse. If possible paralysis is a concern, the issue 
should be resolved through consultation with an anes-
thesiologist. 
There are no special precautions for pronouncing 
brain death in infants and children. Even very young 
infants have well-developed brain-stem reflexes, and 
absence of these reflexes is the cornerstone of a diag-
nosis of brain death. The usual precautions must be 
followed, including an accurate diagnosis for destruc-
tive brain lesions and the absence of CNS depression. 
Because it is often difficult for families to accept the 
death of a child, to allow the family time to adjust to 
the tragedy, some delay-perhaps up to a day-might 
be justified before ventilation is discontinued. 
Additional Examinations That Can Be Made to Verify 
Brain Death 
Results of several electrophysiologic, radiologic and 
other tests can be used when necessary to confirm a 
clinical diagnosis of brain death (Table 3). Since 
publication in 1968 of the Harvard Brain Death Cri-
teria,e electroencephalography (EEG) has been used 
frequently to confirm brain death. It has been suggested 
injection of iodinated contrast material will fill the 
cervical carotid artery but wiii not enter the intracranial 
space, producing what is referred to as a "carotid stop." 
If brain death is strongly suggested in a patient known 
to have barbiturate intoxication, absence of intracranial 
ftow will allow a diagnosis of brain death regardless of 
the degree of intoxication. Radioisotopes injected intra-
venously will not enter the cranial space, and a brain 
scan will show no intracranial ftow." Care must be taken 
with radioisotope studies to ensure that extracranial 
circulation is not misinterpreted as intracranial flow. 
Both auditory and somatosensory evoked potentials 
of the brain stem can be used to prove brain death.10 
They may be particularly valuable in excluding brain 
death in cases of barbiturate coma, which can produce 
absence of demonstrable brain function and a flat EEG, 
by showing that there are brain-stem evoked responses. 
In brain dead patients, all components of the brain-
stem auditory evoked response will be absent except 
for wave I, which arises from the cochlea in the ear 
and may be present despite brain death. 
Monitoring intracranial pressure may show the pres-
ence of intracranial hypertension that equals or exceeds 
arterial pressure. This lack of cerebral perfusion will 
produce complete cerebral ischemia and death within 
five to ten minutes. 
None of these procedures is required for proof of 
brain death in many states, including California, and 
in my opinion should be reserved for those patients for 
whom there is considerable uncertainty about the clin-
ical picture or some reason to doubt the reliability of 
the clinical examination. 
that two EEGs that record electrocerebral silence7- REFERENCEs 
a "flat" EEG-must be obtained 6 to 24 hours apart 1. President's Commission for the Study of Ethical Problems In Med-icine and Biomedical and Behavioral Research: Defining Death-A Report 
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The use of EEG is not required in California, though 2. President's Commission for the Study or Ethical Problems in Med-
it is sometimes reassuring to clinicians, especially in diffi- icine and Biomedical and Behavior Research: Guidelines for the deter-mination of death-Report of the Medical Consultants on the Diagnosis 
cult or uncertain cases, to prove the absence of electro- or Death. JAMA 1981 Nov JJ; 246:2184-2186 
cerebral function. If there is a known cause of brain un~i/i~~~li ~1:f¥e~i :J~~~~-~~ Brain death in three neurosursic:al 
destruction, absence of contributing metabolic or tOXiC 4. Fisc:hbeck KH, Simon RP: Neurological manifestations of accidental hypothermia. Ann Neurol 1981 Oc:t; 10:384-387 
CNS depression and absence of demonstrable brain .5. Pitts LH, Kaktis J. CarOM& J, et al: Brain death, apneic diffusion oxysenation and oraan transplantation. J Trauma 1978; 18: 180-183 
function, we do not do an EEG. In patients for whom 6. Becker HK: A definition of irrevenible coma-Report of the Ad 
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desires support of the clinical diagnosis, an EEG may 7. Guidelines in EEG, 1980. Atlanta, American Elec:troenc:ephaloaraphlc: Society, 1980, section 4, pp 19-24 
be done. However, a single ftat EEG is enough to con- 8. Korein J, Braunstein P, AJax G, et al: Brain death: r. Anaio1raphlc: 
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Cessation of cerebral circulation also invariably pro- 9. Goodman JM, Heck LL: Confirmation of brain death at bedside by Isotope ansloaraphy. JAMA 1977 Aus 29; 238:966-968 
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BRAIN DEATH LA\\"S AND PATTERNS OF CONSENT TO REMOVE 
ORGANS FOR TRANSPLANTATION FROM CADAVERS IN THE 
UNITED STATES AND 28 OTHER COUNTRIES1 
FRANK P. STUART, FRANK J. VEITH, AND RONALD E. CftA:SFOR!:. 
/Jeparlmenl ••f SurRery, L'nll'er.~lly of Ch~eflllO. Clurago, lllirwU ljl)lj:J?,· Depatlrrunt ~~Sur~­
Albert 1.-:&nlileUI Ct,/le~~e tl{ .Vedic~. Neu YW'k, NeK' York. ond Departrrulll of.\"e~t~rol .. ,r: 
Pattema of practice were analyzed for the United 
States and 28 other countries "';th reapeet to consent to 
remove cadaveric organs for transplantation and the 
legal atatua of brain death as a basis for declaring death. 
The Uniform Anatomical Gift Act, adopted throughout 
the United States, allows either the donor or tbe family 
to atve consent to remove cadaveric oreana. In no atate 
Ia eonaent presumed. The lesal atatua of braiD death u 
a baaie for declarlnc death £. ntablished by atatute lD 35 
atatea and by court decision In 'I more. Model braiD death 
lawa have been proposed reee11tly by the Americaa Med· 
leal Aaaoclatio11 aad by the National Conference of Com· 
mt.aioners on Ulllform State Laws. Both moc!els are 
brief. They recopi&e tbe equlvale11ce of brain death and 
death of a penon without prescribing the medical crite-
ria and testa used to eetabUm the c:Uapo.la of braiD 
deatb. 
Seven teeD of the 28 countries aurveyed provide for 
donor carde olmflar to thoae used lD the Ulllt.ed States. 
In 15 countriea eoa.e11t to remove orgaaaa mQd be ob-
tained from the donor or a family member. In thirteen, 
eonaent Is preaumed by law, but iD 6 of the 13, the family 
Ia notified before proceedin1 witb organ aalvage. Brain 
death Ia recognizee~ by statute or administrative law In 
13 of 28 countriea. Ia aeveral of them, medical detail• 
and procedures for diagnosing brain death are incorpo-
rated into the lawa and replations. The number of ea• 
daver organa aalvaged falls to meet the needs of potential 
recipient• In any of the eountriea. Pouible modifications 
of attitudes, lawa. and practice witb respect to tr&DI-
plantation of cadaver orJan• are discussed. 
Hnenepin County .\(edu:aJ Celller, MUilwo.P'•lUJ, Jlllll&-.ta »1:; 
candida~e& for kidney transplantation. A.a immunosuppressiv~ 
techniques become more BpeCUIC and much safer dwing tho: 
next decade, coosiderably more than one-half of them mighr 
benefit from transplantatioD. Yet, in 19'79, only llichtly mont 
than 3,000 of the 45,000 patients on hemodialysis receivect 
cadaver kidney transplants m. One major factor that limira the 
availability of kidney transplantation ia a lack of cadaver kid-
neys. Transplant propama throuchout the country ba\·e lo~ 
waitinllists. 
It is atimated that at leut 20,000 Americana die hiD brain 
injury, brain tumor, or ltroke each year under ~
that could permit removal of viable organs for transpWatatioa 
CR, 3). That number is easily larp enough to meet the needs or 
patients who mlaht benefit from transplantation. The public 1.1 
inc:reuinlly aware ofpreseDt and potential beneftta flom oqm 
transpl.entation and can be eJ:peCted to cooperate with a vlrilcJ 
of at.atutory and aocia1 effortt toward fadlitatinc alvap of 
cadaver organs. A. lone qo u 1968. a Gallu.p poll incficate4 
that 7~ of AmeriCIIDII wer. willina to donate orpufor UIIIIS-
plantation upon their death. (4). Subsequently, all 60-. 
have puaed the Uniform Anatomical Gift Act and 28 Aates 
recognize brain death throu&h ICICUte or Supreme Coun deci-
sions by the end of 1979. Yet, the aYIIilability of cadaver kidneys 
does not meet the demand. The remainder of this article re,'iewa 
the evolution ami current statua of laws and practice relarid to 
dec:laradon of death and conaent to remove organs from ~-.ldav­
ers for transplanwion in the United States and 28 other coun-
tries. lt c:onsiders new .uategies that might facUitate retrie\'1.1 
of cada,·er organs while maintaininc acrupuloua regan! for the 
In 1979, the survival of approximately -15,000 Americans with interests and wishes of the dead person and his family. 
end stage renal di.Hase depended on hemodialysis treatments THE UNIFORM ANATOMICAl. Gin' Ac:T 
three times a week ( n. The num~r of patientl on dialysis has 
increued dramatically from abou_t ;;3~,000;;,;;;;;in~l;;;::9i'2;t' ~·~h~e;;;n;;:t;an~-fcll'llnrol!il968,~rtheta<wNra-pti"'o'lnalJ081Cold-nfidenrertlnce'DifoD1fn:Commissrlbllm.IJJDiioienerallt~~~ 
·- - -- ---.-mendment ro the Medicare prosram of the Social Security 
Administration provided co\·erage for 95'C of the patienta with lea purpose was to .etanclardize and limplify variouaaate &au 
end stqe renal diNAM in the Cnited States. How many patienta on donation of all cadaveric tiMues &md organa. Most statuW:I 
will be maintained by dialysia in 1990'.' No one knows, but the prior to 1968 required comples legal rituals to &m\1111' for 
"cimates range from 80,000 to lOO,OOO. anatomkal gifta and were too cumbersome to pennir urpD& 
Until the causes of renal failure can be pre\·ented, only death postmortem removal of organa for transplantation. l'ncWI' dli 
and successful kidney transplantation acr to red~ the num· Uniform Gift Act, which by 1970 had been adopced in all 50 
ben on dialysis. On•halfofthe patients on dial~ .. i8 are suitable atates. the donor's -iahes are bindins after death in that 1M 
' Thuc work wu M~pponed in part b~· Unitf'd Stare Public H•allh 
~"·k-•• Grants HLBI 1741~ and 5 HOI·C'~"'Ol"~ll3, ttw JIUDN Hilton 
Mannin~t and Emma Auatin Manninl Foundauon. and the E. J. An· 
dtr""" Foundation. Prw.nted at th• Suuh .~nnuAI Mft'ting of the 
Anwnnn Societ~· o( Transplant Surgt'Ona. Chi<"ago. lllinoU. Ma\· 29 to 
:11. I !Nil I. . 
rights of the recipient created by the lift AN paramount t" dw 
rightl of others (5). The legal iutnament i8 a simple "·ai:.te· 
aized card which noquirt.>S the oipatww of rhe donor and ~, 
witnesses (all at lt-ut 18 ye~~n~ of as••· Many .uates ha\·• p~....d 
the donor card format on the *k of vehicle driver~'lin'nM'., 
a ronvenience to encourage organ gift.. 
1'hoee who drafted tht> Uniform Anatomkal t~ " -"•"' .-s· 
' ,,,,,, ,.,.. , 
~·led that rh«: puhh•:'s al1ruasm and st&ll!d willi""nes.o; tt> 
donate orgMns wc,uld tM! tranl'olllf~ antu wide!ipread UHe of donor 
cards. Certainly, the Natat~nal and many Suate Kidney Foun-
dation" 811 weU a11larglf t~mpltJyel'5 have mount~ campaifn," to 
encfJUrqe organ gift.'l. )'et, a recent survey in ~arytand. where 
the donor card i,; on tht~ back side of the driver's liceMe, 
indicated onJy J.5Cl. participation IG. M. Williams. penonal 
communicational. The remaining98.5'i simply avoided dealing 
with the completely voluntary donor card. Dukeminier (61 
antacipated many of the weaknesaes in the t:niform Gift Act 
and predicted that few would oother to sign the card&. The 
greate5t weakneliS iR the paychologicaJ dif(aculty in ac:tUAJ.Jy 
1etting down to the ta&k of giving one's own orcaos away. The 
sipinc of a donor cant ia a much more significant event than 
responding in the afr&nnative to a pollster's question about 
williJlcneaa to donate organs after death. Dukeminier (6) notes 
that leu than 20% or all decedenta leave wills. The fraction ia 
even lower for the young and middle-qed whose orgua .would 
be moat auitable for transplantation. In analyzina attitudes 
toward death. he quotes Freud: 
Our own death II indeed uaimqinable, u d 'l!o"hetaeWr .. make 
&be attempt to imaPne lt, .. can perceive that we rully IW'Vive 
u .-peccaton. Hence, at bottom no ODe believes in bia OWD death, 
or t.o put the unw thiDc ia another way, ln the llllleotl&dou.,..,. 
one of WI is conviDced ofhll oWD iauDortality. 
Dukeminier (6) maintains that aociety mUSt ftnd an Utema· 
tive to the voluntary cift acta to meet the needs for trantplant· 
able organa and euueata that laws be modifiH to provide for 
routine aalvqing of cadaver orsua uale11 there ia objection. In 
Iicht of the Gallup poll NIU.lt, be thinks a carefully dnwn 
atatute could be acceptable to a ~rity of people In the 
United Statu. Seventy-one per cut ohhe phyaid&Ds In a 1869 
IIW'Vey supported the concept of routlDe orsan alvap from 
cadavers (7). Praumed consent would a1lo be ill keepiq with 
traditional humanist values by lll.akiDt the basic preMUDption 
one that favors Ufe and by puttins the burden o£ objec:tiaJ upon 
those who would deny Ufe to aDotber. Tbe policy ot uvial 
human Ufe would be given ftrst priority, yet the wlshes of 
persona to preserve a corpee inviolate would abo be accomJDO-
dated. Objections could be entered in a nationwide computer 
·egistry such as the Medical Information S~'ltem of tbe End 
":)tage Renal Diaeue Program already funded by the Social 
Security Administration. In addition, the nest of kin could 
re&Vter objectiona 111oith the atcendins phy.iciana before or at 
the time of death. Before proceedins further •ith ual)'lia of 
the Uniform Gift Act and. its poaible modifications or alterna· 
ives. it may ..he. helpful to miew the practicn of other countries 
with respect to consent for cadaver organ donation. 
CONSENT TO REMOVE CADAVER ORGANS FOR 
TRANSPLANTATION IN 28 COU!'.'TRIES 
In late 1979, • questionnaire was meiled to renal transplant 
•rograma in 40 c:ountriee.. RHponses were obtained from 28 
lUntriea. Eighteen used .eome form of donor card that could be 
1111ed while a penon was in sood health (Table U. Thirteen 
··ountries used presumed conaent u the built tor remorinar 
or"Rana for transplantation (Table 21. A C:I"'OIt'C'beck of Tablftl 1 
and 2 indicates that &e\'eral countries provid.d for both donor 
cards and presumed c:onaent unless an obj..-('tion bad been 
entered by the decedent or hw relatives. In about Oftll'oohalf of 
the countrk-8 wht're pl"t'ffUml"d coneent prevailta. phy.ricians ap· 
T AIU.E I. l>onor c.nia 



























proac:hed the families to be certain thai they had no objection 
(Finland, Greece, Italy, Norway, SpUn. and SwedeD); iD the 
nm•ining one-half pbyaidaM aimply proceeded with orpn 
aalYqe in the abseace ot prior obj tioD by the decedent w lais 
famUy (Austria, Cz.ec:M.Iovakia. Deamark. Fruce, x...L Po-
land. and SwiuerlaDd). 
In 16 of the 28 reapondiDg cowatries. COOMnt wu not pte. 
IWDed. Rather, u in the United Stata, c:ouent wu obtained 
throqh donor cards or requested from tbe nato! IdA. It lbauld 
be DOted that aD ot the £nsllah·spe•kfnc countrialwere in tbJa 
category.ln tbe ablence of family, all but thne couatria (Jadil. 
Japan. aad South Korea) allowed haepltal oftida1a 01' medical 
aamb:aera to authorize removal ot orpaa. European countries 
are expected to cradually modify lheir CGD~e~at Jawa toward 
presumed c:onaent to remove cadaver orpDS. Tbia baa beeD tht 
positioD o£ the European Committee on Lepl Cooperation ot 
the CoUDCil of Europe llince 1975 (8). The Commluee on Legal 
Cooperation is the European equivalent o£ the National Con· 
ference otCornmisaionen on Uniform State WWII in the United 
States. 
Even those countries with presumed consent ltatutes fail to 
meet their need. for cadaver orp.ns. All have sizable •-aitins 
u.t. fM reDal cranoplantation. Preswaed consent laws iDctuse 
the likelihood of kidney aalvage after a potential donor bu 
been ideatified. but they do little or nothing to atimulate 
hoepital·bued nunet and physicians to aid in that identifia· 
tion. Moat of me k.idne,y,"l come fl:om lup balpitals wMn 
transplantation and dialysis ~ ensure h~ 
awarenea of the need. The medic:allltafr there ere moN libl~· 
to .. ,o the extra mile" reqUired after brain death hu occurred 
to eupport the cardiovasculu ayatem until tbe tnnaplant team 
has been notified and a decision baa been made about the dead 
person'• suitabWt~· u an organ donor. Tbe problem of enlistinl 
the intereec and support of hospiW. dWrant from or unfamiliar 
with t ransplant centel"8 is a aerious one for couatrt. with and 
without pre.urned consent laws. but c:ountriel with pnMJJMCI 
consent eeem ro come closer to mntiq rheir neect. for trant-
planr lddneye. 
SalWJe of c:ada\'el' organa in eountriea without prwumed 
conat'nt laws d..,.ndt~ more heavil~· on an infomwd, aJtruilltk' 
citiz•nry. TIK- iniriativt' must come from rhe dyinc patient via 
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a signed donor card, or from the attending physician and the 
{unily at a time when the family is preoccupied with grief. The 
chief causes of brain death appear .uddenly and give the family 
little time to prepare for lou o( their loved one. It is natural. 
e\o·en in .eezninlly hopeless situations, for the family to hope 
&nd pray for recovery right up until the time that death of tbe 
brain occW"' and the patient' a death is declared. In eome cases. 
n may not be appropriate to diseuse organ donation before 
do~ath has been declared unle• it Is initiated by the family. To 
do eo mirht raise the possibDity in the minds of the relatives 
:hat nunea and physicians would limit their effort on behalf of 
the patient. Nor ahould the announcement of death (on the 
~is of brain death) to the family be equivocal. It must be 
dlreet and clear and accompanied by a .statement that the 
,·entilator will be left in place until the family can make a 
d.ciaion about consent to remove organa for transplantation. 
The attending physician ia frequently reluctant to introduce 
the request to consider organ donation. From his own perlpe<:• 
C'\o"e he has failed, albeit against great odda, to restore the dead 
po.orson'• health. Insofar as he has been unable to "'deliver" on 
:he family's implied request for restored health. he may avoid 
:nakina the request that they consider organ donation. More· 
,wer. he may not wish to incerrupt a b\.ISy schedule to make the 
:tJntacu and arrangements for organ donation. Yet. retrospec· 
~,-e sociologjcal1tudies indicate that those famUies who conaent 
~" organ donation come to view it in a very positive way as their 
;:riehubsides.19t..They drt~ ~~~rt f_rom knowing that a part 
..t their relative survives and frequently-relate t t ey are 
:\Jnfident he would have wanted h that way. Thus, organ 
.:"nation and transplantation actually offer some solace to the 
;neving family. 
On the rare occasion when the potential donor has signed a 
,:.,nor card or when his family has requested organ aalv8Je, the 
.mE-nding physician and hospical staff usually go to great lengths 
·,, oontact a transplant team and are t:ager to facilitate organ 
:"nation. Jl iH a rfl(Uefit chat can usuaUy be met. However, in 
:!le usual 11ituation where neither a donor card nor the family 
:.:uuates consideration or organ donation, the attendint physi· 
:~&n must !lt't! beyond his own pt:n;pecti\·e and pouible r~Iinp 
i failurto in ordtor to bring thto ht-nt"fit of organ donation to thto 
:.>nvr·~ fumih and to thto pott"ntial rtonpient~. Nu~ wh<J 
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helped to care for the patient in the inteuive care unit. aDd 
hospital chaplaina and social workers c:an be bnmensely beJpfui 
to both the anending phyllicia.na and tbe family in OeaJiDr 
eoacumtntly with their lou and the opportunity to give. Mem-
bers of u-ansplant teams are abo quite akilled in ~ 
organ .donation and are usually available to .auwer quwioa. 
for the family. 
APPROACHES TO INCREASE THE SUPPLY OF ORGA.~ 
FOR TRANSPLANTATION IN THE UNITED STATES 
Identification of potential orpn donors ad iDitiadoD of 
contact with a traDBplant center to anaDI• for organ lllv.p il 
a problem in all of the countries I&D'Yeyed nprdlesa ot wt.cber-
consent for removal is presumed or must be obtainecS from the 
famUy. But. the need to obtain apodfic f'amily c:onaent com-
pounds the problem. In the Cnieed States. not more chan ~ 
of auitable donors come to the au.ntion of tn.nsplant ...-
ac:eording to lltl.ldies made in leVeral regiona of the ~· by 
the United StateS Public Health Service Center for Dilaae 
Control <COCt in Atlanta f3, 10). The CDC finds that consent 
to remove organs is obtained ODiy 47'1 of the time, and IICtUal 
orsan salvqe occurs in only 8111 of caae1 with consent (because 
or logistics problems or sudden deterioration of the carctiovas-
cular system). Thus, the CDC ftnda that kidneys are aalvqed 
from only 1~ of suitable potentia! cadaver donora. ln addition. 
the CDC atudies indicate that suitable donora comprise ~ of 
hospital deaths and c:oWd provide 110 kidneys per million 
populatiun (about 25,009 kidne~ eee~. An actual ,.,.,;.,-a~ 
rate ofl6% would provide 4.000 kidDe)'&. Subtraction of a final 
20c.t for kidneyt retrieved but not used because of damqe. poor 
~orage characteristics. or logistics problems leaves an estimate 
of 3,200 usable kidneys; a f~~Un very close to the number 
actually transplanted in 19';"9. 
An ideal combination of laws and practica would atimulate 
aUPnding physicians and hospital peraonnel to notify transplant 
teams about potential donors. and alao ena~re a high likelihood 
of COIW!nt to rt!move OI'Jans. How micbt this combination be 
achieved? Perhaps one key is the pc.itive reapoue that att•nd-
inc physicians mak~ to sign~d donor carda and requt!I'U from 
tht- family. Both 11ituatioruo remove the initiath·e for oflan 
donatiun from tht- phyKil·aan and plat·e him in a mut·h mor~ 
. ~,. ·~, .... · :-iT I . AHT t-:T AL . 
,, 11 ~. .rtablt'. familiar rolto. name!~-. ont' of anempun~t to meet 
tha· , o'QUl'!lt!l of patient!! and their families. Such requei'UI ~~erve 
811 a maxunal stimulus to contact the nearest tranRplant team. 
Initiatives from the Camily llhould increase as the pubhc 
tM-come11 more aware of transplant recipienu ,..hoee health has 
befon NSJtorKI. h will bt a alow proceu and alone will probably 
not Yield a aufficient aupply of donor organ!'. H'"'·e\·er. the 
number of people carrying · ed donor cards could probably 
be increased dramatically simply by requiring that t"'ery adult 
~,.pond to the donor card provision of the Uniform Gift Act by 
eith .. r aiming it or indicat · that he is opposed to organ 
don11tion. Perhaps the curnmt option of voiding the issue 
ahugether ahould be denied. If the poUa are correct, t least 
70'< or the adult population could be expected to sign the cards. 
Yet, the mere ct of requiring a response might decrease the 
number of people willins to sign the cards ther than register 
an objection. Before embarking on a tion"ide prosram, it 
•·ouJd be important to polls or sample populations to 
anticipate tho off'ect of requiring a reeponae to the donor card 
option. 
THE OPTION OF PRESUMED CONSE.VI' U. WS ~ 11iE 
UNITED STATES 
:.awa that presume consent to remove organs would require 
interpretation under the Fifth and Fint Amendment& of the 
t:nited States Constitution (6, 11). The Fifth Amendment pes 
covemment the right of eminent domain over property. It is 
likely that organs of the deceued would be considered pzoperty 
4Dd could be claimed by the state with or without compe tins 
the clonor'a estate. The First Amendment which provides for 
free exerc · of nligion would require that an "objection clause" 
be added to any presumed consent laws. Th appear to be no 
other conatitutional problema with DUCh laws. However, JegiJJ. 
lation would remain the preqative of ch of the 60 state& 
Pt-rhapa the National Conference ofCommJsoionera on Uniform 
Stdte Laws should be asked to consider proposins ...,resumed 
eorusent" amendment to the Uniform .Anatomic Gift Act, 
already enacted by all otatea. ln the absence of model amend· 
ment endorsed by the Confenmee, it ill unlikely that many 
states would enact presumed consent Jaws. 
Presumed coNSent laws ould recognize the humanise mood 
of the country d relieve the family of deliberatiDB on the 
ph:--'Sidan'a request for organ donation at a time whtan their 
crief is most inten&e. Such laws would almost certainly increaae 
the nwnber of organs aalvaged. But, d' d talre.Ddy, they 
would in no y direct physician to initiate organ salvqe. 
Rt ~her, phy1icians would be free to iftitiate or to avoid orpn 
aa. ;qe inquiries. 
famil~ of hi~ dt'daration or imenl w declare death on the buis 
of brain death. the tran~>planr nul"''e coordinator was all ed to 
talk wath the family about organ donation. In the event of 
family l"on~ent. the nur!'e, rather than the attending physician. 
made aU of dw aJTan,em•nu for organ e. In aev ra1 
participatin, hot~picals. identification of potential donom nd 
contact with the famil~· to consider donation approached 1~. 
However, consent was obtained onl)· of the time. The 
combination of increased use of donor cud&. Unpro\'ed donor 
identification through th · tanc:e of nUJ'IIeiJ from the tra.zas. 
plant team, and adoption of laws that preaame conaent to 
salvqe organa fin &he absence of · objectioa) would 
certainly ensure an inc d supply of cadaver orpna probabl)· 
sufficient to meec society'• n 
Dukeminier C61 has noted that continued short 1Upply of 
cadaver o •'ill ine\itably inc:n~ase the preuure~ to buy 
spare OJ'i&na, IUCh as 8 kidney or a pnoDt of inteatine, from 
willing, living, unn ted persons. Alcbouih the ale of organa 
by live donors or by the next of kin after the donor'• death ia 
repugnant to most people, it ia not d t 'th by the Uniform 
Anatomical Gift Act. Sale of o by unrelated live clonon is 
not forbidden by any state. Only Georgia speci(acally forbids 
the sale of cadaver organa. At present it only the unwritten 
code of ethb of transplan tion surgeons that prevents the aale 
of live, unrelated. and cadaver orpna. Specific IDaDipuladon of 
the immune r.pow~e · 110on &llow r concrol of graft 
rejection. Increasing success in aunaplan tioD will place tre-
mendous pressure on transplant aurgeona to modify their op-
position. at least to th willing, li , ted donor. W are t 
the point beN, as Dukemtnier (6) sta "'Society must lace 
the fact that cadnver OJ"'IM can to ve human W'e &Del 
that a bnrd choice must now be made. It must deddo whether 
to advaDCO the policy of preserviDg uti or to d pon1yzed by 
ita taboos." 
BASIS FOR EQUATING BRAIN DEATH WITH DEATH 
Brain d th (in'eversible loss of aD brain func:tiona) ia DOW 
wid ly recognized aa mectically definable cnate and a basia for 
decJaring rson's death (12, 13). Moreover, th re votid 
reasons why it ia ppropriate to recognize brain deeth when it 
occurs and to not leave mechanical tilator in place until 
hypotension or pneumonia and hypo:ria finally cause che heart 
to atop (13). It is unreuonable to subject the tiGnts' family to 
dditional days or weeks of false hope, grief, and medical 
expense beyond the point of brain death. Society ebouJd also 
be spared the useless costa that it coven a third party. 
Prolonged support of respiratory and cardiac function after 
bnUn death hu occuned is demoralizing to nurea and other 
_______ Th~eam_~~ ~L_do'~LP~~~~~~lC~~n~~~~Lm~~~~~~kL~uwUd~~~~~~-­
Atlanta ~eema to have found a way co increue identir~Carion of 
potential donors in hospitals t t are not involved directly with 
an transplantation (10). The plan was accepted by all but 
ono hospita.l in the Atlanta metropolitan area. Initially, pennis· 
aion wu obtained for a nur~e coordinator from the ne 
tranaplanr program to work with the local hoapitaJ'a medical 
1'\'cord librarian to survey the incidence of d ths that might 
ha\·· n roUowed by organ 81.\lvage. Next, permiuion WM 
ohtained from the hospi dmin' rataon d the medical staff 
for the nurse coordinator to viait the inte1111iv care unil& on a 
r• ~-ular buis and to pproach the attending ph)·sicia.n~~ about 
p.ttienu whose brain death was imminent. Then, with the 
pt1~ l!lcian'e pt:nniaaion. and only after he had infurmtod t~ 
urgently by the lhing, ~-et they muat take part in a c e 
involving the brain-dead patient for the sake of his relativ 
who not yet aware that death hu occ:urred. Finolly, the 
only practicaliiOW'Ce of \'iable cadav ric organs for tnuuJplan• 
tion ia from patittnu whose cardiac function and ventiJatioD 
are maintained brittfi~· after brain death hu OCCUlTed. None of 
the o wW be \.;able and tr naplantabJe if the d tion 
of death is delay~ until agonal hypotension, hypoxia, 
cardiac arrest ha\'t- occurred in spite of m.:hanicaJ ven · tory 
IUpport. 
The American 1\!.,.dical .Aaeo<'iation hu long maintained that 
physicians have d the prerogative of 'ng death on the 
basis of brain death. Many phyBicia have exerc:iMd chat 
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prt>rugau'..: rlunng tht! past two decade:;. Other ph~·siciaru~ are 
afraid to dedart- death on the basis of brain death it it ia not 
~tpt-eiflcally allowed by state law. If the~· are unwilling to risk 
law11uit, such ph~·sic1ans have little choice other than to leave 
rh.- ventilator in place for as long u it takes until cardiac an-eat 
occura. Otipit~ Jta medical and scientific uhdity and despite 
its considerable legal and social acceptance. w;e of the brain 
death concept has been hampered in some areas by the absence 
of legal recognition. This reluctance to make death pronounce· 
ments on the buia of total and irreversible cessation of brain 
functions hall been documented by letten from neurologists or 
neurosurgeons in 13 of the 50 states. Because of theM letters. 
the American Medical Aaaoc:iation recently revereed ita position 
that specific legislation to recognize brain death as a basia for 
dt>elaring death was neither necessary nor helpful. 
LEGAL STATUS OF BRAtN DEATH J:-; THE UNITED 
STATES 
Twenty-five states adopted lawa from19i0 through 1979 that 
specifically recognize brain death as a basis for dedaring death 
(Table 31. As indicated in Table 3, the lawa are pattemed after 
11('\'eral models that have beeD thoroughly ft\iewed elsewhere 
c 131. In three additional statet~. Maaaachusetta, (14), Colorado 
(15), and Arizona (16), the legality of a pronouncement of death 
baaed on total and irreverm"ble c:eaation of brain fuadioaa baa 
been conaidered before the lUshest state court. ID all Chree of 
these states, brain death pronouncements have been beld to be 
\'alid and legal. Ia four other states, New York, MinneDota, 
Florida, and Ohio, lower court decisiODS bave made llimi1ar 
judamenta. However, the decisions were not appealed to bieber 
courta. 
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS INDICATING THAT THE BRAIN 
DEATH CONCEPT WILL GAIN WIDER LEGAL 
RECOGNmON WITHIN THE UNITED STATES 
In addition to the more widespread statutory and jwiicial 
recoenition afforded brain death pronouneementa over the past 
several years, several other rennt developments indic:ate that 
still wider legal rec:osnition ill likely. The first is the adoption in 
August 19'78 of a model Uniform Brain Death Act by the 
\'ol. :n. No. 4 
National Confere-nce of Commissioners on Uniform State La.-8 
in the United Slat~ C 17). This act specifies that: 
For legal and medical purpoaea, an individual who hu MlataiiWd 
arrnenible rell68tion ol aU functionina of the brain. includinc &he 
brain atem. u dead. A cletennination under thia MCtion mUIC be 
made in acc:ordanc9 with reuonable medic:ai i&Mdarda. · 
In a comment on the Uniform Brain Death Act. the Com. 
missionen stated that "the act does not preclude a determiDa-
tion ol death under other legal and medical criteria, inductina 
the traditional criteria of ceaaation of respiration and circula· 
tion." 
Another important development has been a chazage in the 
position of the American Medical Asaoc:iation away from ope 
position to statutory defmitions of death. Thill opposition wu 
based on a belief that there wu no need for IIUch laws. In 197i. 
this oppoaition BOftened and in December 1979, largely aa a 
result of added praaure from organizations representing neu-
rologiata and n•urosW'Jeona. this opposition waa entirely re-
versed, and a Model Act to provide for the determinatiOD of 
death waa adopted by the American Medical AasodaQon House 
of Delegates ( 181. The important sections of this act read: 
AD individual who bu 8Witai.aed either 1l inevenlible Cell&tion 
ol cin:ulatoey or respiratory fllnc:tioa~, or 2• irrevenlible Ce~~&tioa 
of all lunctioDa of tbe entire brain. aball be ~ c1ea4. A 
cs.terminatioo or death aba1l be~ ba &CIC'OI'dance wt&b ·~ 
med:kal st.aDdan!a. A ph)'llician or 8ll)' otbllr periOD autboriMd by 
law to determine death who makes ~~~eh determiudoa ba accord· 
uce with I the above) il DOt liable for d.u:Dqa iD &D)' civil ac:tioD 
w IUbject 10 proeeeutioD ba 8llY criminal~ for bJa aeta • 
the ICU ofo~en ilaMd OD that~ 
lD May 1980, representatives of the American Medical M-
aoeiation, American Bar Aaociatioo. and the NatioDal Coat•· 
nee of Commis&ionen of Uniform State Laws reached qree. 
ment on a Uniform DetermiDation ol Death Act. 1'bia DeW 
uniform determinatioa reada: 
An i.Ddividul who hu sustained either 1) ~le ceaadon 
or cimdatory Uld nspi.nltory functioDI. or 2• irnvenible -.atioD 
of all fllnctioDa of the entire brafn, l.ndudiq the brUa a&em, il 
T AJU.& 3. Mode !a adopted by 25 ~&ata for mtutory det\nilion or death 
KlllUIII8 1970 
~laryland 19'i'2- -
:Sew Mexico 1973 
\'ir(inia .. 1 1973 
Oreton 197'~ 
Sorth Carolintr' 1977 
Aluka 1974 
West Virginia• 1975 
Louisiana' 1976 
low.-a• 1976 
Ha,.,-au•· ' 1978 
Teua1979 
Alabama' 1979 
Amenean Bar Aw;ociation model: ure-
v.n.il* ctaaauon of tow brain func:. 
u-~u.a •ath 
oma 





Connecticut•·· • 1979 
• Specifically .Uowa death declaration on basiS of cardiorespiratory failw. or brain death. 
Unifoml BraiD DNCb IIIOdel: 
Samillt co AtMric:ul Bu ~
Ucla model but empb..-... irft. 




• Uae of brain·related cri~ria to pronounc~ duth requires opmion of two physicians. In wme inst.anc:~s N irrinia and Hawaii I, one or theM 
muat be • llpeciali.lln neuroiOCY or neui'OIIUI'gen· . 
· Physician who makft th• determination of duth may not participate In removal or rran.~plantation of orpru; from the deceued. 
"Total br•in function ia deraned u pu~ful ac-uvitin of rhto br•in .. db ll"l\liahed from randum activity. 
• Use of br•in-related criteria only to be uaed for purposetl of th~ Anatomical Gtfl Act. i.e f<K purpusea of or1an dunation. 
'ALia require11 •baenl:e olepontaneoua breathang. 
'As amended in 19'711; Capron-Kualik~ in ,;omto r~:cardA. 
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d.-~td. A dPtt'mllnarum of dt>ath mu:ot Ill" madt- an &4'1'ordann• wnh 
accepte-d medical atandardll. 
Thi.li new model law has been officiall\· endorwd b\' the 
Ethics Conunitree ofthe American Acade~y of Neurology, the 
National Conference of Commissioners of l' nifonn State Laws 
and the Leplative c"«>uncil of the American Medical Auoc:ia: 
tion. It is expecr..d that the Board of Trustees of the American 
Medical Association and the House of Delegates of the Ameri· 
can Bar Association will endorse the model law at meetings 
IIC'hedult>d in late 1980 and early 1981. A newly appointed 
Preaidenti.IJ ComnuSBion on the Study of Ethical Problems in 
Medicine and Biomedical and Behavioral Research is a1ao 
considering the issue of brain death and the need for legislation 
to recognize it. 
LEGAL STA T\JS OF BRAI~ DEATH OUTSIDE 11iE 
UNITED STATES 
Responses from 13 of the 28 countries reported that there 
wu specific statutory recognition of brain death as a basis for 
declaring death: Argentina, Australia, Austria, Canada, Czech· 
oalovak.ia, Finland, France, Great Britain, Greece, Italy, Nor· 
"'ay, Puerto Rico, and Spain (Table 4). Two of the 13 countries 
f.\uatralia and Canada) have eeveral provinces or atatea that 
have not yet enacted brain death law& Britain uses a code of 
practice that baa quasi-legal stat\111. The code wu drawn up in 
October 1979, by a Working Party under the uspicea of the 
United Kingdom Health Departments. 
Although the remaining 15 countries ve no specific laws 
that recocnite brain death. in 10 of them the condition ol brain 
death · accepted medically and uaed u a basis to declare 
death: BelBtwn. Germany, India. Ireland, The Netherlandl, 
New Zealand, South Africa. South Korea. Switzerland, and 
Thailand. In the n-mninlns five. it ia the practice to wait for 
cardiac arrest before declarins death and proceeding with re-
moval of organs for tzan.splaDtation: Denmark. el. Japan. 
Poland, and Sweden. 
BASIS FOR DECLARATION OF BRAIN DEA11i 
A coNMtnsua hu evolved in the United States that brain 
death is a clinical diagnollia which can usually be established by 
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Finland lane I 
France J 
GrN t Bntain' The Netherlands• 
Greec• N-Zealand• 
Italy Po !aDd 
Norway South Africa• 




• Brain death 1a ac-cepted medicaUy even in absence of aperi(~e brain 
oif'ath atatute 
• \'a.rW. wath state or provitk·.,. 
'Code of practice with qu&~o~·l~al atatur.. 
physical ~xamin~tion alone C 19, 20•. Electroencephalography, 
computerued ax1al tomography, and cerebral arteriography are 
ProcedW'es that ma~· be used at the diAcretion of the ph\·sici.an 
to confarm the diagnosia of brain death. AU of the state iawo as 
weU as the model laws propoeed by tbe Amerit"an Medical 
A880Ciation and the National Conference of Commiasionen on 
Unifonn State Laws require only that the phy.ician ue reuora· 
able, accepted. or prevailing medical standards in pronouncing 
death. The statutes are brief and avoid details of the medical 
examination and testing that might be used to diqnoae brain 
death. The laws simply recogniu that brain death can ~ 
diagnosed and that it is equivalent to the death ol a penon. 
Other countries that follow this approach to the d' oeia of 
brain death listed in Table 5. AU of the Engliah-apeakina 
countries that responded to the questionnaire are in this group. 
Ten countries require either electroencephalography d/or 
cerebral arteriography to confum the diagnosia of brain death 
before proceeding with organ removal (Table 5). In these COWl· 
tries the medical criteria and testa required to diagnose brain 
death are either part of a statute or part of a nationv.ide 
re tion with Jegalatatua: A.rpntina. AUIIU'ia. Czechoslovakia. 
France, Greece, Italy, Norway, Poland, Switzerland. and Thai· 
land. 
SOURCES M'D REASONS FOR PRESENT OPPOSmON TO 
STA T\..'TORY RECOGNmON OF BRAL'i DEA11i 
PRONOUNCEMENTS IN THE UNITED STATES 
In the last years, bWs that recognize the leplity of 
brain death pronouncements have been introduced in eevenl 
state legislatures in the United States ed have been dd ted. 
The buill for most opposition to etatutory definitiODa of death 
is that such Ia are ived u being tAtd to laws that will 
faeWtate active or · ao-aDed .. d th·witb-
C'liDic:al Cervini 
~
Alpntina X X 
Au.st.r'ala X 
AUitria X X 
Bel&ium X 
Canada X 
Czec:hoalovalda X X 01' X 
Finland X 
Fnu1ce X X 
Germany X 
Gnat Britaift X 
.Gmtee- -·- ---··-·- ---. ---x--- X 
India X 
Ireland X 
Italy X X 
N- Zealand X 
Norway X X 
Poland" X X X 
Puerto Ric-o X 
South Africa X 
South KWH X 
&pain X 
Sweden• X 
Switzerland X X or X 
Ttwi.land X X 




dignit.\ ·· or ''right-to-dit!" lav. :-o • .:o;ratutor~• dt>finitionll of death 
an· re~arded B!l .. foot-in-lhe-door''legWation for bil111 which will 
permit euthanasia 421). Althou~h thill has rartoly, if ever. bHn 
the calle, thi.R rea110ning has promptl'd the strong and effective 
opposition of aome groups. 
Sonlf' oppoauion t6 the roncept of brain death also exiatl (22, 
23). Air hough a roncepr of death bued on 1otal and irre\'ersible 
ceuation of brain functions iD consiatent wilh the traditions. 
ethics, and theological writings o( all three major Weatem 
religions (13), there are splinter groupe within these religions 
which oppose Uua roncept in principle. Most of these minority 
groups within major religions have failed to publish their op-
poaition or the reaaona that prompted iL Some members of the 
Right·to-Life or Pro-Life Movement have recentl)' begun to 
~gnize that statutory definitions of death and ao-c:alled right-
to-die la ws or laws that permit euthanuia deal with quite 
aeparate wues. This recognition ha&, in part. been stimulated 
by the realization that the existence of a Ita tutory definition of 
death makes an inadequate death pronouncement and eutha· 
nu ia more, not Jeaa. diffic:ult. Awarenesa of these pointa ha& 
prompted the prestigioua Pro-Life Catholic ethicists Germain 
Grisez and Joseph M. Boyle to write in pport of atatutory 
defmitions of death (24). 
Meanwhile, court casea over the issue of exactly what consti· 
tutes death continue to arise and attract public inters in those 
juriadictiona without atatutory defmitions of death. Theae cases 
more than anything e1ae dearly empb.a.me to IIOciety the need 
for statutory def&nition ol death to keep the law consistent 
with present cay science ud medicine. These coun caaa are, 
lhenfore, a atrong and continuina impetua to the more wide-
apread legal NCOgnition ol the brain death concepL 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
The need for cadaver organs wiU increase u the clinical 
outcome of organ ttansplancation continues to improve. Society 
is increasingly aware of the remarkable rehabilitation that· 
cmnsplants offer. The shortage of organs is not because of a 
lack o( potential donors. Enough people die under conditions 
that would allow removal of transplantable Ol'g&ns to aneet the 
needa of all potential transplant rec:ipientl. The ahortqe results 
from failure to identify potential donon and from frequent lack 
of consent to remove organs after death. Continued efforts to 
inform the medical community and the seneral pubUc bout 
transplantation will help to identify potential donon and in-
crease the likelihood of obtaining family c:onaent to remove 
organs. But, many doubt that these steps •ill be sufficient. 
The Center for Disease Control of the United States Public: 
m bo 
established to identify suitable potmtial donom in hospitals 
with more than 100 deaths each year. 11VI eurwrillance group 
would interface between attending ph "dans and transplant 
centers. Widespread use of the CDC proposal should identify 
more potential donors, and might also increase the likelihood 
of obtainins family con~~ent as bener informed hospital person· 
nelleam to handle the i.uue in a sincere, aenaitive manner. 
Some suggat that only pretlumed consent to remove orgaN 
will yield aufrac:ient numbers. The c:ountrietl IIW'Veyed .-ere 
equaUy divided amon thORe that require family or donor 
consent and those that pte~~~.~mto conaeot. Conaent ia not pre-
awned in any of the F"""lillh·sptoakinc C"OUntntoa and attempt11 
to introduct! it would prubebl~· meet IDUCh ftoSiatancto. Hope.--
fully, other approachel' than presumed conaent will provide 
adequate numbt>rs of organ!l for tran~~plantalion. 
Finally, a consensus i.~ e,·o)\;ng both in the Uni~ Scates and 
elsewhere that brain death can be diapoeed with reaaonable 
certainty and should be recogni2ed by la u a · for deda.r· 
ing • person 'a death. Elimination of uncertainty about the lepl 
equivalence of brain death and death of a person ahould increue 
the liGlvqe of cadaver organs and reduce the amount of iache· 
mic injury that they BUBtain bef< removal. 
Acluwu:ledjpnf'nt8. We appl'ftiat.e .-ponMS to our queatiDanairn ' 
from Argentina tO. A. Lopez Blanco), AUIO'alia CA. G. R. Sheil. J. E. 
HWM. R. S. N1UU11, A. d'Apicet, Auatria cO. Waped, Belaiu~D CP. 
Kinnaertt, Cauda IR. D. Guttmu~~, J. R. Jeffery, N. A. IWtuft. G. 
Deveberl, Czechoslovakia (V. Koc:andrlet. Decunuk CF. ~rt, 
Finland CB. L. Linclsuvml. F~ CJ. M. Dubemard). West Germany 
CR. Pichlmayr, H. Pichlmaierl. Great Britain (G. D. au.bolm. P. 
Morris. R. Y. Caine, J. R. Salamu). Greece fJ. D. Homatu. E. J. 
Hadji)'Malcia), IDdie <R. V. S. YadaD,, Iarael CR. A. Preffermaam. Z. F. 
Braf), Italy CG. Mazzoni. S. Stipal, Japu CY. ldnllki. Y. •••akfl, 
Ireland CA. Walahl. The Netherland~ CD. W. wan Bekkum), New 
Zealand lB. H.-lopl, Norway lA. Jako nt, PolaDd !W. A. Rowinlkil, 
Pueno Rico cE. A. Santiqo-Delpiat, SoUth Africa CA. R. Poncin. J. A. 
MybUI'gh), South Ko !Yoftl Kale Lee), Spain (E. Rotellar), s..den 
CC. G. Groth, C . Franblon, B. Huabarl. Switzertaa4 (F.l.aqiader, F. 
Harderl, Gild ThailaDd (f. Shaipamcb). We appnciate dw bel,» or 
Mary &..W.Ch in preparina and lllllidDi 1M manUICI'Ipt. 
LITERATURE errED 
1. Health Care FUwlclnc Admmisuatiaa. ESRD PropuD: &acolld 
Annual Repon to Coqreea. FY 1 
2. Couch NB: 1966 TranoplaDc.WaD 4: 187 
a. Bart KJ, MacoD EJ, Whittiet PC, 14 aJ: Trauplutadoa fill ,_, 
4. Gallup PoD: JUNIII)' 17, UMil, N .. Yen Timea City Edldaa. pIS. 
columD a 
6. Sadler A. Sadler B. Stuon D: 1168 .lAMA JOa 3801 
6. Oukeminier J: 1970 Micb w Rov 68: 811 
7. WWiama R: 1969 Arch Iaten~ Med 124: 216 
8. Ad Hoc Committee on Orpn ~\Dtkla. dnrl reporl so 
EUIOPIIan Committee on Cooperation, CouDdl of Europe, 
s~. Man:h 1a. 197& 
9. Si.mmoaa RG. Klein so. s· RL: um, p :sa& Oi/l of ,q.. .robn 
Wiley Sons, New York 
10. Bart KJ, Macoo EJ, Humpbriae AL. et a1: 1'1uaplanla&iaa fill 
P*-11 
11. Note: 1969 Columb' LAw !Wv • 893 
12. B k PM: 19'i'8 N Enc2 J • 299: 338. 393 
13. Veith FJ. Fein JM, Tendler D • .t a1: 11'77 JAMA 238: 1651, 1144 
! ... Commonwealth v...us Golst.oo: 366 NE 2d '741 (l\4.-. 19'77) 
15. Lovato venus District Court CColaradol, No '7'9 SA lilY/ (Oct 15, 
]979) 
16. State vemu Fierro, ANona SuPft'IIM Court, 19'7'9 
17. rm run , 
National Conference ot Comrni.aiOMI'I on Cnironn s.. .. Lawa, 
July 28-August 4, 1978 
18. Model Lepu.tion: I~ .lAMA 243: GO 
19. Selby R: 19i9 !'\euroeuruery 6: 636 
20. Sweet WH: 19'i'8 N End J Med 299:410 
21 . Lecis!otiVIl' lftndJI: 1976 Qrisina 6; 4 11 
22. Bynw .. A. O'Reilly S, Qua~· PM: 1979 .lAMA 241: 1118& 
23. \'eith FJ. Tendler MD: 1980 JAM 2.:S: 1808 
24. Gn.z G. Boyle .JM: 1979, p Mt Lif~ Olld dealll lllilll ~ 1111d 
jullli~Y: a rontnbutioll to tla~ el'tltanuia d~6ole. UniV'Iflit\· ol 
Sot~ Dame .. ,.._, NutA l)ame, lad • 
Hec~riwd 6 A at 1~. 
A&:ctrflted 211' 0..1oblrr 1~). 
-46-
COMPLIMENTS OF: JULIUS YOUMANS, 
DECLARATION OF CEREBRAL DEATH 
A person may be pronounced dead if it is determined by a physician 
that the person has suffered a total and irreversible cessation of brain 
function. There shall be an independent confirmation of the death by another 
physician. 
Factors to be considered in declaring brain death include: 
1. Cerebral unresponsitivity. There should be no evidence of a 
cerebral type of response to intensely painful stimulus, 
noise or visual stimulation. Spinal cord reflexes may be 
present. 
2. Absence of brain stem reflexes, including the pupillary and 
oculocephalic reflexes. 
3. Apnea. Trials of the first five and then ten minutes 
without respiration should produce no efforts at spontaneous 
breathing. 
4. The patient shoul~ have a brain lesion that is not unamenable to 
treatment. Primary hypothermia and significant abnormalities of 
the metabolic and endocrine factor should be excluded. 
5. Chemical screening for drug levels should be done in all cases 
except those with a firm diagnosis of a major cerebral lesion 
that is clearly capable of causing brain death and there is no 
history of ingestion of drugs. 
6. Confirmatory tests that may be used in making the diagnosis of 
brain death include the absence of blood flow as shown by 
angiogram, isotope studies or absence of midline echo 
pulsations, persistent intracranial pressure measurements 
sufficiently over systemic blood pressure to preclude 
intracranial flow; and electrocerebral silence on the 
electroencephalogram. 
------------· ·- ------ -------~~~~:..:..:=.=~~~~-------------------
JRY:bl 
7. Factors supporting the diagnosis of cerebral death should be 
present for six hours with a known structural untreatable brain 
lesion of the type that can produce cerebral death. If such a 
lesion is not present, or the patient is under· one year of age 
the factors supporting the diagnosis of cerebral death should be 
death should be present at least 24 hours. 




For an~:ient and medieval man. death was 
an experience cloaked in mystery and fear. 
Because of its universal and irreversible na-
ture. the subject has been treated exten-
sively in the literature of philosophy, theol-
ogy. and science from ancient times to the 
present. The role of the physician in this 
drama was to prevent death through treat-
ment and, if this was not possible. then to 
determine when death had occurred. Thus. 
various criteria for the determination of 
death arose. including cessation of respira-
tions and heart beat, lack of pupillary ac-
tion, rigor mortis, hypostasis. and relaxa-
tion of the anal sphincter. However. since 
even deep coma might be reversible in the 
rare case, the only incontrovertible sign of 
death for the ancients was the onset of tis-
sue decay. 
The lack of a reliable criterion for distin-
guishing actual from apparent death caused 
a universal concern that it might be pro-
nounced prematurely. Indeed. in previous 
centuries this fear was not unfounded. Nu-
merous instances of individuals who were 
thought to be dead but had cataplexy. 
trance states, hysteria, hypothermia, and 
coma from a variety of causes were re-
ported even in the late nineteenth cen-
tury .d6 Writing in 1896, Montgomery re-
ported on the condition of bodies removed 
from a military cemetery. He states: 
We found among these remains two that bore 
every evidence of having been buried alive. The 
first case was that of a soldier that had been 
~truck by lightning. Upon opening the lid of the 
coftln we found that the arms and legs had been 
drawn up as far as the confines of the coffin 
would permir. The other was a case of death re-
sulting from alcoholism. The body was slightly 
turned. the le!,l~ were drawn up a trifle and the 
h.mds were clut~o:hing the clothe!..:,~ 
He concluded his report by saying 
Nearly two percent of those exhumed were, no 
doubt. victims of suspended animation.~2 
Pamphlets with such t'itles as "Burying 
Alive, a Frequent Peril" kept the public 
concerned by citing cases like that of a 35-
year-old man who was supposed to have 
died of scarlet fever and was buried 48 
hours later. The pamphlet stated 
The coffin was moved two months later and 
the glass front was found to be shattered, the 
bottom kicked out and the sides sprung. The 
body was reported to lay face downward with 
the arms bent and in the clenched fist were hand-
fuls of hair. 7~ 
Such reports gained wide circulation and 
fueled the universal fear of premature inter-
ment. As a result many individuals 
throughout the world left instructions that 
their bodies were to be mutilated by such 
actions as having a sword put through the 
heart after death was thought to have oc-
curred. According to Walker. as late as 
1918 the law in France was that death could 
be declared only after temporal or radial ar-
'teriotomy produced no hemorrhage.72 This 
widespread attitude changed little until a 
more scientific one developed later in this 
century. Despite the scientific progress. in-
cidents still happen that support the fear of 
an incorrect dia nosis of death. For in-
stance, in 1967 an American soldier who 
had failed to respond to the efforts of a re-
suscitation team for nearly an hour was left 
for dead and later showed signs of life as he 
was about to be embalmed.:H In view of the 
centuries-old universal fear of incorrect 
diagnosis of death and premature burial, it 
is remarkable that during a mere two dec-
ades the world's society could accept such 
J. R. YOUMANS,T. M. KELLER, ANDJ. F. ALKSNE 
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,..,.·ceri ng sociological. philosophical. and 
legal .:hanges as to even consider the diag-
no~i" of Jea h of the organism by death of a 
~ingle o rgan. i.e., the brain.~ 
The background for acceptance of cere-
bral Jeath as an entity was developed dur-
ing the last few decades with the gradual 
•1cceptance of the idea that death encom-
pas-.;es many factors a d evolves in stages 
rather than being one simple finite cataclys-
mic event. The definition of death as a ces-
!iUtion of all vital functions in a Jiving orga-
nism was enlarged as insight and diverse 
connot<Jtions were applied to it by individu-
als of various professions and backgrounds. 
Many amplifying terms were used. They in-
cluued such terms as "biological death," 
"brain death." "cardiac death," "cerebral 
death." "clinical death," "cortical death," 
"cytological death." "irreversible death," 
"legal death." "psychological death,'' 
"p~ycho~ocial death," and "spiritual 
death. "'2 Against this background, the de-
velopment of modern techniques that per-
mitted prolonged artificial ventilation of ap-
neic patients gave urgency to the quest for 
criteria for death that recognized the legal, 
social. medical. and ethical implications of 
declaring death in a patient who had lost 
certain vital functions but not all others. 
These discussions have led to many defi-
nitions of death. One that has been well ac-
cepted defines death as ". . . a point at 
which the deterioration of functions be-
comes irreversible so that the organism can 
never again function as an integrated, ratio-· 
nal organ. " 10 Perhaps, in the statement at-
tributed to him, Justice Holmes best sum-
marized the problem when he said "to live 
is to function: that is all there is to Jiving. " 27 
The question has arisen whether destruc-
t ion of the cerebral hemispheres or cerebral 
cortex in a person with preserved respira-
functions could be con-
side red to be adequate evidence to ec are 
that person clinically or legally brain dead. 
Some wri ters have argued that cortical 
deuth alone is not sufficient to deprive a 
person of his right to liveY' The justifica-
tiOn for this argument is that some psychic 
activity may be present in the brain stem. 
Others have argued that if the cerebrum is 
irreversibly destroyed bilaterally, the infra-
tentoria l portions of the brain do not have 
psyc hic uctivity and make no significant 
contribution to the continuing function of 
the total human organism .u The issue in 
this controversy is whether vegetative 
functions oft e body without accompany-
ing cerebral function constitute an adequate 
basis for declaring the person to be alive. 
Some aut ors have qualified the term 
"cere ral death" and have subdivided it 
into "neocortical death," which means the 
destruction of the cerebral mantle. and 
"brain death,'' which has been reserved to 
mean the total destruction of all the intra-
crania nervous tis~ue.~~ Although physi-
cians well-informed in neurology can reli-
ably diagnose brain death even with some 
lower brain stem reflexes present, at pres-
ent it would seem that a holistic designa-
tion is appropriate and that a subdivision of 
the diagnosis should not be attempted. 
A problem arises when the terms ··cere-
bral death'' or "brain death" and "irre-
versible coma·· are used loosely. Cerebral 
death implies total and permanent abolition 
of brain function so that both volitional and 
higher-level reflex activity and responsivity 
are lost. In contrast '"irrj!versible coma" 
refers to a state in which all functions at-
tributed to the cerebrum that identify the 
human essence-mind. personality, behav-
ior, and in theological terms. the soul-are 
lost, but certain functions that regulate res-
piration. temperature, blood pressure. and 
lower-level central nervous system activity 
remain. Patients with irreversible coma fit 
the so-called appallic state described by 
lngvar and Brun, which implies loss of the 
pallium, the cortical gray matter that covers 
the cerebral cortex.36 These patients are in 
the broad category that includes the persist-
ent vegetative states, coma vigi l. and ak·-
netic mutism.~2 In them a variety of vegeta-
tive functions including respirat ion may be 
preserved so that survival for years is pos-
sible. 
The well-publicized case of Karen Quin-
an • • 27 
For reasons that are unc lea , this 21-year-
old girl ceased breathing for two 15-minute 
periods. On her admission to the hospital 
her temperature was 100°, her pupils were 
unreactive, and she was unresponsive to 
deep pain. She was given respiratory assis-
tance via a respirator. When examined by a 
neurologist three days later she was found 
to be comatose with evidence of decortica-
tion. The respiratory assistance was contin-
ued. Tests of the urine disclosed traces of 
-4 9-
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quin ine. barbiturates. and diazepam. A 
brain· scan. an angiogram. and a lumbar 
puncture were normal. Her electroenceph-
alogram was characterized as "abnormal. 
but it showed some activity a nd was con-
sistent wit h her clinical state ." The c linical 
state was a sleeplike unrespons ive condi-
tion at fi rst, but later she developed sleep-
wake cyc les. In the waking state she would 
blink and cry out. She was "totally un-
aware of anyone or anything around her," 
and was characterized as being in a 
"chronic . pers istive, vegetative state, and 
no longer had any cognitive function. ··2 ~ 
LEGAL ASPECTS 
Prior to the evolution of the concept of 
cerebral death before death of the entire 
body. the courts of the United States were 
applymg the definition of death from 
Black ' s law dictionary. which was 
the cessatron of life: the ceasing to exist: 
defined by physicians as a total stoppage of the 
circulation of the blood, and a cessation of the 
animal and vital functions consequent thereupon 
such a~ respirations. pulsations, etc. 1 ~ 
Typical of the legal rulings based on that 
definition was that of an appeals court. 
which said in a case determining which of 
two men had died first, 
. . . death occurs precisely when life ceases 
and docs not occur until the heart stops beating 
. and respirations end. Death is n9t a continuous 
event and is an event that takes place at a precise 
'-time .67 
As a result of this type of approach by the 
to mary standards of mcdil:il l prac tice. it has bee n 
determined that the person has ~u ffered an irre-
versible ces~at ion of brain fu nction ... . 1" 
The legal ramifications of defining death 
are far-ranging. For instance. the s ituat ion 
may exist in which a person is considered 
dead for one purpose suc h as transplan ta-
tion of organs, and a live for anothe r such as 
inheritance or predecease of another ind i-
vidual or re solution of problems involving 
estate taxes. The legal complexit ies have 
led legislative bodies to vary widely in the 
degree of specificity that they enjoin in giv-
ing legal sanction to the concept of cerebral 
death. Some states in the United States 
have been quite specific and others have 
followed the advice of the House of Dele-
gates of the American Medical Association, 
which supported the concept of cerebral 
death but opposed statutory definitions. In 
the December 1974 meeting of the House of 
Delegates. the following resolution was 
passed. 
Reso/l·ed. That the American Medical Associa-
tion reaffirm established policies that: "At first 
statutory definition of death is neither desirable 
or necessary": "that state medical associations 
urge their respective legislatures to postpone en-
actment of legislation defining death by statute"; 
"that death shall be determined by the clinical 
judgment of the phys icians using the necessary 
available and current accepted criteria··; and 
"permanent and irreversible cessation of func-
tion of the brain constitutes one of the various 
criteria which can be used in the medical diag-
nosis of death.· '72 
MORAL ASPECTS 
courts, the physicians making a diagnosis of The potential for error a nd lax ity causes 
cerebral death and stopping respiratory as- troublesome ethical and moral q uestions. 
sistance to the patient or removing organs The remote possibi lity of error mandates 
for trans pian tat ion bet ore cessatiun~:orif'i1Tite!1antt-t -----ccli'aiTuf1tti71omnll'a[l'nrrdhc::-~:oJ1tntc::J:e~•,uriinn-ee"V"Yee-Fr)v-· -aaS1Sfll}lt!~C~trio>if:_ _ 
beat were at risk of prosecut ion for mal- mak ing the diagnosis . When appropriate 
practice by omission or criminal prosecu- caution and concern have been used. cur-
tion for permitt ing removal of an organ rent theological teachings would support 
prio r to the patient's death . Gradually over the concept of diagnosing cerebral death 
several years the concept of cerebral or and taking appropriate action. For exam-
brain death as representing the actual death pie . Pope Pius XII discussed the obligation 
of the ind ividual came to be supported in a to use elaborate and expensive means of re-
number of courts and j udic ial forums . 3~'51 '59 suscitation by saying 
For example, one early court ru li ng that 
f b · d h It is incumbent on the physician to take all rea-
supported the new concept 0 ram eat sonable. ordinary mean~ of restoring the sponta-
was that neous vital functions ami consciousness. and to 
Deat h is the cessation of life. A person may he employ such extraordinary means as are avail-
pronounced dead if. based on the usual and cus- able to him to I his end . It is not !)bligatory. how-
-50-
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nt:r. ro ulfllllllll' ru uc,e cxlraonllnary mean~ in-
udinircly 1n hopeless c!asesY• 
In this regard the definition of extraordi-
nary means has been interpreted as 
.. whatever . .. is very costly or very un-
usual. or very painful. or very difficult. or very 
dangerous. or if the good effects that can be ex-
pected from it are not proportionate to the diffi-
..:ulties and inconveniences that are entailed .20 
WORLD ACCEPTANCE 
The acceptance of the concept of cere-
bral death varies in different countries of 
the world (Tahle 21-1 ). The difference in 
philosophies of the various nations and so-
cieties was shown at the 1976 meetings of 
the Neurorruumatology Committee of the 
World Federation of Neurological Socie-
ties.72 Two major views were put forth. One 
was that the criteria for brain death should 
be based upon clinical considerations with 
lrttle or no laboratory confirmation. Those 
holding that view thought that, with a con-
firmed diagnosis of an untreatable and soon 
to be fatal brain lesion, the absence of re-
sponsivity and spontaneous respirations 
and cephalic reflexes for a period of 12 to 48 
hours was a simple and satisfactory means 
of determining the death of the brain that 
could be used by all physicians regardless 
of their neurological expertise. The other 
view was that clinical criteria were inade-
quate and laboratory tests such as electro-
encephalographic or metabolic studies 
were needed to confirm the diagnosis. Im-
plied in this second view is the constraint 
that the diagnosis of cerebral death could 
be made only in centers equipped for these 
laboratory studies and by individuals who 
were adequately trained to interpret and 
correlate them with the patient's neurologi-
cal status. This latter approach would not 
be a significant impediment to organ trans-
plantation, since organs are transplanted in 
well-equipped hospitals where the instru-
TABLE 21-1 MEDICAL AND LEGAL STATUS OF CEREBRAL DEATH• 
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mentat1on for making the various studies 
is available. However. the question of 
whether to continue costly and needless 
support of a hopelessly ill patient arises in 
smalle r and less well-equipped hospitals 
also . Indeed. the need for the decision to be 
made for economic and humanitarian rea-
sons involving only the patient and his fam-
ily will arise much more often than it will 
for o rgan transplantation. 
CHARACTERISTICS 
OF BRAIN DEATH 
Physical Signs 
A patient with brain death will have no 
respirations but may have a pulse and blood 
pressure. The blood pressure may be nor-
mal or unstable, and pressor agents may be 
required to maintain it. The pulse rate 
shows no distinctive pattern with cerebral 
death. If the blood pressure is unstable, 
shock should be ruled out. The use of pres-
sor agents may cause characteristic ar-
rhythmias, but these are related to cardiac 
irritability and not to cerebral responsive-
ness. 
Cranial Nerves 
A variety of reflex arcs ~ubserved by the 
cranial nerves or cephalic reflexes are avail-
able to evaluate the viability and function of 
the brain stem . All these reflexes must be 
absent for the criterion of absence of ce-
phalic reflexes to be met. 
The pupillary light reflex is produced by 
flashing a bright light into one eye and then 
the other. Subsequent constriction of the 
pupit-t hat is--stimu fated--eon-s t-it tttes--t-he--e.t--
rect response. and constriction of the other 
pupil. the consensual response. The light 
should be directed into the eye for several 
seconds while the pupillary response is ob-
served c losely . Rapid flashing of the light 
may cause slow or minimal responses of the 
pupil to be missed. Small pupillary size may 
make evaluation of the light reflex difficult. 
With pont ine lesions that interrupt the brain 
s tem sympathetic p~Hhways the pupils will 
be smul l. In this siiUation. reactivity is best 
u~sessed by using a magnifying glass or the 
plus .:?0 lens on the ophthalmoscope. In as-
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sessing this reflex. one must remember that 
damage to the optic nerves. chiasm, or ra-
diation. and a variety of pharmacological 
agents, can result in nonreactivity of the 
pupils. 
The corneal reflex is mediated through 
the pons with the trigeminal nerve as the af-
ferent arc and the facial nerve as the effer-
ent arc. It is elicited by drawing a wisp of 
cotton over the cornea and noting a blink 
response of the eye. Belrs phenomenon. 
the bilaterally responsive eyelid closure 
and u.pward deviation of the eyes. will be 
absent also when the corneal reflex is ab-
sent. Corneal hyposensitivity due to dry-
ing, edema. or corneal anesthetics reduces 
the validity of the test. 
The oculocephalic reflexes are tested by 
the doll's head maneuver. The head is 
briskly turned from side to side to evaluate 
horizontal eye movements. and the neck is 
flexed and extended to test vertical eye 
movements.34 The normal response. turn-
ing of the eyes in the direction opposite to 
that in which the head is moved. reflects 
function of the vestibular mechanisms. Ab-
sence of vertical and horizontal movements 
implies dysfunction of the midbrain pretec-
tal area and the pontine conjugate gaze cen-
ters respectively. Jn patients who have suf-
fered trauma. the stability of the cervical 
spine should be assessed before this ma-
neuver is attempted. The test should be 
done in conjunction with that of the oculo-
vestibular reflex. since similar pathways 
are being evaluated. The latter test shou ld 
not be performed until it has been estab-
lished that the tympanic membrane is in-
tact. Then .:?00 ml of ice water may be in-
troduced slowly into the external auditory 
canal until nystagmus or ocular deviation 
occurs. An induced conduction current is 
5@-t--u-p-~n the labyl=iuthine..endoJympb__of..lb.e._ _ 
lateral semicircular canal that alters the bal-
ance of the paired vestibular systems and 
produces tonic conjugate eye deviation 
toward the same side with cold stimuli or 
toward the opposite side with warm stimuli . 
The pharyngeal. or gag, reflex is a con-
traction of the constrictor muscle elicited 
when the posterior part of the pharynx is 
touched. It may be unreliable in the apneic 
patient supported by a respirator owing to 
the presence of an endotracheal tube . The 
same may be said for the swallo\\ and 
cough reflexes . 
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Sensory and .Motor Responses 
There are no cerebrally mediated sensory 
reactions or motor movements in patients 
wi th bra in death . Decorticate or decere-
brate moveme nt s may be present as long as 
lower parts of the brain survive. but usually 
these will be lost by the time that apnea 
occurs. If not. they will disappear soon 
thereafter . Musc le tone may be present in 
the e xtremit ies: in the majority of cases. 
howeve r. it is absent. 
Spinal Reflexes 
Move ments induced by noxious stimuli 
arplied to the extremities after brain death 
are due to spinal reflexe!>. In the lower ex-
tremity the response is usually a partial 
tlexnr reflex, although other spinal reflexes 
such as the crossed extensor may be pres-
ent. n the upper extremities, extensor re-
sponse!> such as those characterizing a high 
spinal cord transection may be induced. 
The spina! reflexes manifested by tendon 
jerk!> of the arms and legs are poor indica-
tors of the state of the brain. Since the spi-
nal cord may still be viable in the presence 
of cerebral death. it is not surprising that 
the tendon reflexes may persist. Pathologi-
cal reftexe!l such as the extensor plantar re-
sponse wi ll be see n m re ofte n h· n he s -
perficia! te ndo reflexes. 
Laboratory T ts 
Unfortunate ly. t e el i ical ndings are 
not invariably re liable in rna i g the di g-
nosis of brain deal . Indeed. in the 50 a-
tients who had coma and apnea for 15 min-
utes and were admi ted to the Col abora ive 
Study on Cere ra Death. 4 (9 per cent) 
survived for longer than three months.3 As 
would be expected. many of the m had vari-
ous forms of intoxication. A number of lab-
oratory and pathological correlates may be 
used to corroborate the diagnosis of brain 
death. 
Cerebral Blood Flow 
To perform normally, the brain req ires a 
constant supply of oxygen and glucose. De-
livery of these substances requires approxi-
mately 15 per cent of the cardiac output.~6 
Interruption of this blood flow in the human 
for only 5 to 10 minutes will begin to cause 
brain damage, and an interruption of 20 to 
30 minutes will cause irreversible damage. 
As a resu lt, the demonstration of an ab-
sence of cerebral circulation can be used to 
diagnose cerebral death. 
Figure 21- 1 Angtt>gram o f a patic:n "" ilh ~:erehral 
death due h> increa~etl tnt r<~cr:m i . ol pre~~ re . The .J}c: 
doe~ not rlow into t he in trac ;on i· I p rtwn f the ca· 
rot it! arte ry ant.J it s br;t c h.:~ .-\ . Amen>p.'- terior vie"' 
H . L;Heral vie w 
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Ce1ehral angiography was the earliest 
standard techn ique to assess the status of 
the cerebral ci rcu lation (Fig. 21-1 ). Mit-
chell and associates noted the absence of 
cerebral blood flow in patients with severe 
intracranial hype rtension . T he contrast ma-
terial stopped at the internal carotid artery 
at the level of the carot id siphon whi le the 
external carotid artery and its branches 
filled normally. At autopsy . patency of ca-
rotid vessels was demonstrated, thus con-
firming that the lack of flow was due to in-
creased intracranial pressure.50 Greitz and 
co ·workers U!>ed aortocranial and carotid 
angiography in 42 patients with brain death . 
In them . the ~.:ontrast media stopped at one 
of several sites-in the neck close to theca-
rotid bifurcation, in the intradural parasel-
lar part of the internal carotid artery, or in-
tracranially either just distal to the carotid 
siphon or in the bifurcation of the middle 
cerebral artery .31 Angiographic evidence of 
absence of blood flow is not a sine qua non 
for the diagnosis of cerebral death, how-
ever. because of rare instances in which a 
therapeutic measure such as ventricular 
puncture has been successful in relieving 
the increased intracranial pressure and re-
storing the cerebral blood flow .58 Of course, 
if the elevated intracranial pressure cannot 
he re lieved in a short time. it may be as-
o;umed that cerebral infarction and death 
have occurred. 
A noninvasive technique for assessing 
the cerebral circulation is to inject an iso-
tope such as 2 me of 99m technetium per-
technetate into an antecubital vein and then 
to place radioisotope detectors over the 
head and over the femoral artery. Patients 
with normal cerebral blood flow show a rel-
atively sharp rise and fall of radioactivity in 
both cephalic and femoral leads. Patients 
an ultrasonic reftec toscope or echoenceph-
alograph coupled with a device that gives 
additional processing of the scope's electri-
cal signal so as to show the pu lsations of the 
midline of the bra in with each heart beat. 
This system was tested in 46 patients by 
Uematsu and colleagues. Three of the pa-
tients were in stupor. fifteen in coma, and 
twenty-eight suspected of having cerebral 
death on the basis of unresponsiveness , 
apnea . and e lectrocerebral silence. One of 
those who were thought to have brain death 
and yet had a midline echo pulsation had 
had a large decompressive craniotomy with 
removal of the bone flap. It was thought 
that the persistent midline pulsation might 
have been transmitted from the external ca-
rotid pulsation to the intracranial cavity be-
cause of the large decompressive cranial 
defect.69 The cause of the midline echopul-
sations in the other case with presumed 
brain death is less clear. Perhaps the func-
tion of the cortex and electrical activity 
were lost prior to the total cessation of 
cerebral flow. In any event, these findings 
lend credence to the absence of the pulsa-
tile midline echo as clear evidence of lack 
of cerebral flow. Further. when this finding 
is present for 30 minutes or more. the diag-
nosis of brain death can be made with confi-
dence. 
Electrocardiogram 
Electrocardiographic findings may be 
normal in patients with brain death. but ST-
T changes usually are seen in the terminal 
stages . At necropsy. the heart often has 
minimal abnormalities such as subendocar-
dial and subepicardial hemorrhages of a 
nonspecific nature . These changes may be 
related to anoxia.2~ 
__________ __ ____ -----,w~itc!..'h,____._.h.J._y~p~o~p~e.!..!rf~u!..>!s~io,!.!n.!........!h.._.a._,v"'e'---"a'----"-sm.........,a..,ll~g..._,ra.,.,d,.,u,.,a,....l_----:;;;=-o;o------ -------------
lincar increase in activity over the head and CT Scan 
normal activity over the femoral artery. CT scans of patients with brain death 
This latter pattern occurred in all of Korein show no definitive characteristics in spite of 
and associates' 80 patients who were coma- the arrest of intracranial circulation as 
tose and apneic.
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Goodman and co-work- shown by the angiogram ."!! It appears that 
ers studied more than 500 patients by iso- CT scanning cannot be used to diagnose 
tope angiography with the scintillation cerebral death. 
camera. The cerebral arteries and venous 
sinuses were visualized in all patients ex-
cept three who had brain death.30 
Another technique for evaluating the 
prc~en~.:e of a cerebral circulation is record-
ing of the pulsatile midline echo of the 
hrain. These recordings are made by using 
Biochemical Changes 
As the cerebral function fails in brain 
death a variety of biochemical changes 
occur in the brain. It loses the ability to uti-
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ro produce energy through production of 
high -energy phosphate bonds. Thus, the 
lack of oxygen consumption is manifest by 
the d iminution in cerebral blood flow and 
the decrease in the arteriovenous difference 
of oxygen content across the brain.61 As 
les:, oxygen is used. anaerobic glycolysis 
begim., and it produces lactic acid. With 
lo!>s of the brain· s normal metabolic integ-
rity there is a depletion of phosphocreati-
nine. adenosine triphosphate, and adeno-
sine diphosphate in the neurons. They 
cease to function and become progressively 
edematous, and the oxidized respiratory 
enzymes are destroyed. 
A variety of tests is available to assess 
the cerebral metabolic parameters, but they 
are too complex for routine clinical use. 
Electroencephalogram 
The electroencephalogram is a valuable 
aid in evaluating patients who may have 
brain death. Vestiges of cerebral cortical 
function may be detected with this test 
even though the patient is profoundly co-
matose as judged by the conventional neu-
rological examination. The reliability of the 
electroencephalogram is shown by the 
study of the American Electroencephalo-
graphic Society's ad hoc committee on 
electroencephalographic criteria for the de-
termination of cerebral death. They re-
viewed 2650 cases of coma with presum-
ably isoelectric recordings.2 Only three 
therefore fundamentally one with low volt-
age and fluctuating frequency . It may be 
seen in as many as I 0 to 13 per cent of 
healthy persons.3~·4~ Further. it is thought 
that conditions such as advanced age, fa-
tigue, drowsiness, and sleep. and anesthe-
sia incn!ase the number of flat studies. 6.23.29 
Diseases such as encephalitis may cause a 
flat electroencephalogram. Bental and Lei-
bowitz reported the case of a 44-year-old 
woman with encephalitis who had a fiat 
electroencephalogram for 28 days.9 Al-
though in their report they speak of her as 
having "complete absence of electrical ac-
tivity," it is apparent from review of their 
publications that she merely had a fiat re-
cording and not one that meets the require-
ments of electrocerebral silence. This pa-
tient made a complete clinical recovery, 
and her electroencephalogram returned to 
normal. 
To avoid confusion, it is recommended 
that nonphysiological terms such as " iso-
electric" or "linear" should not be used to 
describe the recordings obtained during 
brain death. The appropriate term is "elec-
trocerebral silence." Electrocerebral si-
lence, or electrocerebral inactivity, is de-
fined as 
... no electrocerebral activity over 2J.Lv when 
recording from scalp or referential electrode 
pairs 10 or more centimeters apart with interelec-
trode resistances under 10,000 ohms or (impe-
dances under 6000 ohms I over 100 ohms.~ 
patients whose records satisfied the com- The reason for using the term "electrocere-
mittee's criteria showed any recovery of bral silence" is that the cardiac action and 
cerebral funct ion. T hese three had suffered artifacts from various causes produce elec-
from massive overdoses of nervous system troencephalographic changes (Fig. 21-2). 
depressants, two from barbiturates and one As a result, the recordings are not truly fiat 
from meprobamate. The reported "isoelec- or isoelectric. 
tric" records of these patients either were, Once electrocerebral silence has been 
- -------------------~o':"n':"'r'::e~v~ie~w:-t-"':lo=='w'.:L--v'='o;o::l~ta~e,_r;-::e':"c~o~r~d~s-::o~r~h7a::d=-c:be~e:::n~---:n~o~t==e~d~, 7!t~h==e~re:;;i~s~a;-;:h i~· g;:;;h~d~e;g:,re:;.;e~o;;f~co~r:;r~e~la;:.,-__ _ made with techniques inadequate to bring tion Wit u tlmate eat : ese n mgs 
out low-voltage activities. have, however. been present for more than 
The distinction should be made between 24 hours and yet some patients re-
a ftat electroencephalogram, an isoelectric cover. 12 .:J2 .:J7•41 Also, a few patients may be 
electroencephalogram. and electrocerebral deeply comatose, have electrocortical si-
silence. The flat electroencephalogram is lence, and yet have functioning brain 
one that shows no spontaneous activity of stems.~· 18 In fact. an elderly woman has 
higher voltage than 20 tJ. v .1 The majority of been reported to have electrocerebral si-
these studies consist of irregular bursts of lence and yet to breathe spontaneously.71 
activity of varying frequency that merge These reports suggest that although the 
wilh each other and do not show any con- electroencephalogram is a valuable aid in 
slant frequency even during hyperventila- diagnosing cerebral death. it has to be used 
tion. In rare instances there is almost no in the context of the entire clinical problem 
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The montage is a~ follows : 
Channel Electrode~ 
I F,.,-A2 
:! C., -A, 
3 01 -A2 
4 F,..-A, 
S C, -A, 
6 0 2 -A, 
7 T, - A2 
8 T,- A1 
Calibratilln : MaJor time line. 1.0 
second, : ~ensllivity. I 1-'~ per milli-
meter. 
Figure 21-2 Electroencephalogram of It 34-year-old man with cerebral death. All waveform changes are related 
to cardiac or mu~clc activity. Channel 4 shows muscle artifact~. There is no electrical acti\ it} of cerebral origin 
that i' greater than 2 1-' v. These electroencephalographic findings would confirm the clinict•l e\"idence of cerebral 
death . 1Cour1esy of Dr. A. Gabor. J 
te~t for it. As Bennett has stated, "in the pain (e.g., pinch). loud sound. and (option-
state of brain death. the EEG is always si- ally) strong light (stroboscopic if available). 
lent: however ECS does not always mean 9. Recording time of at least 30 min-
death. " 7 utes. 
In order to standardize recordings and to 10. Recordings to be made only by quali-
minimize errors in determining electrocere- tied technologists. 
bral silence, the American Electroencepha- II. A repeat electroencephalogram if 
lographic Society has set forth the follow- doubt exists about electrocerebral silence. 
ing recommendations for use in making the I2. Telephone transmission of the elec-
recordings. troencephalogram not to be used for deter-
!. Use of a minimum of eight scalp elec- mination of electrocerebral silence.2 
trodes and ear lobe reference electrodes . Before the electroencephalogram is per-
2. An interelectrode impedance under formed, the patient should be in a stable 
10.000 ohms but over 100 ohms. state, since shock or hypothermia may de-
3. Test of integrity of recording system press the amplitude of the recording. Also. 
by artifact potential. it is essential to insure that drugs are not 
j 
• f 
4 U ~;e of in te reI ectrode _.,.lJJ i~s.ut :"-~• n.uc...~e;.:sL..t..JolLf---'a:11t_---1Pnr_~;e~s.k.eun.Lt _ji.un~s uu.fufinc.li.k.eunt.l._l,Q(.IU.uaun!.!tJJi tll'i e~S:t.' ..Jt~o~dcl;;e!!p'!Cre~s!!.>· S!.__ __ _ 
lea~t 10 centimeters. the recording. Drugs that are often nsso-
5. Seno;itivity increase from 7 IJ.V per mil- ciated with electrocerebral silence include 
limeter to 2 p..v per millimeter during most barbiturates. methaqualone. diazepam. me-
of the recording with inclusion of appropri- cloqualone, meprobamate. and trichlo-
ate calibrations. methylene. Drugs that can be ingested 
6. Use of time constants of 0.3 to 0.4 sec- in toxic quantities and not produce electro-
ond during part of the recording. cerebral silence as a primary effect include 
7. Use of monitoring devices such as the phenothiazides. atropine sulfate. tricyclic 
ele~trocardiogram and others as needed to antidepressants. nitrazepam. salicylates. 
detect artifacts emanating from the patient 
or intluced by the surroundings. 
H. Use of tests for electroencephalo-
grarh ic reactivity to intense stimuli such as 
' See reference~ II. 1:!. 30. 31. 35. 39. 44. 45. S I. 60. 
63. 69. 73. 
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heroin. insecticides. glutethimide , and 
amani ta phalloides (mushroom poisoning). 
If sedative or intoxicating drugs are present 
the diugnosis of cerebral death must be de-
la) ed until their concentration is below 
toxi~ levels. 
Evoked Potentials 
Another electrophysiological means of 
evaluating brain function involves the mea-
surement of auditory brain stem responses . 
The test is an objective method of measur-
ing st!nsory pathways transversing the 
brain stem. Starr found that these re-
spom.es were either absent or markedly at-
tenuated in 27 patients who met the clinical 
criteria of brain death. In addition, in pa-
tients who progressed from mere coma to 
brain death . a decrease in amplitude and a 
prolongation of the latency of the later com-
ponents of the characteristic evoked wave-
form were noted.ll-l The technique can be 
used as a corroborative test along with the 
electroencephalogram, especially in evalua-
tion of the brain stem. The American Elec-
troencephalographic Society Ad Hoc 
Committee on Cerebral Death recom-
mended that an effort be made to evoke po-
tentials by auditory. visual, and tactile 
stimulation when a patient suspected of 
having cerebral death is being evaluated. 63 
Atropine Tests 
Normall y the cardiac activities are under 
the antagonistic influences of the intrac ra-
nial parasympathetic system (vagal dorsal 
nucleus) and. the extracranial sympathetic 
system. In brain stem death the cardiac ac-
tivities are influenced only by the sympa-
thetic system without regulation from the 
intracranial centers. As a result the intrave-
nous inject ion of 2 mg of atropine will not 
cause an acceleration in the cardiac rate. In 
a study of 42 successive patients who had 
cerebral death there were no exceptions to 
these findings. 57 
Combined Testing 
Quaknine reported on 13 types of studies 
that may be performed antemortem to con-
firm cerebral death. Forty-two patients 
were included in the series, and various 
numbers of patients were given each type 
of test (Table 21-2).57 From a study of his 
findings. it is apparent that cerebral death 
can be confirmed by a consistent lack of 
cerebral and brain stem function. absence 
TABLE 21-2 TESTS PERFORMED IN 42 PATIENTS IN BRAIN DEATH• 
NO. OF 
TEST CASES RESULTS REMARKS 
Electroencephalography 32 Flat tracing even alter ampliltcat1on 13 cases under scope only 
and stimulation 
Atropine Jest 42 No tachycardia after Intravenous 1n- 32 cases under ECG 
Ject1on of atropine (2 mg) 
Calonc test 42 No eye movements With ice water or ethyl chlonde 1nto 
the e)(ternal auditory meatuses 
E teet ronystagmography 22 Flat tracing With ice water or ethyl chlonde into 
the e)(ternal audttory meatuses 
Echoencephalography 26 No echopulsations 1n the scope Demonstrated in 10 cases by photo 
with three different exposures 
Carottd and vertebral 26 Circulatory arrest at the base o the lnjectton under ressure rn f ive 
--anq;oqraphtes skull cases 
ln1racran1al pressure 7 Very high (>100 mm Hg) Measured by intraventncular 
catheter 
Bra•n temperature 6 Brain r• always less than rectal r• Even in cases of hypothermia (e1c 
29' < 32'C) 
Cerebral blood flow B No signif1can1 flow : < 10 ml m1n ' Xenon . two cases 
100 gm· ' of bram Hippuran: Si)( cases 
Cerebral O)(ygen consumptton 4 <1 .5 ml of 0 2mtn '100 ml·' of blood Blood taken from carotid btlurcat ion 
and IUQular bulb 
Bratn scanntng 12 " Cold brain area · and no appear· Intravenous techneltum 
ance of the sup. long sinus tn AP 
pro)ectton 
Gamma camera B " Cold bratn area · and no appear· Intravenous technertum 
ance of the sup long sinus tn AP 
projection 
lnlta thecal on1ec1ton of radto· 6 No cerebrospmal flu id ftow Even after 48 hours 
toClmated serum alllumtn 
Bram autopsy 26 From cerebral edema ro complete Correspond tng ro brain death 
1ys1s of brain duration (1 - 7 days) 
·From Ouaknrne, G. E. Bedstde procedures •n the diagnos1s of bratn death Resuscttat ron . 4 159-177. 1975 Aepnnted 
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• 
of cerebral blood flow, brain temperature 
markedly lower than body temperature, or 
increased intracranial pressure of a degree 
that would preclude cerebral blood flow. 
The test of function of the brain can be ac-
complished by electroencephalography, the 
atropine test of heart rate. the caloric test, 
or electronystagmography. The status of 
the cerebral circulation may be determined 
by arteriography or isotope studies . Deter-
mination of the brain temperature or the in-
tracranial pressure requires the placement 
of intracranial probes of an appropriate na-
ture. 
Autopsy 
At autopsy after brain death. 90 per cent 
of the brains appear to be abnormal by 
gross examination.73 If the patient has re-
quired a respirator for more than 24 hours, 
over 60 per cent will have cortical abnor-
malities including pericellular edema, ne-
crosis. neuronal loss, hemorrhage, and in-
farction. About 40 per cent of the cases will 
have the characteristic findings of the "res-
pirator brain ." These findings are a soft 
brain that is difficult to remove from the 
calvarium, a gross appearance of general-
ized swelling, poor fixation, a congested 
cortex. and a macerated cerebellum of 
which fragments are found in the spinal 
canal. Microscopic findings included pyk-
nosis of neuronal cytoplasm in some cells 
of all sections, little or no inflammation, 
scattered neuronal changes or loss, and 
glial. microghal, or vascular alterations at 
the site of the microscopic findings. 
FORMAL CRITERIA OF 
BRAIN DEATH 
lead to controversy and delay in obtaining 
organs for transplantation. Prior to the pio-
neering work of this committee. the con-
cept of cerebral death was vague. A large 
portion of the medical community did not 
understand or accept the concept, and 
those who did use it were without legal 
sanction. 
The ad hoc committee recommended that 
criteria be set up so that the issue of the 
time of death could be considered solely as 
a medical one. Further, they emphasized 
that the patient should be declared dead be-
fore the respirator was stopped rather than 
afterward, since in the latter situation. the 
physician would be withdrawing respira-
tory support from a patient who was, under 
the existing Jaw, still alive. To make the 
diagnosis of cerebral death safely in a medi-
cal and legal milieu in 1968, the committee 
suggested four criteria to be met in patients 
in whom hyperthermia or central nervous 
system depressants such as barbiturates 
were absent. The criteria were: (1) Unre-
ceptivity and unresponsivity with total un-
awareness to externally applied stimuli and 
inner need, with even the most intensely 
painful stimuli evoking no vocal response. 
withdrawal of the limb, or quickening of 
respirations. (2) No movement or breathing 
over a period of one hour. If the patient was 
receiving mechanical respiratory support, 
spontaneous breathing should be totally ab-
sent for three minutes after the respirator 
was removed. (3) The absence of all elicit-
able reflexes, the absence of postural activ-
ity (decerebrate or other), and the presence 
of fixed and dilated pupils that would not 
respond to a direct source of bright light. (4) 
A flat or isoelectric electroencephalogram 
with the machine run at standard gains of 10 
p.v per millimeter and 50 p.v per 5 mm and 
at double the standard gain, which is 5 !J.V 
__ ----~r:...millimerer or 25 !'v per 5 mm All these 
Harvard Criteria 
In 1968, the need for a better understand-
ing of the concept of cerebral death and the 
need for obtaining organs for transplanta-
tion earlier than at death with cessation of 
heart beat led the faculty of the Harvard 
Medical School to appoint an ad hoc com-
mittee to study the matter.22 The goals of 
this committee were to help identify those 
patients who had brain death despite sus-
tained heart function and to delete obsolete 
criteria for definition of death that could 
tests were to be repeated at least 24 hours 
later with no change. The committee re-
garded items I, 2, and 3 as making the diag-
nosis, the confirmation being made with the 
fourth item, the electroencephalogram.22 
The so-called Harvard criteria were a no-
table advance, but probably were more 
strict and relied more heavily on the elec-
troencephalogram than was necessary or 
justified in some cases. In particular, there-
quirement for re-evaluation in 24 hours 
often caused needless delays and damage to 

















CEREBRAL DEATH 757 
were published by other groups that re-
duced the period of observation to 12 hours 
ami noted that segmental spinal reflexes 
such as deep tendon reflexes and triple flex-
ion responses might be present. Further it 
was noted that the electroencephalogram 
and cerebral angiography "may provide 
supportive data and diagnosis of brain 
death. but they are not essential. " 21 
American Association of Neurological 
Surgeons Guidelines 
In the last decade numerous organiza-
tions and institutions have set forth criteria 
for cerebral death based on known physio-
logical principles and observations that 
were post hoc. 5 · 1 a.IY.2~·39 Among them was 
the American Association of Neurological 
Surgeons. which issued the following 
guidelines for diagnosing cerebral death. 
I. Cerebral unresponsivity. 
2. Apnea. 
3. Absence of cephalic reflexes including 
the pupillary. audio-ocular, and oculo-
cephalic. 
4. Dilated pupil (5.0 mm). In the event 
that the pupil is less than 5.0 mm, the possi-
bility of a toxic factor is heightened, and de-
termination of blood drug levels or studies 
of the cerebral circulation or both may be 
required to eliminate this possibility. 
5. Electrocerebral silence. Findings 
meeting the American Electroencephalo-
graphic Society's criteria must be observed 
for a minimum recording period of 30 min-
utes at a time when the requisite cl inical 
conditions have persisted for at least six 
hours. These findings should be re-exam-
ined and confirmed on a second occasion at 
least s ix hours later. (These criteria may be 
___inapplicable._ -10 ..children_under-.j--¥ears of 
age. since there are indications that the im-
mature nervous system can survive signifi-
cant periods of electrocerebral silence.)15 
The arguments in favor of the American 
Association of Neurological Surgeons cri-
teria are: (1) Since brain function is what is 
being evaluated, only cerebral reflexes are 
important. (2) The presence of a fixed but 
nondi lated pupil increases the possibility of 
a toxic factor and therefore requires special 
consideration . (3l The time frame is short-
ened because it has been recognized that 
when the criteria have been met for even a 
few minutes brain survival is unlikely and 
unreasonable measures may be required to 
maintain cardiovascular function for the 24 
hours suggested by the Harvard ad hoc 
committee. (4l When any question arises 
about the validity of other findings the dem-
onstration of complete cessation of intra-
cranial circulation verifies brain death. 
Evaluation of Criteria 
To test the criteria of brain death in a pro-
spective manner, the National Institute of 
Neurological and Communicative Disease 
and Stroke supported a collaborative study 
at nine medical centers distributed geo-
graphically throughout the United States.3 
The study collected data on the clinical 
findings, the electroencephalograms. and 
the laboratory analyses for drugs of the pa-
tients as well as the neuropathological re-
ports on the dead brains. The protocol re-
quired that every patient over I year of age 
admitted to the participating medical center 
hospital in a cerebrally unresponsive state 
and apneic for 15 minutes be admitted to 
the study regardless of the cause of these 
findings. To be considered in the group for 
a diagnosis of brain death. the prerequisites 
were absence of sedative drug intoxication, 
hypothermia, cardiovascular shock, or are-
mediable primary disorder, and the pres-
ence of cerebral unresponsiveness, apnea. 
and electrocerebral silence. 
The combined study demonstrated the 
practical problems of applying such a pro-
tocol in the diagnosis of cerebral death. For 
instance, in assessing the presence of seda-
tive drug intoxication. it was found that the 
history of drug ingestion was often unreli-
able, it was virtually impossible to obtain 
accurate analysis of toxic agents within a 
few bouJ:s.__and it was -difficult to evaluate 
the significance of minimal amounts of 
drugs in the blood. The determination of 
normothermia and the absence of cardio-
vascular shock was less of a problem. In-
suring the absence of a remediable lesion 
often required detailed laboratory studie·s 
such as computed tomography or angiogra-
phy. The average time for obtaining those 
studies was 7.4 hours. Determining the 
presence of cerebral unresponsivity was 
straightforward except in 9 per cent of the 
cases: in these confusion was caused by 
spinal reflex movements. Although apnea is 
easily recognized at the bedside, its deter-
-59-
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minalron in rhi~ study was imprecise hc-
(;au.,e of the need to maintain artificial res-
pirations . After the diagnosis of brain death 
had been established by other criteria. re-
moval of the respirator .. was rarely fol-
lowetl by an~ respiratory effort and never 
by sufficient chest movement to sustain 
life.·· Determination of electrocerebral si-
lence was complicated by three factors: 
technical inadequacies. observer error 
<misinterpretalion in the reading of the rec-
nnl> . and the degree of validity of a single 
rewrding. There was a 3 per cent disagree-
ment between the panel reviewing the 
~tudie~ and the original interpreter of the 
recording. Most of the disagreement con-
eel ned I he confusion of artifact with bio-
logical activity . In only I per cent of the 
ca~e., was there disagreement in which the 
original reader diagnosed electrical cortical 
silence and the review panel considered 
lhat b1ological activity was present. The re-
port states: 
Though on critical analysis some ··fiat rec-
ords" may be considered by reviewers who 
know the complete history of the case as show-
ing biological activity, such varied opinions re-
gunling I lo 3 per cent of the cases are inevitable 
at I he present state of lhe an of eleclroencepha-
logruphy .=• 
When all drug-induced comas were ex-
cluded from the study. no patient in this se-
ries recovered after having a 30-minute pe-
riotl of electrical cortical silence. 
The cepahlic reflexes-pupillary. cor-
neal. oculoauditory (blink to a clap). oculo-
cephalic (doll"s eye). oculovestibular, cilia-
spinal. snout. cough, pharyngeal (gag), and 
swallowing-were noted to have varying 
scn~1t1vi1y as indicators of brain stem dys-
function. The addition of these reflexes to 
the basic factors to be considered did not 
m rov the accurac of the dia nosis of 
brain death. 
Although dilated and fixed pupils have 
commonly been thought to be present in 
bmin death. they occurred in less than half 
the patients in this series. Of the 187 pa-
lients meeting the three basic criteria for 
brain death. 128 had dilated. 44 had small. 
and 15 had unequal pupils . Two patients 
wilh drug intoxication had small pupils. 
Almost 70 per cent of patients had ab-
sem:e of muscle tone in either arms or legs. 
and 60 per cent lacked it in bo1h. Another 
10 per cent lost their muscle tone sometime 
before C<trdiac arrest. In this same group. 
abnormal posturing was noted in 14 per 
cent of cases at the time of the initial exami-
nation. but in only half the number at the 
time of final examination before cardiac ar-
rest. 
The spinal reflexes as manifested by ten-
don jerks with the arms and legs are poor 
indicators of the state of the brain. Of the 
I 87 patients meeting the basic criteria for 
brain death. 101 had no reflexes and 71 had 
active reflexes: the remaining 15 were not 
examined for their reflexes. 
The directors of the combined study con-
cluded that the minimal criteria for diag-
nosis of cerebral death should be that (I) all 
appropriate diagnostic and therapeutic pro-
cedures have been performed: and (2) the 
patient is in coma with cerebral unrespon-
sivity and apnea; has dilated pupils. absence 
of cepahlic reflexes. and electrocerebral si-
lence : and these findings have been present 
for a period of 30 minutes at least six hours 
after the onset of coma and apnea. If an 
early decision about cerebral death is de-
sired and particularly if any of the critical 
findings are not definitive. it was suggested, 
a confirmatory test to insure the absence of 
cerebral blood ftow should be made. 
Ideal Criteria 
The ideal criteria for determination of 
cerebral death would give unequivocal and 
reliable results that could be accepted with-
out question by the medical and lay public. 
Further, they would be simple and clear so 
that any physician could apply them by 
merely referring to the list of requirements 
necessary for making the diagnosis. Unfor-
tunately, criteria that cover all circum-
stances in the most ideal and expeditious 
manner do not exist. As a result, the diag-
nosis of cerebra eat s ou e a medtcal 
decision based on the physician's judgment 
that is made after all factors have been con-
sidered. A strict protocol cannot encom-
pass all circumstances that arise. and if one 
is imposed by institutional policy or legal 
requirements. needless delays will occur in 
obtaining organs to be transplanted and 
needless expenses will be incurred to ren-
der treatment that is useless . As a work-
ahle. practical. and safe approach to the 
problem. the authors of this chapter suggest 
the following factors be considered in mak-
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I . There should be C'N<'hml unrespon-
~ivity and unreceptivity. There should be no 
evidence of a cerebral type of response to 
inten!>ely painful stimulus. noise. or visual 
stimuli. Spinal cord or lower brain stem 
function may be present. 
2. There should be no suspicion that the 
coma is due to depressant drugs. A careful 
drug history and chemical screening for 
drug levels is essential in all situations ex-
cept those with a firm diagnosis of a major 
intraceJ:ehral lesion that is clearly capable 
of causing brain death. 
3. Spontaneous respiration should have 
ceased. With the blood oxygen tension at 
normal or higher levels, trials of at first 
three and then five minutes without the res-· 
pirator should not produce efforts of spon-
taneous breathing. To protect against hy-
poxia. 5 liters per minute of oxygen may be 
perfused through an intratracheal catheter. 
If facilities to measure oxygen tension are 
not present and no organs are to be do-
nated. then the trial without the respirator 
should be 10 minutes. Since the carbon 
dioxide tension increases at the rate of ap-
proximately 3 mm of mercury per minute, 
the carbon dioxide build-up should be ade-
quate to stimulate breathing.80 
4. The patient should have an untreatable 
brain lesion. This situation may be obvious 
within hours of a severe head injury, spon-
taneous intracerebral hemorrhage. or cranial-
om}'. With cardiac arrest. hypoxia, or se-
vere circulatory insufficiency with cerebral 
anoxia or cerebral embolism, longer peri-
ods of ob!>ervation may be necessary. 
5. Primary hypothermia and significant 
abnormalities of metabolic and endocrine 
factors should be excluded. It is acknowl-
edged that marked abnormalities of these 
factors may develop during treatment of the 
patient over a prolonged time and should 
not delay the diagnosis of cerebral death if 
other appropriate factors are present. 
Whereas primtll'y hypothermia should be 
ruled out, secondary hypothermia develops 
in a majority of patients with cerebral 
death. In these patients the temperature 
may be 96° For lower. 
6. Although a reliable diagnosis of brain 
death can be made on the basis of the clini-
cal findings and course of events in most 
cases . adJitional confirmation may be de-
si l ahlt: in other cases. In particular. if there 
is a question of homicide or other factors 
tha i ma~ lead to legal questions the confir-
mation of brain death by laboratory tests 
may be particularly desirable. This confir-
mation can be obtained by several tests or 
combination of them . Absence of cerebral 
blood ftow may be demonstrated by angio-
gram, isotope studies, or absence of mid-
line echopulsation . Absence of cerebral 
blood flow and presumed cerebral infarc-
tion may be inferred from persistent intra-
cranial pressure measurements sufficiently 
elevated over systemic blood pressure to 
preclude intracranial flow. Electrocerebral 
silence on the electroencephalogram de-
notes lack of cerebral function. If sup-
pressant drugs are absent. it is presumptive 
of cerebral death. Brain stem function and 
reflexes may or may not be present with 
electrocerebral silence. If a known struc-
tural, untreatable brain lesion of the type 
that can produce cerebral death is not pres-
ent. the electroencephalographic e lectro-
cortical silence should be confirmed by re-
cordings 24 hours later. 
DISCUSSION WITH SURVIVORS 
Explaining the concept of brain death to 
the surviving family and friends requires 
patience and an understanding of their emo-
tional distress. The question of organ trans-
plantation may be raised by the family, but 
usually it has to come from the physician 
attending the patient. When appropriate, 
the physician should assume a positive 
role. informing the family of the opportu-
nity to get healthy organs to benefit the vic-
tims of chronic disease. After effective 
communication is established with the fam-
ily and the criteria for brain death have 
been met. the declaring of death and re-
moval of the patient to the operating room 
for the transplantation procedure should 
cause no difficulty. By arranging this se-
quence of events. the physician may have 
aided the family to assuage their grief by 
helping them to know that the death of their 
loved one has, through organ transplanta-
tion, permitted another person to have an 
additional gift of life . 
Regardless of whether or not organs are 
to be used for transplantation. the phys-
ician and ancillary members of the medical 
team such as the nurses and social workers 
must be knowledgeable about the course of 
events and be willing to explain them, as 
often as needed, to all members of the fam-
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ily in a kind. calm. and sympathetic man-
ner. Finally. the diagnosis of cerebral death 
and action based on it, such as discontinu-
ing respiratory assistance. are medical mat-
ters. The survivors should not be burdened 
with the decision about when to stop the 
respirator. Of course. they should be in-
formed of the plans in a clear, straightfor-
ward manner. In most instances they will 
agree with the suggested course of action. 
If they disagree, however, then further dis-
cussion is in order and the respiratory assis-
tance should be continued until a full under-
standing is reached or cardiac arrest ensues 
to settle the matter. 
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Transplant Foundation 
Senator Ollie Speraw, Chairman 
August 23, 1984 
Senate Select Committee on Anatomical Transplants 
California Legislature 
Room 4082, State Capitol 
Sacramento, California 95814 
Dear Senator Speraw: 
I am sorry I must decline your generous offer to testify in 
person at your hearings on brain death to be held on September 18, 
1984. I am, however, writing to you to try to answer some questions 
you identified in your recent letter to me that possibly could be 
helpful to you during these hearings. 
As you stated, all states have adopted a Uniform Anatomical Gift 
Act and many states have also adopted a brain death law. I am en-
closing for your information a copy of the law which was passed in 
Pennsylvania and signed into law late 1982. This law went into 
effect early 1983. The Pennsylvania law, like most laws passed, 
simply states that brain death is the legal death of the individual. 
No specific criteria is stated in the law, however, the law does 
state that accepted medical criteria must be utilized for the deter-
mination of brain death. 
To specifically answer your questions, your first question was 
"What criteria should be accepted in determining brain death?'' The 
criteria utilized for brain death normally not only differs from 
state-to-state, but from hospital-to-hospital. Although a majority 
of hospitals still follow the original Harvard criteria for the de-
termination of brain death, many institutions have adopted new 
policies and procedures over the past 17 years. The basic concepts 
for the determination of brain death have remained the same, but time 
factors and confirmatory criteria have been changed. I am enclosing 
a copy of the Guidelines for the Determination of Death, which was a 
report to the President's Commission for the Study of Ethical Prob-
lems in Medicine and Biomedical and Behavioral Research Hopefnlly 
this will give you some starting point as to what criteria could 
possibly be utilized. 
Your second question is, "Should brain death be accepted as 
legal death?" This question is very simply answered as in over 35 
states today who have passed the brain death law, brain death is the 
legal death of the individual. I am enclosing a copy of the Penn-
sylvania Uniform Determination of Death Act, which states this in the 
body of the law. 
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Question three: if we determine that brain death is, in fact, 
death even though we can maintain the body on support systems, should 
a local coroner have jurisdiction when such a body is transported 
into California under medical supervision for transplantation? This 
is a question I am sure that must be answered by your local coroners 
association. Our experience in Pennsylvania in transporting patients 
who have succumbed to brain death, but whose body functions are sup-
ported by mechanical means, have not fallen under the jurisdiction of 
the local coroner, since the body will be returned to the location 
where death was determined. 
Question four: when brain death has been certified in another 
state, should we require legal reaffirmation by California doctors 
prior to harvesting any organs or tissues? Again, I can only speak 
from our experience at the University of Pittsburgh on this particu-
lar question. We do not require our physicians to reaffirm brain 
death, as long as the criteria utilized for the pronouncement of 
brain death is acceptable and close to the criteria we utilize our-
selves. 
Brain death, if documented with certainty, is the legal death 
of the individual in many states. I personally feel that if the 
death of an individual can be documented through brain death, it is 
wrong to maintain this person's vital organ functiornartificially, 
unless the individual's family has agreed to organ donation. Many, 
many patients in this country are needlessly and hopelessly main-
tained for prolonged periods of time simply because laws do not exist 
stating that brain death is the legal death of that individual. This 
not only causes great anguish and prolonged suffering for that patient's 
family, but also wastes valuable hospital space and an enormous 
amount of funds that could be utilized for other lifesaving purposes. 
I hope that this information is of some use to you and wish you 
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Providing for determination of death. 
The General Assembly of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania hereby 
enacts as foUows: 
Section 1. Short title. 
This act shall be known and may be cited as the "Uniform Determina-
tion of Death Act." 
Section 2. Uniformity of construction and application. 
This act shall be applied and construed to effectuate its general 
purpose to maki uniform the law with respect to the subject of this act 
among states enacting it. 
Section 3. Determination of death. 
- Only an individual who has sustained either: 
(1) itrev~rsible ces~tion of circulatory and respiratory functions; 
or 
(2) irreversible cessation of aH i"unctions of the entire brain, 
including the brain stem; 
is dead. A determination of death must be made in accordance with 
accepted medical standards. 
Section 4. Effective date. 
This act shall take effect in 60 days. 
APPROVED-The 17th day of December, A. D. 1982. 





Guidelines for the Determination of Death 
Report of the Medical Consultants on the Diagnosis of Death to the President's Commission 
for the Study of Ethical Problems in Medicine and Biomedical and Behavioral Research 
The ouodehnes set forth '" thos report represent the voews or the slgnatoroes as indivoduats. 
they do ,,of necesaar oly reflect the policy of any instotution or proreseoonal assocoatoon with which 
any sognatory is alhilated Although the practoce of individual signatories may vary slightly, 
atonatot~ea agree on the acceptability of these guidelines: Jesse Barber, MD: Don Backer, MD, 
Rochard B&hrman. MD, JO: Donald R Bennett, MD; Richard Beresford, MO. JO; Regonatd 
Bocklord . MD; Wilham A Black. Jr. MD; Benjamon Boshes, MO. PhD; Philip Braunstein. MD, John 
Burroughs . MO. JO. Russell Butler . MD; John Caronna . MD; SheHey Chou, MD, PhD; Kemp Clark. 
MD; Ronald Cranford. MO; Mochael Earnest, MD; Albert Ehle, MD; Jack M. Feon, MD; Sal Fiscona. 
MO, JO . Terranes G Furlow, MO, JO; Eli Gotdensohn, MD; Jack Grabow, MD; Phillip M. Green, 
MD; Ak11 Grenvok. MD; Charl&s E. Henry, PhD, John Hughes, MD, PhD, OM; Howard Kaufman, MO. 
Robert King, MD, Julius Korein, MD; Thomaa W Langfitt, MD; Cesare Lombroao. MD; Kevon M. 
Mcintyre MO. JO: Rochard L. Masland, MD; Don Harper Mills, MD, JO: Gaetano Molinari, MO; 
Byron C Pe¥ehouse , MO: Lawrence H. Pitts. MO. A Bemard Pleat, MD; Fred Plum. MD; Jerome 
Posner. MO : Oavod Powner . MD; Richard Rovot, MD; Peter Safar, MD; Henry Schwartz, MD: 
tiona! Conference of Commissioners 
on Uniform State Laws, and the Pres-
ident's Commission for the Study of 
·Ethical Problems in Medicine and 
Biomedical and Behavioral Research 
have proposed the following model 
statute, intended for adoption in 
every jurisdiction: 
UNIFOR~l DETERMINATION OF 
DEATH ACT 
Edward Schlesong&r. MO; Roy Selby, MD; James Snyder, MO; Bruce F Sorenson, MD; Cary 
Suter, MO. Barry Tharp, MO; Femando Torres, MD; A. Earl Walker, MD; Arthur Ward, MO; Jack 
Whosnant. MO. Rob&rt Wilku&. MD; and Harry Zimmerman, MO. 
An individual who has sustained either 
(1) irreversible cessation of circulatory 
and respiratory functions. or (2) irrevers-
ible cessation of all functions of the entire 
brain, including the brain stem, is dead . A 
determination of death must be made in 
accordance with accepted medical stan-
dards. 
The preparation of this report was lacolitated by the President's Commission but the 
guidelines have not be&n passed on by the Commiseion and are not intended as matters lor 
governmental revoaw or adoption. 
THE AD\'EXT of effective artificial 
cardiopulmonary support for severely 
brain-injured persons has created 
some coniusion during the past sev-
eral decades about the determination 
of death. Previously, loss of heart and 
lung functions was an easily observ-
able and sufficient basis for diagnos-
ing death. whether the initial failure 
occurred in the brain, the heart and 
lungs, or elsewhere in the body. Irre-
For editorial comment 
seep 2194. 
versihle :'a ilure of either the heart 
and lunl!5 or the brain precluded the 
-rcrminueri- functiomng -of t-h~ . 
~ow, however, circulation and respi-
ration can be maintained by means of 
a mechanical respirator and other 
medical i:nenentions. despite a loss 
of all brain functions. In these cir-
cumstances, we recognize as dead an 
indh·idu : •. whose loss of brain func· 
tions i~ c·1mplete and irre\'ersible. 
R•pr~ ..... rr-: .J~ttls to J : anr>e L Jnn MO. Asststar"1 
C•rertC"r t-r • ·~d•Cal Srudu~s Pres•oent's Comm•s· 
!i•'Jn • : r •t•.:. !.''-~ "Y or E!""•cat Prr t 1P.ms 1n Med•crne 
ant' B•()M•r : :a• ara Sehavtora l Research SUite 
555. C' _ c~ ,. )t ~JW . Was"•nglo~ DC 20006 
To recognize reliably that death 
has occurred, accurate criteria must 
be available for physicians' use. These This wording has also been endorsed 
now fall into two groups, to be applied by the American Academy of Neural-
depending on the clinical situation. ogy and the American Electroen-
When respiration and circulation cephalographic Society. 
have irreversibly ceased, there is no The statute relies on the existence 
need to assess brain functions di- of "accepted medical standards" for 
rectly. When cardiopulmonary func- determining that death has occurred. 
tions are artificially maintained, neu-. The medical profession, based on 
rological criteria must be used to carefully conducted research and ex-
assess whether brain functions have tensive clinical experience, has found 
ceased irreversibly. that death can be determined reliably 
.More than half of the states now by either cardiopulmonary or neuro-
recognize, through statutes or judicial logical criteria. The tests used for 
decisions, that death may be deter- determining cessation of brain func-
mined on the basis of irreversible tions have changed and will continue 
cessation of a!T f unctions ofrt't~e-~b~r;;:;a:ri n;;-. -+t'lio~a:r.o;;-s"'o;;-"""'Jlltfi~Tf'hfi~>e--;;ar1dr.cv:-ae"'n"'t-ro•rr'---rn"'e"'\'.,.., --
Law in the remaining states has not research and technologies. The "Har-
yet departed from the older, common- vard criteria" (JA.\•1.-l 1968:20!1:337-
law \'iew that death has not occurred 3-tO) are widely accepted. hut ad-
until "all vital functions" (whether or vances in recent years have led to the 
not artificially maintained 1 have proposal of other criteria. As an aid 
ceased. The language of the :>tatutes to thr implementation oi the pro-
has not heen uniform from state to posed uniform statute, we prr11·ide 
state, and the dh·ersity of propu,;ed here one statement of current!~· 
and enartPrl laws ha~ createrl ::ub- accepted mt!dical standards. 
st.antial confusion. Con,;equen t ly . the 
American Bar Association, th~ .-\r.wr-
ican :\Ierlic:.d r\ssm·iation. the \' a-
INTRODUCTION 
The critt!ria that physicians u,;P in 
2184 ~ : •,1A Nov 13. 1981-Vol 246. No 19 -67- Doagnosos of De:-tth 
<l<>ll'rmining tht.t death has occurred 
should Ill f!liminatE> errors in classi -
f~· inJ! a li\"ing indi\·idual as dead: (21 
allow as ft-w errors as possiblE> in 
c·la~~ifying a dE>ad hody as ali\·e; (31 
allow a dt>termination to be made 
without unrt-af"onahlt- cit> lay; I~ I ht-
adaJ•~ahle to a Yariety of rlinical 
~ituations: and 151 be explicit and 
ac·c·l';:sible to \·erification. 
Because it would be undesirable for 
any guidelines to be mandated by 
legislation or regulation or to be 
inflexibly established in case law, the 
proposed l"niform Determination of 
Death Act appropriately specifies 
only "accE-pted medical standards." 
Loral, state. and national institutions 
and professional organizations are 
encouraged to examine and publish 
their practices. 
The following guidelines represent 
a distillation of current practice in 
regard to the determination of death. 
Only the most commonly available 
and Yerified tests have been included. 
The time of death recorded on a death 
certificate is at present a matter of 
local practice and is not covered in 
this document. 
These guidelines are advisory. 
Their successful use requires a com-
petent and judicious physician, expe-
rienced in clinical examination and 
the releYant procedures. All periods 
of obsen·ation listed in these guide-
lines require the patient to be under 
the care of a physician. Considering 
the responsibility entailed in the 
determination of death, consultation 
is recommended when appropriate. 
The outline of the criteria is set 
forth below in boldface letters. The 
lightface text that follows each head-
ing explains its meaning. In addition, 
the two sets of criteria (cardiopulmo-
nary and neurological) are followed 
by a presentation of the major com-
plicating conditions: drug and meta-
bolic intoxication._~ypothermia. 
young age, and shock. It is of para-
mount importance that an:.·one refer-
ring to these guidelines be thoroughly 
familiar with the entire document, 
inrluding explanatory notes and com-
plicating conditions. 
THE CRITERIA 
FOR DETERMINATION OF DEATH 
:\n incih·idual prE'S!'nting thP find-
inJ,:, in' ;'! ir• ,. 5E't': :on :\ frnrdi<•p:olmo-
nar:; • n•· ~··l'tion E f. npur·<.!ogir:,]l is 
JAMt.. r-.ov 13. 1981-Vol 246 No 19 
dead . In either section, a diagnosis of 
death requires that both cessation of 
funrtions, as set forth in subsection 1, 
Clnrl irre\·ersibilitv, as set forth in 
subsertion 2, be demonstrated . 
A. An indhidual "ith irre.\ersible ces-
!iatiun uf circulator~ and respirator~· 
functions is dead. 
1. Cessation is recognized by an 
appropriate clinical examination. 
Clinical examination will disclose 
at least the absence of responsive-
ness, heartbeat, and respiratory ef-
fort. ~1edical circumstances rna~· re-
quire the use of confirmatory tests, 
such as an ECG. 
2. lrrel·ersibility is recognized by per-
sistent cessation of functions during an 
appropriate period of obsenation and/or 
trial of therapy. 
In clinical situations where death is 
expected, where the course has been 
gradual, and where irregular agonal 
respiration or heartbeat finally 
ceases, the period of observation fol-
lowing the cessation may be only the 
few minutes required to complete the 
examination. Similarly, if resuscita-
tion is not undertaken and ventricu· 
lar fibrillation and standstill develop 
in a monitored patient, the required 
period of obser\·ation thereafter rna~· 
be as short as a few mintues. When a 
possible death is unobsen•ed, unex-
pected, or sudden, the examination 
rna~· need to be more detailed and 
repeated over a longer period, while 
appropriate resuscitative effort is 
maintained as a test of cardiovascular 
responsiveness. Diagnosis in indiddu-
als who are first observed with rigor 
mortis or putrefaction may require 
only the observation period necessary 
to establish that fact. 
si\·ity. Medical circumstances rna 
require the use of confirmatory stuc 
ies such as an EEG or blood-flo• 
study. 
b. brain stem functions are absent. 
Reliable testing of brain stem r1 
flexE-s requires a percepti\'E' and t>Xpf 
rienced physician using adequa1 
stimuli. Pupillary light, corneal. ocL 
locephalic, oculo\·estibular, oroph~ 
ryngeal, and respiratory 1apneaJ r1 
flexes should be tested. When the~ 
reflexes cannot be adequately a! 
sessed, confirmatory tests are recon 
mended. 
Adequate testing for apnea is ver 
important. An accepted method : 
ventilation with pure oxygen or a 
o,.·ygen and carbon dioxide mixtur 
for ten minutes before withdrawal c 
the ventilator, followed b~· passh 
flow of oxygen . (This procedut 
allows PaC02 to rise without hazarc 
ous h~·poxia. ) Hn>ercarbia adequate: 
stimulates respiratory effort withi 
30 seconds when Paco: is greater tha 
60 mm Hg. A ten-minute period c 
apnea is usually sufficient to attai 
this level of hypercarbia. Testing c 
arterial blood gases can be used 1 
confirm this le\·el. Spontane01: 
breathing efforts indicate that part c 
the brain stem is functioning. 
Peripheral nervous system activit 
and spinal cord reflexes rna~· persh 
after death. True decerebrate o 
decorticate posturing or seizures ar 
inconsistent with the diagnosis c 
death. 
2. lrr~versibility is recognized whe 
e'·aluation discloses findings of a and 
and c: 
a. The cause of coma is establishe 
and is sufficient to account for the loss c 
B. An indh·idua l with irreversible ces- brain functions, and .•. 
sation of a ll functions of the entire brain, Most difficulties with the determ' 
including the brain stem, is dead. The nation of death on the basis of neurc 
"functions of the entire brain" that logical criteria ha,·e resulted fror 
are rele,·ant to the diagnosis are inadequate attention to this basi 
..ih..2Sf... that are clinically ascert.ailc_ __diagD.D.stic..pr.erequisite.Jn additian..t 
able. Where indicated, the clinical a carefu clinical examination an 
diagnosis is subject to confirmation investigation of history, rele,·an 
by laborator~\' tests, as described in ·nowledge of causation rna~· b 
the following portions of the text. acquired by computed tomographi 
Consultation with a ph~·sician experi- scan, measurement of core tempera 
enc·ed in this diagnosis is advisable. ture, drug screeninr,r. EEG, angiogra 
J. C1•ssatiun is reco:.:nized" 1en e1a u· phy, or other proredures. 
ation disclose!. findin::s of a and b: b. the possibilit~ of reco,er~ of an 
a. Cen•hral functions are absent, and brain functions i~ excluded. and ... 
Tl: o·rt· mu~t h, dt.tl'jl c<•m;,, that is. 
c-en·h~: .l unren'J•ti\·it ~ and llll rf'!' ]'On · 
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Th E> most important re·; f>rs ilole con 
ditions are ~t·<.L t inn, l'::: ;)ot!w rm i:J 
nt•uromuscular h'nC'k3d t' . and :;:hork 
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In 1: •· \1!!11:- l:a : t·ir, arn,;tanl't ' 11 ht-re a 
~lit! : ,·i,•nt t ' ,l ll ~•· rannot ht> estah-
li,_!:, -.:. trn·· ··r-:ihili:~· ean Ill' rt>liai11.1· 
ir:f, · :·:···~l .. nl~ :i!'tt•r extt•n,;in• t":alua-
tittt : :· .. r d ru:.: int .. \it·atiun .. •'l:tended 
o\,,.,.~ ·. :uion .. tnd otlwr testin)!. :\ 
dt•lt'!"lllinatiun that bloorJ tlow tO thP 
hrai 1 is ab:-:t>nt t·an he used to ciPmon-
"' r:d• · a ..,q !lic' it•n1 and il'rc'\"t'I"Sihlt• 
c. the ce!tsatiun of all brain functions 
pcr'i~ls fur :m appropriate period of 
oh!>tenation and/or trial of therapy. 
Ewn when coma is known to ha\'e 
started at an t>arlier time, the absence 
of all brain functions must be estab-
li.:hett h~ an expPrienced physician 
at the initiation of the observation 
pt>riL'd. The duration of observation 
periods is a matter of clinical judg-
mt:'nt. and some phrsidans recom-
mend shortt'r or longer periods than 
tho!'t' j!ivPn ht>re . 
Except for patients with drug 
intoxication . hypothermia, young age, 
or shock, medical centers with sub-
stantial experience in diagnosing 
tlea t h neurologically report no cases 
of hrain functions returning following 
a six-hour cessation, documented by 
clinical examination and confirmato-
rr EEG. In the absence of confirma-
tory tests, a period of observation of 
at least 12 hours is recommended 
when an irreversible condition is well 
established. For anoxic brain damage 
where the extent of damage is more 
difficult to ascertain, observation for 
~.t hours is generally desirable. In 
anoxic injury, the observation period 
may hP reduced if a test shows cessa-
tion of cerebral blood flow or if an 
EEG shows electrocerebral silence in 
an adult patient without drug intoxi-
cation, hypothermia, or shock. 
Confirmation of clinical findings by 
EEG is dPsirable when objective doc-
uml!ntation is needed to substantiate 
t ht· c inical fintlin)!s . Electrocerebral 
silt•nt·t- verities irreversible loss of 
~Ftie-al- funefions.-e;oeeept ffi pa-tients-
with drug intoxication or hypother-
mia. l!mportant technical details are 
provit!Prl in ":\linimal Technical Stan -
dartb for EEG Rt>cording in Sus-
(>t't'tl•d CerPbral neath" [Guidelines in 
EE(; J:•.,IJ. Atlanta, American ElPc-
t rnPnn•phalocraphic SociPty, 1980. 
~·· l' t i .. r. ·1. pp 19-:!.t ].1 WhPn joinl'd 
., it h tilt' clin it·al lindinf,!s of ahsenl 
i·t· 11n - · Prn funl"l i••ns, elt:'etrot·t>rebr:d 
. ;), .•:••· c·qnfirm:-: tht> cliaf,!no;:i:-;. 
f\•n: l' lt'tt• ("l'~..;at i on of l' irc .::ation to 
tht' no)rnwtht'rm it• adult h; ain i•Jr 
nlllrl' tha n tt•n minutP;: i,; tnc·.,mpati-
h ,. 1•.it h ;:un·i,·al of bra :~. ti,;suC'. 
nlll'll fl1 t•ntation ot' thi;: rir l'ulatury 
failurP i~ tht>rt•for·p el·iclt•nt·t· qf dt•ath 
()f thP t'ntire brain . Four-1·p,;~ .. intra-
aanial angiography is rlt'fir.l! il"e for 
diagn .. ~inJ.! rt·ssatiun of' t·irru ation to 
thl• t>ntire brain 1hoth cerebrum and 
posterior· fo:>sat hut entails suh:>tan-
tial practical difficulties anrl risks. 
Tests are available that assess circu-
lation only in the cerebral hemi-
:>pheres, namely radioisotope bolus 
cerebral angiography and gamma 
camera imaging with rad ioi:>otope 
cerebral angiograph~· . Without com-
plicating conditions, absent cerebral 
blood flow as measured by these tests, 
in conjunction with the clinical deter-
mination of cessation of all brain 
functions for at least six hours, is 
diagnostic of death. 
COMPLICATING CONDITIONS 
A. Drug and !\letabolic lntoxication.-
Drug intoxication is the most serious 
problem in the determination of 
death, especially when multiple drugs 
are used. Cessation of brain functions 
caused by the sedative and anesthetic 
drugs, such as barbiturates, benzodi-
azepines, meprobamate, methaqua-
lone, and trichloroethylene, may be 
completely reversible even though 
they produce clinical cessation of 
brain functions and electrocerebral 
silence. In cases where there is any 
likelihood of sedative presence, toxi-
cology screening for all likely drugs is 
required. If exogenous intoxication is 
found, death may not be declared 
until the intoxicant is metabolized or 
intracranial circulation is tested and 
found to have ceased. 
Total paralysis may cause unre-
sponsiveness, areflexia, and apnea 
that closely simulates rleath . Expo-
sure to drugs such as neuromuscular 
bl-oeking agents--or -ami-nogl;:coside-
antibiotics, and diseases like my-
asthenia gravis are usually apparent 
hy careful review of the histo ry . Pro-
lone:Pd paralysis after use of succinyl-
ehnline chloride and re lated drugs 
requires e\"aluation for pst> ucl(•t:holin-
Pst.•rase deficiPnc~· If thl're i:-; an~· 
qu t>~tinn, low-do,;e atropine "ti mula-
t i•.1n. ••lectromyogram, Jll• ripheral 
rwn·e "timulat iun, EEC; , t .. ~ t '> nr' 
in t racranial cirC'ulation. or ... , :,.nclt>d 
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,,h,_, ., ... :t: l ••n, a~ indit':llt•d , w= li m ;,i.,t-' 
tht• d i .. ..!• i u ... j..; c lt•ar . 
In .!r·.~-indutt·d cnm:i, EEf; al"ti·•i-
t~· m:.:. rPt ::rn 0r !Jt ' r~ i "t wh :!t· tlw 
pati,•nt J'l'rnain " llnr .. spon,;iH•. and 
tht•n•!on· thP EE(; may he an imJJor-
tant t''. a :uation a lonJ.! with e\ttnclt>d 
oh,;t•n·ation . If the F.EG show~ l'lt>r-
t rol't•rc•hral :-.i l,•nt'l' , ,hor latl'llr ~ ~lll­
ditor~· CJr somatosen!>ory-eYol.l'd po-
tt•ntials may be used to test brain 
stem funt:tions, since these potentials 
are unlikely to be affected by drugs. 
Some severe illnesses (eg, hepatic 
encephaiopathy, hyperosmolar coma, 
and preterminal uremia 1 can cause 
deep coma. Before irreversible cessa-
tion of hrain funct ions can he deter-
mined, metabolic abnormalities 
should be considered and, if possible, 
corrected. Confirmatory tests of cir-
culation or EEG may be necessary. 
B. H~pothermia.-Criteria for reli-
able recognition of death are not 
a\·ailable in the presence of hypother-
mia (below 32.2 oc core temperature). 
The ,·ariables of cerebral circulation 
in hypothermic patients are not suffi-
ciently well studied to know whether 
tests of absent or diminished circula-
tion are confirmatory. Hypothermia 
can mimic brain death by ordinary 
clinical criteria and can protect 
against neurological damage due to 
hypoxia. Further complications arise 
since hypothermia also usually pre-
cedes and follows death . If these 
complicating factors make it unclear 
whether an indi,·idual is ali\·p, the 
only a\·ailable measure to resoh·e the 
issue is to restore normothermia. 
H:rpothermia-is not a common cause 
of difficulty in the determination of 
death. 
C. Children.-The brains of infants 
and young children hal"e incrPased 
rPsistance to damage anrl rna~· reco,·er 
substantial functions e\·Pn after ex-
hibiting unresponsiYene:>s on nt?uro-
logical examination for longer periods 
-com pared-------wi-th-adu-lts. -Fh ,\ s i cia us-
should be particularly cautious in 
applying neurological criteria to de-
termine rleath in children younger 
than 5 ~·pars . 
D. Shock.-Physicians should al:>o 
he partieularl~· cautious in ap)'l~· ing 
neut·olo)!ical criteria to dt>tt•rmint• 
de:llh in patit->nts in shock bt't':l ll"'' the 
t' f' cluction in cerPhral circulat ion l'a n 
r•·ndt•r l' i!n ic·all"\am ina inn a nd laho-
ralo1rY It'"'' unrt> liahlt-> . 
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UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, SAN FRANCISCO 
BERKELEY • DAVIS • IRVINE • LOS ANGELES • RIVERSIDE • SAN DIEGO • SAN FRANCISCO SANTA BARBARA • SANTA CRUZ 
SCHOOL OF MEL>ICINE 
DEPARTMENT OF MEDICINE 
Ollie Speraw, Chairman 
Senate Select Committee on Anatomical 
Transplants 
Room 4082, State Capitol 
Sacramento, CA 95814 
Dear Senator Speraw: 
SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA 94143 
September 14, 1984 
I received a copy of your letter and news release concerning Tuesday•s 
hearing on brain death and organ donation from Joseph Spinelli, Director of 
the UCSF Animal Care Facility. Frankly, I am quite disturbed that you find 
the California Determination of Death Act 11 Vague and ill-defined 11 and a poten-
tial source of 11 error and confusion. 11 
The current statute of the California Health and Safety Code (7180) reads 
as fallows: 
11 An individual who has sustained either (1) irreversible cessation 
of circulatory and respiratory functions, or (2) irreversible cessa-
tion of all functions of the entire brain, including the brain stem, 
is dead. A determination of death must be made in accordance with 
accepted medical standards .... " 
This phrasing is identical to the uniform statute proposed by the President•s 
Commission for the Study of Ethical Problems in Medicine, the American Bar 
Association, the American Medical Association and the National Conference 
of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws. 
The document of the President•s Commission entitled Defining Death 
explains at length why this definition is adequate from an ethical and legal 
point of view. Therefore, no further amendment should be undertaken at this 
- - -ti-me-;- -As a member·---uf the President•s Comm1sslon, rrecommend this document 
to you. You may obtain it from the U.S. Government Printing Office, Library 
of Congress #81-600150. 
cc: Oscar Salvatierra, M.D. 
Lawrence Pitts, M.D. 
Franklin Jacobson 
Susan Hopper, RN, MSN 
Joseph Spinelli, DVM 
GenroP Wil~nn M n 
~/Zf.l?. 
4~t R. Jansen, 
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Professor of Ethics in Medicine 
Chief, Division of Medical Ethics 
STANFORD UNIVERSITY MEDICAL CENTER 
THOMAS A. RAFFIN, M.D. 
Assistant Professor of Medicine (Respiratory) 
Assistant Chief of Medicine 
Medical Director, Respiratory Therapy 
Room C356 • (415) 497·6381 
September 13, 1984 
Senator Ollie Speraw 
Chairman, Senate Select Committee 




Sacramento, CA. 95814 
Dear Honorable Senator Speraw: 
STANFORD, CALIFORNIA 94305 
Dr. Lewis Wexler referred you to me concerning the question when does brain 
death actually and legally occur? I have included for your information one 
of the most important references in the medical literature and it is entitled 
GUIDELINES FOR THE DETERMINATION OF DEATH: REPORT OF THE MEDICAL CONSULTANTS 
ON THE DIAGNOSIS OF DEATH TO THE PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION FOR THE STUDY OF 
ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN MEDICINE AND BIOMEDICAL AND BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH. This 
outstanding document reflects my opinions and is referenced frequently when 
discussing this issue during the practice of medicine. 
To briefly summarize: 1) The criteria in this article should be used to determine 
brain death; 2) Brain death is legal death; 3) If a brain dead individual 
is transported into the State of California for any reason (for example, 
for consideration of use of one of his organs in a transplantation operation) 
no governmental or judicial official should have any jurisdiction over the 
body unless a crime has been committed. In other words, a local coroner 
should absolutely have no jurisdiction when such a body is transported into 
California. The physicians taking care of the patient should supervise the 
proceedings. 4) When brain death has been certified in another state and 
a patient is being transported into California, then clearly the California 
physician must evaluate the patient and make sure the diagnosis is correct. 
No legal reaffirmation involving any governmental or judicial body should 
be invotved. Again, this is a straight-forward and normal activity for a 
physician and bureaucratic meddling can only serve to complicate the process, 
delay it, and possibly place a potential transplant recipient's life into 
jeopardy. If a governmental or judicial official believes a crime is being 
committed, then action should be taken. 
-71-
Senator Ollie Speraw 
September 13, 1984 
Page 2 
I hope I have been of assistance to you. If you have any further questions 
please don•t hesitate to get in touch with me. With warm regards. 
Sincerely, 
~f(ajf 
Thomas A. Raffin, M.D. 
Assistant Chief of Medicine 
TAR/kls 
Enc. 
cc: Lewis Wexler, M.D. 
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Chairman 




Sacramento, California 95814 
Dear Senator Speraw: 
·' 
11 September 1984 
Mr. Tom Harlan, our associate administrator at Pacific Medical 
Center in San Francisco, has forwarded to me a copy of your 
letter to him for comment. 
I am a clinical neurologist and the chairman of the department 
at Pacific Medical Center. The concept of brain death is, of 
course, something I deal with on a constant basis and one with 
which I am concerned as far as legislation goes. 
At present, I think most neurologists are quite happy with the 
California law on brain death. It does not set criteria and 
this is highly desirable. In fact, the law has been praised in 
medical journals for this very reason. The criteria for the 
pronouncement of brain death have evolved over a period of 
years. To some degree they will probably still evolve. It 
would therefore not be desirable to lock into law criteria from 
which we would then have to deviate as capabilities to accurately 
recognize brain death change. 
As an example, the Harvard criteria of 1968 were too rigid and 
it was soon recognized that they could be liberalized. I think 
in essence the present law is quite satisfactory and need not 
--·-----·-------be- -Ghanged. ------------·------------
When brain death is pronounced, I think like any other pronounce-
ment of death, it can be accepted as legal death. 
I can't really comment on when a local coroner should have juris-
diction in a body that is transported over the state line. How-
ever, if brain death has been certified in another state by 
competent physicians, I think that this should be acceptable to 
the physician who is harvesting the kidneys. What they do need, 
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Senator Ollie Speraw 
9/11/84 
Page 2 
however, is a copy of the doctor's note which allowed him to 
conclude that brain death was present. If that is not satis-
factory to the harvesting surgeon, then he should have a local 
opinion obtained. 
I hope this is of help to you in your hearings. 
Sincerely, . 
--\-- J -( -- ( \~ --r ,~\:: ·-.c ·, · \ ;,_· __ - c, _ l 
Phiiip R. Callnchini 1 t-1..D. 
PRC:da 
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NATIONAL KIDNEY FOUNDATION, INC. 
2 Park Avenue, New York, N.Y. 10016 • (212) 889-2210 
August 21, 1984 
Senator Ollie Sperow 
Chairman, Senate Select Committee 
on Anatomical Transplants 
Room 4082, State Capitol 
Sacramento, CA 95814 
Dear Senator Sperow: 
Please reply to: 
David A. Ogden, M.D. 
Renal Section 
University of Arizona 
College of Medicine 
1501 North Campbell Avenue 
Tucson, AZ 85724 
Thank you for· the invitation to testify concerning California 
legislation concerning brain death in the September 18th hearing. 
Unfortunately, a prior commitment for this date precludes my 
appearing to testify at this hearing. · 
I am enclosing an article you may find available. As you can 
see, brain death is a legal basis of declaring death by statute 
in 25 states and based on court decisions in 7 additional states . 
Medical criteria for brain death are well defined and accepted 
now by all appropriate medical organizations. This would seem to 
respond to your first two questions. In response to your third 
and fourth questions, if death has already been pronounced and a 
cadaver is transported to California for transplant surgery, the 
cadaver is exactly that - a cadaver. I see no need for a local 
coroner to have jurisdiction or for a California doctor to recertify 
death unless the same is required for a cadaver shipped from another 
state to California for burial. 
Finally, Oscar Salvatierra, M.D., Chief of Transplant Surgery at 
the University of California San Francisco, is expert in these 
matters and would be an excellent resource person for your committee. 
r:J:!JoqJL 






"flitch" People v. Hitch (1974) 12 Cal 3d 641 
"Nations" People v. Nations (1980) 26 Cal 3d 176 
See also People v. Mejia (1976) 56 CalApp 3d 574 
Peoule v. Goss (1980) 109 CalApp 3d 457 
(per Boyd Stevens) 
"13owmun" In re Bowman (1980) 619 Pac Rptr 2d 731 
"Dority" Dority v. Superior Court (1983) 145 Cal App 3d 273 
- ---- - ---- -
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